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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
Whether the State of Utah recognizes the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence.

STATEMENT OP THE CASE
NOTE: These respondents agree with the briefs filed by
respondents, Ainsworth and Staker. No attempt will be made to
repeat the points made in those briefs. Ratherf this brief will
focus only on points not covered by other respondents, including the
wisdom of the decision in Hal 1 aday v^> Cl_uf f, 685 P. 2d 500, which
drastically altersf to the point of oblivion, the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence.
This case involves rural farmland which has had fences and
irrigation ditches marking property lines for the last 75 to 100
years.

The fence lines do not now correspond with surveys performed

in the last fifteen years.

According to present surveys, the

property lines should be approximately eighty feet to the south.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The doctrine set out in past Utah Supreme Court cases, and
perpetuated in Halladay v. Cluff, for resolving boundary line
disputes, confuses the doctrines of "boundary by acquiescence" with
the doctrine of "boundary by agreement."

Adopting the criteria of

"boundary by agreement" and making it an element of "boundary by

1

acquiescence" deals the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence a
fatal blow in the State of Utah.
It is incumbent upon this Court to differentiate between
the doctrine of "boundary by agreement" and "boundary by
acquiescence" and put an end to the confusion which has existed in
this State in somef but not allf cases since Tripp v. Bag!ey, 74
Utah 57 f 276 P. 912 (1928).

ARGUMENT

I
THE SOURCE OP THE PROBLEM
The year 1984 was a watershed year in this State for Utah
Supreme Court cases dealing with boundary dispute resolution.

In

May, Hal l_aday y\L_Cluf f, 685 P. 2d 500 , was decided finally adding,
in no uncertain terms, the element of "objective uncertainty or
dispute" to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.

Four months

later, in Stratford^y. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, and Pajj^ons__v^_
Anderson, 690 P.2d 535, the Utah Supreme Court decided two more
cases using "objective uncertainty or dispute" as the criteria for
boundary by acquiescence disputes.
Appellant, who had known of the boundary problem on his
property since 1972 when he purchased the property and had a survey
performed, saw his chance to claim additional property and forced
this matter into litigation.

Of the six parties involved herein,
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Appellant's appeal was for the entire decision of the

District Court and an appellant is stuck with the facts involving
all property owners, not just the property line between its property and the Ainsworths, as it asserts in its' brief.
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A. Boundary by Agreement
S 78. By Parol Agreement.
It is now a well-settled principle of law that an
unascertained or disputed boundary line dividing
the lands of adjoining owners may be permanently
and irrevocably established by a parol agreement of
the adjoining owners. Such an agreement does not
originate or create a line or pass title to real
estate; it simply serves to fix the true location
between contiguous lands of a boundary line about
which there is dispute; hence the agreement is not
in contravention of the statute of frauds. It is,
however, essential to the validity and binding
effect of such agreement that the boundary line
fixed by the agreement be definite, certain, and
clearly marked, and that it be made by the
adjoining landowners with reference to an uncertain
or disputed boundary line between their lands. * * *
§ 79.—Necessity for dispute or uncertainty
concerning location of line.
One of the requisites necessary to the validity of
a parol agreement establishing a boundary line
between adjoining owners is that the location of the
true line sought to be thus established be doubtful,
uncertain, or in dispute. If the line is not
disputed, indefinite, or uncertain, a parol agreement
changing its location is within the statute of
frauds.
B. Boundary by Acquiescence
§ 85. Acquiescence, generally.
It is well established that if adjoining landowners
occupy their respective premises up to a certain line
which they mutually recognize and acquiesce in for a
long period of time—usually the time prescribed by
the statute of limitations—they are precluded from
claiming that the boundary line thus recognized and
acquiesced in is not the true one. In other words,
such recognition of, and acquiescence in, a line as
the true boundary line, if continued for a sufficient
length of time, will afford a conclusive presumption
that the line thus acquiesced in is the true boundary
line. This is a rule of repose for the purpose of
quieting titles and discouraging confusing and
vexatious litigation. According to many decisions,
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recognition o f , and acquiescence in, a line as the
true boundary line in order to establish that line
as the true line must continue for the period f
time necessary to establish title under the
statutes of l i m i t a t i o n , o r , at l e a s t , for L
period of acquiescence fixed by a special statute
as sufficient to establish a boundary line, mv**rule, h o w e v e r , is based upon p o l i c y , and
c i r c u m s t a n c e s may exist which •* " 1 ~ control the
ordinary requirement \. ^ a line be recognized a.iu
acquiesced in for a p e : L O G of time equal to that of
the statute of limitations. Thu- •., ^presentati-"
as to the boundary line or conveyance made with tue
intent to describe a boundary marked and located on
the ground, followed by acquiescence therein for
less than the statutory p e r i o d , prevent the parties
from,, claiming a different ] ine thereafter,
With regard to the establishment of a commo?
boundary l i n e , acquiescence means a consent to the
conditions and involves knowledge of them. It
involves more than a mere establishment of a line
by one party and the taking of p o s s e s s i o n by him.
There must be knowledge on the part of the other
party of the establishment of the line and the
taking of possession by the adjoining o w n e r , and
there must be assent t h e r e t o , and this may be shown
by the conduct of the second p a r t y , by his w o r d s f
r*r &\?&r>. hv hie QJ ] ence.
Acquiescence may,- of" c o u r s e , be'"shown . ; ... i. „,.
p o s s e s s i o n of the o w i lers up to the l i n e , 01 it -^v
consist of acts or declarations recognizing th*
line over the necessary period. But the line
acquiesced in must be k n o w n , d e f i n i t e , and certain
or known and capable of ascertainment
--H~
parties agree that the line to which
not the true line and agree subseque:^^. L ascertain the true boundary, the quality oi:
acquiescence is destroyed and no boundary 3 f. i xed
by continued o c c u p a t i o n ,
The cases approving the doctrine of acquiescence
generally do not differentiate between cases where
the boundary was uncertain or in doubt at \ne t .•e
it was first acquiesced in and cases where it was
known and c e r t a i n . However, in the second c a s e r
only adverse possession can. avail the person
c 1 a i m i n g u n d e r t h e bo 11 n d a i: y s o recognized.

7

As noted in the last paragraph quoted above, the section
on Acquiescence refers to "cases" in which boundaries are
"uncertain or in doubt at the time it was first acquiesced in."
There is only one citation given for that whole paragraph and that
citation is Tripp y. BagjL e g*

74

Utah 57, 276 P 912, which started

the confusion in Otah in the first place.
In short, boundary by agreement involves a situation in
which the location of the true boundary between two adjoining
tracts of land is unknown, uncertain or in dispute, and the owners,
by parol agreement, establish the boundary line, and thereby
irrevocable bind themselves and their grantees.

See Brcwn^j^

Milliner, 323 P.2d 202, 206 (Utah 1951); see also Rydalch v.
Anderson, 37 Utah 99, 107 P.25; Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P.
912.
Boundary by acquiescence involves a situation in which:
(1) adjoining landowners, (2) have occupied respective premises up
to an open boundary line visibly marked by monuments, fences or
buildings, (3) for a long period of time, and (4) have mutually
recognized it as a dividing line between them.

See B^own^v^

Milliner, supra, and Holmes v. Jud^e, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009.

IV
THE ABSENCE OP AN ADVERSE POSSESSION REMEDY
The problem with adding the standard of "objective uncertainty and/or dispute" to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence

8

is further compounded in this State by the fact that Utah does not
havef either by statute or common law, a provision for parties to
make a claim to property by reason of long-term adverse possession.
Our statute is short-term (seven years) and requires the payment of
property taxes—which rarely occurs.

(See UCA § 78-12-12.)

Adverse possession has not been claimed herein by either
appellant or respondents because none can claim the possession of
the property and the payment of property taxes.
What is lacking in the legal framework in the State of
Utah in this particular situation, created by the doctrine
enunciated in Hal1a<3ayy is: (1) the ability to claim adverse
possession to fence lines by a party in possession even though
possession has been open and notorious for a long period of time,
and/or (2) the ability to claim acquiescence in a property linef
without having to also show there was once a dispute as to the line.

V
THE PROBLEM OP "TIME" PROPOSED BY THE
"OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY OR DISPUTE" STANDARD
A.

Impossibility of Proof.
Using the property occupied by respondents Holmes/Jensen

and Shane typifies the problem of impossibility.
purchased by Mr. Hyrum Lancaster in 1889.

9

This property was

His grandsonf Melvin A.

Lancaster, stated in his affidavit that the fence lines between the
Holmes/Jensen/Shane property and the Staker property were erected
by his grandfather and are presently located in the same place they
were that he remembers as a child in the 1920s.

(R. 75.)

The

fence was erected in the 1890s (as was the house presently occupied
by Shane). (R. 120.)

Determining whether there was any uncertainty

or dispute as to these fence lines when they were erected in 1890s
would require testimony of Hyrum Lancaster.

Were he alive today,

he would be 135 years old (b. October 8 f 1852f d. August 5, 1941).
Halladay requires the party attempting to establish boundary by
acquiescence to have the burden of proving there was uncertainty or
dispute as to the boundary line and that it was resolved in favor
of the fence. (At 506-507.)

To do so in the potential

Holmes/Jensen/Shane dispute with Staker (should the district
court's decision be reversed) this case would require our raising
the dead.
By its very nature, any uncertainty or dispute with regard to a
property line will be oral.

Property owners then resolve the

dispute, orally, at a predetermined point.

For the law to require

anyone to prove an oral agreement of anyone nearly 100 years ago is
simply absurd.

(The old English system of "feoffment with livery

of seisin" for transfer of property actually has some superior
aspects to the requirement imposed in Halladay.

At least with

livery of seisin the law required the presence of assembled
neighbors who might be prospective jurors to witness the event in
case of a future title dispute.)
10

B.

Reasonably Available Survey Information.
The Halladay case states:
In general, when survery information is
reasonably available (such as when reliable
survey control points are accessible to the
land and survey costs are not disproportionate
to the value of the land) so that it is
reasonable to expect the parties to locate
their boundary on the ground by surveysf the
courts should be less willing to apply the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. This
reasonable availability of survey information
obviously varies from place to place and from
time to time. Howeverf it can be said in
general that survey information is more
available and its cost is less likely to be
disproportionate in relation to the value of
the land in the city and platted areas than in
rural or wilderness areas. (At 504.)
Again, the case raises the question of time.

In the

present case is the survey information to be reasonably available in
1889 when Lancaster bought the property or 1985 when this suit was
filed?

Should the trial court take testimony as to the relative

cost of surveys in the relation to the value of the land in 1889?
According to the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's Officer
Mr. Lancaster paid $275 for forty acres of land in 1889.

Is that

information helpful?

C. Rural or Urban.
The Halladay case further imposes the requirement of
determining whether the land is rural or urban for purposes of
reasonably available survey information.
matter of time.

Againf the question is a

Does this refer to when the fence was installed or

11

at some later date, presumably when the property changes hands?
In 1889 the land was a rural and today all the property in
question herein is still used for farming purposes.

However,

kitty-corner across the freeway to the southeast of the subject
properties one of the largest shopping malls in the State of Utah
was completed.

Does the court want evidence as to whether that

constitutes the property presently being rural or urban?
D. Repose.
The issue of boundary lines among the properties involved
herein remained dormant from the time it was first discovered by
appellant in 1972 until 1984—the year of Halladay et al.
A basic reason for applying the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence is that it avoids litigation.

This point has been well

made by this court in the case of Baum_j^L_DeJEar 525 P.2d 725:
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence derives
from the realization, ancient in our law, that
peace and good order of society is best served by
leaving at rest possible disputes over long
established boundaries. Its essence is that where
there has been any type of a recognizable physical
boundary, which has been accepted as such for a
long period of time, it should be presumed that any
dispute or disagreement over the boundary has been
reconciled in some manner. (At 726.)
The second reason for the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence is that it minimizes conflict with the
frauds.

statute of

See Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726, 728 Utah 1981); Tripp v.

Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 71-72, 276 P. 912, 917-918 (1928).
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Applying the rational of Halladay to the issue of repose
in the present case is indicative of the fact that Halladay will do
anything but let sleeping dogs lie.

If the decision is expecting

resposef it is asking homeowner (Shane) who now has a property line
running through the middle of his house to sit quietly by and
accept the fatef and the Yocum's to move out of their house
entirely.

It is also asking respondents Holmes and Jensen to give

up one and one-half acres they have had for thirty years, and asks
Holmes and Jensen, the Stakers, and the Ainsworths to construct new
fences and irrigation ditches, and award appallent one and one-half
acres he never thought he had and never used.

VI
THE DISSENTING VIEW
While justice Howe's dissent in Halladay, §tjcatfojcd_

and

Parsons is anything but passive, he sits as the lone wolf on the
bench on this issue.
Interestingly, in the four commentaries which have been
written on the matter since these cases were decided, Justice Howe
is anything but alone.

All articles have been unanimous in their

criticism that the cases "effectively sounds the death knell for
boundary by acquiescence in this state."
dissenting.

13

Stj^atf^r<3, supra, Howe, J.

The first article to appear was a 1984 BYU Law Review
article on page 711f entitled "Objective Uncertainty In Boundary By
Acquiescence:

Hal lad ay y_.L_Clu_ff. "

This article essentially takes

the position that the Halladay decision, rather than reducing
litigation, will increase litigation, "thus defeating the
traditional rational for boundary by acquiescence." (At 720.)
A 1985 Utah Law Review note under "Recent Developments,"
commenting on Halladay, Stratfc^rd and Parsojis, states:
These decisions effectively eliminate boundary by
acquiescence as a viable doctrine for settling
property disputes in Utah. As a result,
longstanding boundaries may now be subject to
challenge. (At 194.)
*

*

*

Since claimants in Utah cannot rely on the
doctrine of adverse possession to settle boundary
disputes, there is no effective way to quiet title
to small portions of land representing the
difference between a fence line and a deed
description. (At 201.)
This article also notes that "in contrast to the purpose of
the court, litigation over boundaries may increase."

(At 201.)

In 11 Journal of Comtemporary Law 567, an article entitled
"Hal1aday v. Cluff: 'Objective Uncertainty' In Deed!"

the author

states:
...and the new requirement of "objective uncertainty" as to the true location of the boundary line
makes the doctrine inapplicable to a great majority,

14

if not all, of the cases involving disputed
boundary locations. (At 567.)
*

*

*

In adopting the "objective uncertainty"
requirement as an element of boundary by
acquiescence, the Utah Supreme Court has further
confused one of the most troubled doctrines of
Utah law. The new objective uncertainty
standard, as Justice Howe stated in the Stratford
dissent, "effectively sounds the death knell of
boundary by acquiescence in this state. (At
581-582.)
*

*

*

In Halladay, the court turned conventional
thinking regarding boundary by acquiescence
upside down when it argued that the goals of
preventing litigation and strife could best be
served by adoption of the objective uncertainty
requirement. Because the conventional approach
outlined in Brown v. Milliner had served these
goals so well, the court should return to that
policy of clearly distinguishing boundary by
agreement and boundary by acquiescence.
(At 582.)
This article is an excellent review on how we got into the
quagmire we are in and analyzes the cases cited in Halladay.
A 1986 BYU Law Review article by Professor James H.
Backman, entitled "The Law of Practical Location of Boundaries and
the Need for an Adverse Possession Remedy," is a thoughtful
discussion of the boundary problem in Utah as it has developed.
With regard to boundary by acquiescence, Professor Backman states:
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The Utah Supreme Court has eliminated an
important doctrine in its arsenal for
reaching equitable results in cases based on
possession. It may not be fully satisfied
with the announced principles and the
apparently inconsistent results flowing from
the old doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
But that liberality in applying this boundary
doctrine was justified because it was the
last route of escape for a party that had
exercised significant possessory claims to
property for substantial periods of time.
(At 981.)
Since all articles are so on point, and provide a thorough
analysis of the history of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
and boundary by agreement in this state, they are attached hereto
in the Appendix as Exhibits "D," "E, n "F" and "G."

VII
THE SOLUTION
Asking this court to retreat from a recently announced
legal principle is not made lightly.

However, it is made sensibly.

There is no question that this state has confused the
doctrine of boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence in
some cases prior to Halladay.

But it has not confused them in all

cases and just because it has confused the doctrines in some cases
does not mean we should perpetuate the confusion.

The Hal1aday,

Stratford and Parsons cases not only confuses the doctrines, it
completely obliterates them by merging the two together.
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The case of ^rown^j/^j^Ulin^r f 232 P. 2d 202, is a Utah
Supreme Court case which clearly differentiates between the
doctrines of boundary by acquiescence and boundary by agreement and
can be relied upon with clarity by this court as enunciating good,
clear, cogent law.

We should return to what was once clearly

stated legal principles.

The case of HoJjfnes_yj._^

31 Utah 269,

87 P. 1009, which is the first case to setforth the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence in this State also makes an excellent
statement as what the law should be.

There are other cases noted

in Justice Howe's dissents and the attached law review articles.
They should be followed.

CONCLUSION
Somehow, in 1928 in TrjLjpp y. §agl_ey, supra, this Court
merged the doctrines of boundary by acquiescence and boundary by
agreement.

It has caused considerable confusion since, but worst

of all it was perpetuated in 1984 in Halladay v. Cluff;, Stratford
^-Jl^ISA1!'

anc

continue.

The doctrines are clear and distinct and are viable

^

Par

SQn.s_ _Y* _A n .4 erso _ n *

There is no reason it should

doctrines which can be followed for the peace and good order of
society in maintaining stability in the ownership and occupation of
lands.

The reason for their existence in the Common Law has not

vanished with time.
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Mack HALLADAY and Merle Halladay,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Madge CLUFF, Perry K. Bigelow and
Norma G. Bigelow, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 18032.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 1, 1984.

In a boundary dispute, the Fourth District Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif,
J., sustained defendants' ownership of disputed tract under doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence, and record owners of the
tract appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks,
J., held that: (1) with regard to requirements that there must be uncertainty or
dispute over location of boundary before
claim based on boundary by acquiescence
can be maintained, existence of dispute or
uncertainty should be measured against objective test of reasonableness, so that dispute is not proved by mere difference of
opinion, and uncertainty is not proved by
mere lack of actual knowledge of true location of the boundary; (2) where boundary
dispute involves property in city for which
survey information is readily available, party claiming boundary by acquiescence has
burden of proving objective uncertainty as
one of the prima facie elements of the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence; and
(3) defendants failed to establish applicability of doctrine of boundary by acquiescence,
where defendants had ready access to
deeds and had actually examined surveys
clearly establishing plaintiffs' record title
to property in dispute.

1. Boundaries <£»48(3)
Period of acquiescence required fur rw
liance on a "boundary by acquiescence1*]
depends on the circumstances of the partitt
ular case, but only under unusual circunw
stances would period be less than 20 years*
2. Boundaries <s=>48(2)
For purposes of rule that doctrine of
"boundary by acquiescence" cannot be applied where there is no dispute or uncertainty concerning location of the boundary,
"dispute" is not proved by a mere difference of opinion, and "uncertainty" is not
proved by a mere lack of actual knowledge
of the true location of the boundary; "dispute or uncertainty" should be measured
against an objective test of reasonableness,
rather than against a subjective test under
which a boundary line could be uncertain or
in dispute even though capable of being
readily ascertained; rejecting Ekberg v.
Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 and
Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110 Utah 523,
175 P.2d 718.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

with di-

3. Boundaries «=»48(2)
Under doctrine of "boundary by acquiescence," property line shown on record
title cannot be displaced by another boundary unless it is shown that during the period of acquiescence there was some objectively measurable circumstance in the
record title or in the reasonably available
survey information, or other technique by
which record title information was located
on the ground, that would have prevented a
landowner, as a practical matter, from being reasonably certain about the true location of the boundary; by the same token, a
claimant cannot assert boundary by acquiescence if he or his predecessors in title
had reason to know the true location of the
boundary during the period of acquiescence.

Howe, J., filed an opinion concurring
and dissenting.

4. Boundaries «=»48(2)
Examples of objectively measurable
uncertainties in location of boundary, based

Reversed
rections.

and

remanded
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doctrine of boundary by acquiesi^would be appropriate if the doctrine's
r requirements were met, are: inability
ate monuments established in original
internal inconsistencies in plat, no
I or original plat or survey by which
line could be located, disagreeDt among different surveyors on locaof boundary line, landmarks referin deeds that have disappeared, untitles or disputes created by conflictterms in deeds, such as overlapping
ption, or metes and bounds descripjpns that do not close; boundary by acquiscence should also be available where
iere are other inconsistencies that create
reasonable doubt in the meaning of the
ord title or in its application to the actuon-the-ground location of the property
ntified in the record.
% Boundaries e=>33
I: Where boundary dispute involves property in city for which survey information is
readily available, party claiming boundary
by acquiescence has burden of proving objective uncertainty about the location of the
boundary as one of the prima facie elements of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence; rejecting Brown v. Milliner,
120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202; Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224; Universal InvestmentCorp. v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35,
484 P.2d 173; King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d
135, 378 P.2d 893; Mortzkus v. Carroll, 7
Utah 2d 237, 322 P.2d 391.
6. Boundaries <3=»48(2)
Notwithstanding allocation to party
claiming boundary by acquiescence of burden of proof of objective uncertainty as one
of the prima facie elements of the doctrine
of boundary of acquiescence, record landowner may conclusively negate the existence of objective uncertainty by proving
that the claimant or his predecessors in
title had reason to know the location of the
true boundary before the expiration of the
period of acquiescence.
7. Boundaries «=>48(2)
Claimants failed to establish applicability of doctrine of boundary by acquies-

cence, where claimants had ready access to
deeds and had actually examined surveys
clearly establishing adjoining landowners'
record title to property in dispute.
Brent D. Young, Provo, for plaintiffs and
appellants.
M. Dayle Jeffs, Provo, for Cluff.
S. Rex Lewis, Provo, for Bigelow.
OAKS, Justice:
This is an appeal from a judgment relying on boundary by acquiescence to quiet
title to a 52.5- by 118-foot parcel of real
property in the city of Provo. The issues
are whether a showing of uncertainty or
dispute on the locationj)f a boundary line Js
necessary to the application of boundary by
acquiescence, and, if so, what is meant bjr
"uncertainty" and who has the^burden^ of
proving it
—~~
The property in issue is located in Provo
City and is shown as parcel A-B-OD on
the accompanying map. From 1930 to the
present, there has been a feMejtlongJjnes
E-A-B-K It extends approximately 52
feet behind the rear property lines (OD) of
lots 1 and 2. This extension apparently
resulted from an assumption that the 231foot depth of these lots was measured from
the edge of the street instead of from the
points across 100 South Street shown on
the legal descriptions.
The fence was clearly visible when the
Bigelows purchased lot 1 in 1947 and when
Cluff acquired lot 2 iiu!948. The Halladays acquired lot 3, which contains most of
the disputed parcel, in 1958. (They purchased lot 5 in 1950 and lot 4 in 1961.)
When the Bigelows and Cluff purchased
lots 1 and 2, they assumed their properties
extended to the back fence at line A-B.
Acting accordingly, they cultivated gardens
and built and maintained several chicken
coops on their respective portions of parcel
A-B-C-D. Bigelows^ had ajsurvey made in
1956 that placed their rear boundary near
Hne_ C-D, but they and Cluff apparently
believed the survey to be erroneous. In
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During the.period of their adjoining pi
erty ownership, the Halladays maintai
that Bigelows' and Cluffs true
Tl

1975, Cluff obtained a plat that placed her
rear boundary at line C-D.
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boundaries were at line C-D. Mr. Halla-_
day informed Mr Bigelow of Uus fact""on one occasion in the 1950s and told him not
to use the disputed parcel on several occasions in the 1970s. Halladays had no discussions with Cluff regarding the property
line until shortly before this litigation commenced. Halladays made very little use of
lot 3.
In 1979, the Halladays commenced this
suit to quiet title to parcel A-B-OD. The

Bigelows and Cluff counterclaimed, and the
district court sustained their ownership of
this parcel under the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence. On appeal, the Halladays
seek to overturn that decision on the basis
that boundary by acquiescence cannot b€
appliecTwhere there wasrio* dispute or" uncertainty concerning the location of the
boundary. We agree and reverse with directions to quiet title in the Halladays, the
record owners.
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UNCERTAINTY OR DISPUTE AS
INGREDIENT IN BOUNDARY
BY ACQUIESCENCE
he doctrine of boundary by, acquiesnce has been the jourcejof considerable
sion andj^jitroversy among judges,
wyers, and landowners in this state.
Kng~vrFr6nJc; 14 Utah'2d 135, 139, 378
]
2A 893, 895 (1963); Note, Boundary by
cquiescence, 3 Utah L.Rev. 504, 504
.953). See generally Note, Boundaries
fby Agreement and Acquiescence in Utah,
•1975 Utah LRev. 221. One of the primary
f§reas of confusion is the requirement of
foe "presence or absence of dispute and/or
[uncertainty as to boundary." King v.
\Fronky 14 Utah 2d at 139, 378 P.2d at 895.
f [1] Much of thecpnfusiojni^has^resulted
Ifromthe intermingling of rules governing
•boundary by acquiescence and boundaryjbj
-par^agr^m^nC*%nnot, 7 ^ . 1 T R 4th 53,

["69 USWlKTtfoflTof these doctrines identify
circumstances in which landowners can establish boundary lines without a written
agreement Originall^,_the two were easily
distinguishable because bouS3ary"by parol
igrwment^jrequired_an^ express,_parol
.agreement .with respect to a boundary but
no period of acquiescence, while boundary
by acquiescence jeguired a Jengthy period
of acquiescence but no express parol agreement Hummel v. Young, 1 Utah 2d 237,
239-40, 265 P.2d 410, 411 (1953); Brovm v.
Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 25, 232 P.2d 202,
207 (1951); Note, 1975 Utah L.Rev., supra,
at 224.1
With time, the distinctions between
boundary by agreement and boundary by
acquiescence became blurred. The requirement of an Express parol agreement began
to be articulated among the elements of
boundary by acquiescence, although this
Court said that "the law will imply an
agreement fixing the boundary as located,
if it can do so consistently with the facts
1. The period of acquiescence required for
boundary by acquiescence has not been quantified into an exact period of time; it depends on
the circumstances of the particular case. This
Court's most recent discussion identifies it as a
"long period of time . . . generally related to the
common law prescriptive period of 20 years;

appearing — " Hummel v. Young, 1
Utah 2d at 240, 265 P.2d at 411. Similarly,
the requirement of a long period of acquiescence was applied to boundary by agreement. Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp.,
Utah, 530 P.2d 792, 794 (1975); Blanchard
v. Smith, 123 Utah 119, 121, 255 P.2d 729,
730 (1953). J^j^qu^qpinions, the^Court
even referred to boundary by agreement
and boundary by acquiescence as if_they
had merged into one. See, e.g., Hobson v.
Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d at 794
(reference to "the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence or agreement"); Carter v.
Lindner, 23 Utah 2d 204, 460 P.2d 830
(1969) (reference to "boundary line by acquiescence under an oral agreement;");
Note, 1975 Utah L.Rev., supra, at 222-23.

The confusion stemming from the intermmgling of boundary by agreement and
boundary by acquiescence has carried over
to the subject of uncertainty pr_ dispute
over the_boundary. Originally, this was
mentionedj^ a.rjBquirementonly ir^ccjiriection with boundary_by agreement Rydalch v. Anderson, 37 Utah 99,lo9, 107 P.
25, 29 (1910). In that context, uncertainty
or dispute over the boundary would precede and provide the motivation for the
oral agreement In 1928, th^JSourt began
to refer to uncertainty or dispute ai~aT
m a t t e r ^ n ^ c o n s i d e i ^ J n boundary Jby
acquiescence, Tripp v. Bjxaley%7i Utah
"57T66^72, 276 P. 912, 916-liT (1928).
Thereafter, the opinions of this Court frequently referred to a showing of uncertainty or dispute as an essential ingredient in
the application of the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence. Madsen v. Clegg, Utah,
639 P.2d 726, 728-29 (1981); Leon v. Dansie, Utah, 639 P.2d 730, 731 (1981); Wright
v. Clissold, Utah, 521 P.2d 1224, 1226
(1974); Universal Investment Corp. v.
Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35, 37-38, 484 P.2d
173, 174-75 (1971); Glenn v. Whitney, 116
and only under unusual circumstances would a
lesser period be deemed sufficient." Hobson v.
Panguitch Lake Corp., Utah, 530 P.2d 792, 795
(1975) (10 years held insufficient). Accord King
v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 141-42, 378 P.2d 893,
897 (1963).
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Utah 267, 272-73, 209 P.2d 257, 260 (1949);
Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105
Utah 208, 219, 141 P.2d 160, 166 (1943);
Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 93, 34
P.2d 697, 698-99 (1934). Although there
are admittedly some other opinions
throughout this period that make no mention of a showing of uncertainty or dispute,2 we have concluded from the more
recent cases and from the clear weight of
authority that the relevance of this ingredient is settled in our law. See generally
Annot, 69 A.L.R. 1430,1501-04 (1930), supplemented in 113 A.L.R. 421, 436 (1938); 12
AmJur.2d Boundaries §§ 78-79, 83, 88
(1964).

This reasonable availability of survey in
mation obviously varies from place to \
and from time to time. However, it <
said in general that survey informati
more available and itsjyst is less likel;
beHIsproportionate in rdationjp thej
of the land in city and .platted, areas I
rural or wilderness_areas^ It can alsolS
said in general that technological advance
in survey techniques (as well as in thi
accuracy and accessibility of record titlj
information) is tipping the scales towarc
greater reliance~on record Jitle^informatioi
and lesser reliance on boundary by acquiea
jgnce. 3 The law should conform to thoa
realities.

The difficult issues in respect to uncertainty or dispute as an ingredient in boundary by acquiescence concern the meaning II. THE MEANING OF UNCERTAIN
of these terms and who has the burden of
OR DISPUTE OVER BOUNDARY
proof. As demonstrated hereafter, our
In some earlier cases, uncertainty or <
opinions have not given consistent answers
pute had to be traceable to an objective
to these questions. The contest is typically
determinable ambiguity in a deed or sui*
between interests that are both worthy—
vey, so that the true location of the boundthe desire to confirm boundaries that have
ary could not be readily ascertained. It
apparently been recognized on the ground
over a long period of time and the desire to was not established by proving that neither
enhance reliance on the property dimen- adjoining landowner knew the exact locasions shown in the county records. The tion of the boundary, because "lack of
law clearly gives precedence-to .thejrscori knowledge as to the location of the true
title, with boundaryJ>y acquiescence being boundary is not synonymous with unceran exception, but the conditions of that tainty." Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah at
exception have not been settled with clarity 273, 209 P.2d at 260; Note, 1975 Utah
or adhered to with consistency, in part be- L.Rev., supra, at 231-32. However, later
cause of the bewildering variety of factual cases rejected this objective measurement
circumstances in which the question arises. in favor of a subjective test in which "a
4
In general, when survey information is boundary line may be 'uncertain' or in
reasonably available (such as when reliable dispute' even though it is capable of being
survey control points are accessible to the readily ascertained." Ekberg v. Bates, 121
land and survey costs are not dispropor- Utah 123, 127, 239 P.2d 205, 207 (1951),
tionate to the value of the land) so that it is quoting Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110
reasonable to expect the parties to locate Utah 523, 531, 175 P.2d 718, 723 (1946).
their boundary on the ground by surveys, Uncertainty or dispute was much easier to
the courts should be less willing to apply prove under this rule, which therefore had
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. the effect of increasing the availability of
2. Eg., Goodman v. Wilkinson, Utah, 629 P.2d
447 (1981); Monroe v. Harper, Utah, 619 P.2d
323 (1980); Hales v. Frakes, Utah, 600 P.2d 556
(1979). See also Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah at
25, 232 P.2d at 207 (uncertainty or dispute characterized as the "fiction" on which boundary by
acquiescence is grounded).

3. When boundary by acquiescence was first introduced in Utah almost a century ago, Switzgable v. Worseldine, 5 Utah 315, 15 P. 144 (1887),
much of the state had not been surveyed and
searches of record title may have been difficult
to conduct.
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First, by allowing less latitude for boundary by acquiescence, we minimize conflict
with the objectives of our statute of frauds,
e[2] After carefully considering our pre- which forbids the transfer of interests in
pus decisions on this question, we return real property without a written convey) the more rigorous definition set forth in ance. U.C.A., 1953, § 25-5-1; Madsen v.
Ifrlenn v. Whitney, supra, and hold that Clegg, 639 P.2d at 728-29; Tripp v. Bag&dispute" is not proved by a mere differ- ley, 74 Utah at 68-72, 276 P. at 916-18.
ence of opinion, and "uncertainty" is not
Second, an objective test, which minimizproved by a mere lack of actual knowledge es reliance on boundary by acquiescence,
u>f the true location of the boundary. This corresponds more closely to the purposes
pa the thrust of our recent decisions on this of that doctrine. This Court has recogsubject, e.g.f Madsen v. Clegg, supra, and nized that "[tjhe very reason fox bejngjrf
^it is the holding of the better-reasoned the doctrine of boundary byacquiescence
cases in other jurisdictions. E.g., Buza v. or agreement is ^JtojwoioV) stirring up^
Wojtalewicz, 48 Wis.2d 557, 564-67, 180 controversy," Hobson v. Panguitch Lake
N.W.2d 556, 560-61 (1970); Hartung v. Corp., 530 P.2d at 794, ^prevent litigaWitte, 59 Wis. 285, 298-300, 18 N.W. 175, tiqn^ and[ j£J?EQmpj£_r^pose^of^ title, jand
180-81 (1884); Fry v. Smith, 91 Idaho 740, stability in ^undarjgs. Hales v. Frakes,
741-42, 430 P.2d 486, 487-88 (1967). Final- 600 P.2d at 559? These purposes are best
ly, the ingredient that has been called "dis- furthered if those who purchase, use, or
pute or uncertainty" should be measured sell real property must rely on descriptions
against an objective test of reasonableness in deeds and reasonably available survey
and should therefore more appropriately be information to settle boundary questions in
called "objective uncertainty."
the first instance. .Only when it is jiot
reasonable to^expect landowliers to ascer[3] Under the rule as we have defined it tain the true location of the boundary by
here, the property line shown on the record this manner should landowners be allowed
title cannot be displaced by another bound- to claim boundary by acquiescence. See
ary unless it is shown that during the peri- Hartung v. Wiite, 59 Wis. at 298-500, 18
od of acquiescence there was some objec- N.W. at 180-81. Allowing a claimant to
tively measurable circumstance in the forego reasonably available means of derecord title or in the reasonably available termining the true boundary and to assert
survey information (or other technique by his lack of "actual knowledge" as a basis
which record title information was located for boundary by acquiescence fosters unon the ground) that would have prevented certainty on the location of boundaries and
a landowner, as a practical matter, from magnifies the number of instances in which
being reasonably certain about the true landowners have to resolve disputes by litilocation of the boundary. By the same gation.
token, a claimant cannot assert boundary
[4] Boundary by acquiescence remains
by acquiescence if he or his predecessors in
a viable means of establishing a boundary
title had reason to know the true location
where there is objective uncertainty in the
of the boundary during the period of acqui- location of the true boundary that cannot
escence.
reasonably be resolved by reference to the
pundary by acquiescence and decreasing
nee on the record title.

Our decision to measure compliance with
the requirement of "objective uncertainty"
by whether the landowner, as a practical
matter, could be reasonably certain about
the true location of the boundary on the
ground is supported by two policy considerations.
Utah Rep 682-692 P 2d—7

record title and by use of reasonably available survey information. For example, following are instances of objectively measurable uncertainties in which boundary by
acquiescence would be appropriate if its
other "requirements were met: inability ^to
locate 'monume~nte~established in original
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In some of the opinions of this cojj
survey, Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 271,
the subject of disputed boundaries,*
87 P. 1009, 1010 (1906); internal ineonsistare statements to the effect
enciesjiyjlat,. Young v. Hyland, 37 Utah
location of the true boundary mu
229, 233, 108 P. 1124, 1126 (1910);_nooffiuncertain, unknown or in dispute i
cial or originaTplat or survey by which the
an agreement between the adjoin
boundary line_can.be located, Jensen v.
landowners fixing the boundary
Barileil, 4 Utah 2d 58, 60, 286 P.2d 804,
upheld, citing Tripp v. Bagley, sup
806 (1955); disagreement among different
support thereof
But the Tripp n
surveyors^onjocation of boundary line, id.;
does not require a party relying up
landmarks referenced in deeds havejlisapboundary which has been acquie
j^ared7~^oaguin v. Shiloh Orchards, 84
Cal.App.3d 192, 148 Cal.Rptr. 495, 496
for a long period of time to pr
(1978); uncertainties orjiisputes .created by
evidence that the location of the taj
conflicting terms in deeds, such as overlapboundary was ever unknown, uncertai
ping^ descriptions, Motzkus v. Carroll, 7
or in dispute. That the true boundtn
Utah 2d 237, 239, 322 P.2d 391, 393 (1958);
was uncertain or in dispute and that thi
or metes and^ bounds descriptions thatjio
parties agreed upon the recognizee
not close, Nunley v. Walker^ 13 Utah 2d
boundary as the dividing line will be in
105, 110-11, 369 P.2d 117, 120-21 (1962).
plied from the parties' long acquiescence
Boundary by acquiescence should also be 120 Utah at 27, 232 P.2d at 208. Nume!
available where there are other inconsisten- ous decisions after Brown v. Milliner use
cies that create reasonable doubt in the a. similar approach, either by omitting thi
meaning of the record title or in its applica- subject from the list of elements to estaiH
tion to the actual on-the-ground location of lish the doctrine or by requiring the defend^
the property identified in the record.4
ing landowner to prove "the absence of a
dispute or uncertainty in fixing the bound*
ary" as a means of rebutting a presump.
III. BURDEN OF PROOF OF
tion of boundary by acquiescence. Wright
OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY
An early line of cases placed the burden v. Clissold, 521 P.2d at 1226. See, e.g.t
of proving uncertainty or dispute on the Universal Investment Corp. v. Kingsbury,
party claiming boundary by acquiescence. 26 Utah 2d at 37, 484 P.2d at 174; King v.
Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah at 93-94, 34 Fronh, 14 Utah 2d at 138, 378 P.2d at 895;
P.2d at 698-99; Home Owners' Loan Motzkus v. Carroll, 7 Utah 2d at 242-43,
Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah at 219-20, 141 322 P.2d at 395-96.
P.2d at 166; Willie v. Local Realty Co.,
However, in Florence v. Hiline Equip110 Utah at 530-32, 175 P.2d at 722-23; ment Co., Utah, 581 P.2d 998 (1978), this
Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah at 272-73, 209 Court was again squarely faced with the
P.2d at 260. For example, since the fence question of who should carry the burden of
in Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, proof. In holding that boundary by acquisupra, "was not shown to have been estab- escence did not apply, the trial court had
lished to settle any dispute or to establish stated as a conclusion of law "[t]hat the
any boundary line, the true location of doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
which was unknown or even uncertain," arises only when the true boundary is eiboundary by acquiescence was held to have ther unknown, uncertain, or in dispute,
failed. 105 Utah at 219, 141 P.2d at 166. none of which was proved in this case."
A few years later, however, in Brown v. Id. at 1000. The Court, in an opinion auMilliner, supra, this Court rejected the thored by Justice Hall (only one justice
dissenting), affirmed that decision and its
ruling in this line of cases, stating:
4. Parties also remain free to settle uncertainties
or disputes through boundary by agreement or
by the use of quitclaim deeds or other legal

documents. Disputants may also acquire property through adverse possession, as provided by
statute. §§ 78-12-2 to -21.
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nent of the law, noting that it was hold that the party claiming boundary by
sistent with this Court's prior hold- acquiescence has the burden of proving
Id. The Florence holding was ap- objective uncertainty asjart^of Jthe prima
ently ignored (but not questioned) in facie elements &£_thejipctrine.of. boundary
subsequent cases.5 Then, in reject- by acquiescence/ Notwithstanding this alrfg boundary by acquiescence, our two location of the burden of proof, the record
most recent cases discuss the absence of landowner may, of course, conclusively neuncertainty or dispute in conjunction with gate the existence of objective uncertainty
the affirmative requirements of the doc- by proving that tj^clafniarit or his predetine and contain no intimation that this cessors'"^ title had reason to know the
aubject is part of the burden of a record location of the_trae_boundary before the
landowner seeking to rebut a presumption. expiration of the period of acquiescence.
Leon v. Dansie, Utah, 639 P.2d 730 (1981);
Madsen v. Clegg, Utah, 639 P.2d 726 (1981).
IV. THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
Jn the latter case, this Court stated: "In
We are mindful that the district court
the absence of any initial uncertainty had to rule on the facts of this case in the
concerning the ownership of the property face of the contradictory authorities we
in question, the doctrine of boundary by have discussed. Since we have now underacquiescence has no application/9 Id. at taken to clarify the rules pertaining to this
729 (emphasis added).
case, our task is much easier.
The question of burden of proof is about
[7] Although there are no direct findevenly balanced on the authorities. On ings relating to the requirement of uncerpolicy, both positions are supportable by tainty, the court did find that "[t]here is no
persuasive arguments. The allocation of record title in either [the Bigelows or Cluff]
the burden of proof could therefore depend to the property in dispute/' Neither of
on what one assumes about whether it is these claimants challenges the factual bathe record owner or the claimant by acqui- sis for that finding. In addition, there is no
escence who has superior access to facts evidence jtf imy_otueatryjely.ine5Siirfiabl^.cirabout events long past, but that basis of cumstance in the record title or in the_readecision is unacceptable because either as- sonably available survey information that
sumption could be made and neither could would have prevented the^claimants from
be justified empirically. In this circum- using these means to ascertain, the true
stance, we are especially well advised to boundary onJhe^ground. On the contrary,
limit our rule of law to the facts before us. Ttlie evidence clearly ^sKows that both claim[5,6] This case involves property in the ants had ready access to deeds and had
city of Provo, where survey information is actually examined surveys clearly estabreadily available. It is therefore reason- lishing the Halladays' record title to the
able for the law to require the parties in property in dispute. Consequently, the
this case to locate their property lines on doctrine of boundary by acquiescence I s
the ground by means of the record title and inapplicable as a matter of law In the cirreasonably available survey information cumstancesjjfjthis case. The decree relyrather than by acquiescence in a fence line ing on that doctrine in quieting the claimA-B-C-D must thereor other identifiable points on the ground. ants' title to parcel
7
Consequently, as to this circumstance we fore be reversed.
5. These cases, cited note 2 supra, do not list
uncertainty or dispute as an affirmative requirement of boundary by acquiescence.
6. We express no opinion on whether this allocation of the burden of proof would apply to
property not located in a city or platted area.

7. Our resolution of this issue makes it logically
unnecessary for us to rule on the other issues
tendered by appellants.
We also forego answering the numerous arguments and charges in the dissenting opinion.
We do caution that the meaning and intent of
this opinion should not be judged by the content
of the dissent, because we do not acquiesce in
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The decree is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the district court for the entry
of a new decree in conformity with this
opinion. No costs awarded.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissenting):
I concur in the result i>n_the Junited
ground^that both,jtheJEigejowj^^and .the
Cluffs, whorefy on Jboundary J?y .^acquiescence, halTa^ualjy^examined jLUiyey.3, during the period of acquiescencejhowing the
Hanadayr8 ownejrehip of the property Jn
dispute. Once t^y_^xamined the^surveys,
^ney Jiadj^easpn to f know that the Jine_acquiesced to_w^ jiot t h e _ ^
could acquire ^jio frights J&erej&fj&k In
Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912
(1928), this Court held the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence to be not applicable because the evidence affirmatively demonstrated that when the boundary fence
was erected, the parties knew that it was
not on the true line, and further, they could
not have believed it to be on the true line
since the true line was straight north and
south along a section line, whereas the
boundary fence had angle turns in it like a
dog's leg. This requirement was again recognized in Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110
Utah 523, 175 P.2d 718 (1946). More recently, in Florence v. Hiline Equipment
Co., Utah, 581 P.2d 998 (1978), this Court in
holding the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence not applicable, noted that both the
joining owners knew where the true boundary was located and thus they did not treat
a fence which ran between their properties
as marking the boundary. Similarly, in
Madsen v. Clegg, Utah, 639 P.2d 726 (1981),
we stressed the fact that the fence running
between 'the two properties ran in a
straight line, whereas the parties' deed
the dissent's interpretation of this opinion. To
cite only one example, a boundary located on a
surveyed line could qualify for boundary by
acquiescence, even though a subsequent survey
showed the original survey to have been in
error. A rule of law that is intended to encourage landowners to rely on record title informa-

lines which coincided along this cou
two right-angle turns in them. In'*
these decisions the parties had
know that the acquiesced line was :
true line, or that fact was implicit^
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence^
held in each case to be not applicable^
I regard most_o,f the balance of thej
jority opinion to be dicta and, an unwa
ed assault upon boundary J^acquiei
as it haa frpen r W ^ p p ^ by tftp
this Court over the past 80 years. I
sent from much of it, especially from '&
announcement that boundary by acqui ~
cence should be further restricted and i
applied where the adjoining land on
could have or should jiavehad their prop
ties surveyed before the boundary
marked on the ground. I cannot sub
to that announcement for the folio*
reasons.
The doctrine of boundary by acquies-j
cence has always been very restrictively'
applied. Since it operates to take from thr
fee owner a small strip of his land, it has
never been given broad application. Only
in those exceptional circumstances where
all four of the following elements were
present has it been employed: (1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings; (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; (3)
for a long period of time; (4) by adjoining
land owners. Goodman v. Wilkinson,
Utah, 629 P.2d 447 (1981). Since the doctrine was first announced in Holmes v.
Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009 (1906), it
has been applied only in approximately 25
cases reaching this Court (see appendix).
The effect of the announcement by the
majority opinion is to sub silentio overrule
most of those cases. In a thoughtful and
well-considered opinion written by Justice
Frick of this Court in Holmes v. Judge,
supra, it was pointed out that the doctrine
tion and reasonably available survey information will not be applied to penalize a landowner
who has done just that. If the original survey
was in error, that is a clear instance of objective
uncertainty, and boundary by acquiescence will
apply if its other elements are proved.
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oundary by acquiescence rests upon
nd public policy; that it was a doctrine
epose with the view of quieting titles
preventing strife and litigation coning boundaries. Many years later, JusCrockett in Hobson v. Panguitch Lake
Jwy., Utah, 530 P.2d 792 (1975), endorsed
lis same public policy when he said:
jTKat in the interest of preserving the
fpeace and good order of society (sic) the
•quietly resting bones of the past, which
no one seems to have been troubled or
complained about for a long period of
years, should not be unearthed for the
purpose of stirring up controversy, but
jjhould be left in their repose.
Now the majority seems to say that this
long recognized public policy should be
abandoned; that the bones of the past may
be unearthed and controversy permitted if
when the boundary was marked on the
ground (by fences, trees, etc.) 30, 40 or 50
years ago it was feasible for the then owners to have surveyed their properties which
supposedly would have resulted in the
placement of the boundary on the deed line.
There are three major difficulties with that
approach. In the first place, a .survey may
have been actually made and the^oundary
Sjarjced janjhat Hne. Because of the lapse
of many yearsA no one who was then
present may be alive or_available^ Just
because a recent purvey shows the marked
boundary to be incorrectly^plajgdjioes^npt
proveHffiat the Jhen j)wners^ many years
ago, did not have a survey made onjyhich
they relied in establishing the marked
boundary." As finer and more precise instruments of survey are developed, property lines established in accordance with earlier surveys may often be shown to be out
of place by later surveys. Under the rule
adopted by the majority, apparently the
later survey would govern and a marked
boundary which may well have been established in reliance on the earlier survey
would yield. In Wacker v. Price, 70 Ariz.
99, 216 P.2d 707 (1950), the Court emphatically rejected such a suggestion and quoted
with approval the following statement appearing in a Michigan case, Diehl v. Zanger, 39 Mich. 601 (1878):

r

Nothing is better understood than that
few of our early plats will stand the test
of a careful and accurate survey without
disclosing errors. This is as true of the
government surveys as of any others,
and if all the lines were now subject to
correction on new surveys, the confusion
of lines and titles that would follow
would cause consternation in many communities. Indeed, the mischiefs that
must follow would be simply incalculable, and the visitation of the surveyor
might well be set down as a great public
calamity. But no law can sanction this
course.
The majority assures us that a new survey
would not necessarily be allowed to upset a
boundary set on an earlier survey. But
after the lapse of many years, no one may
kiiow that an earlier survey was^made.
Thus, the later survey will be followed and
tKe boundary^ IQH^ recQ^Tiize/L, will he
moved.
Secondly, the boundary dispute is here
jigd now._It does little good to reflect as ^o
what the then owners 30, 40 or 50 years
ago might have done and disregard entirely
the conduct of the owners and their successors since that time in acquiescing in the
markers on the ground. In most cases, the
acquiescence is an unconscious act with no
thought being given during the period of
acquiescence to the boundary, let alone
with surveying it Thirdly, this Court
should not embark upon the impossible
task of tryj.ng,. tn -determine, .in each_case.
whether thejtwners 30, 40 or 50 years ago
could have afforded a survey had they then
given_ thoughtJojthejjoundary or whether
the value of the property " ^ "that'time
would have been worth it, depending upon
whether the boundary dispute arises "in
city and platted areas" or whether it arises
in "rural or wilderness areas." The answers to such inquiries will be impossible
to obtain. The inquiry apparently will be
subjective. Yet in many cases the builders
of the marked boundary will be dead or will
have long since sold their interest in the
property and be unavailable. Our cases on
boundary by acquiescence for the past 80

510

Utah

685 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

should be summarily disavowed,
statement was dicta since the ev
showed that the person who had ereda
the old fence did not own land on
side of it and boundary by acq ie ^
clearly did not apply.
Ill a surprising turnabout in thinkini
public policy, the majority opinion now 3
claims that the stirring up of controversy^
avoided, litigation is prevented and
Holmes v. Judge, supra, and its progeny of title and stability in boundaries is
have been consistent in rejecting the notion moted if "those who purchase, use or i
that boundary by acquiescence should only real property may rely on descriptions
be applied when the true line could not deeds and reasonably available survey
have been ascertained by a survey. This formation to settle boundary questions
contention was put to rest in an earlier the first instance." As I have already]
case, Young v. Hyland, 37 Utah 229, 108 pointed out, generally reliance on descriw
P. 1124 (1910). Two years later, in Bin- tions in deeds and available survey infor^
ford v. Eccles, 41 Utah 453, 126 P. 333 mation is salutary. However, in those rare
(1912), Chief Justice Frick again dismissed instances where the elements of boundary
that contention in the following words:
by acquiescence are present, an exception
Appellant would thus be permitted to has been recognized and disputing neigh-,
unsettle boundaries which by the adjoin- bors are not permitted to depart from that
ing land owners had been recognized and which they have long acquiesced in. This
acquiesced in for approximately a quar- does no mischief to those who purchase,
ter of a century. Any rule of law which use or sell real property as the majority
would permit such a result would be opinion maintains since it is not unfair to
pernicious, and in the long run would charge buyers with taking notice of a
produce strife and litigation, and in marked boundary which is there to be seen
the nature of things would often result in plain sight Boundary by acquiescence
in injustice if not oppression. [Empha- cases oftenarise when one adjpining.land
sis added.]
More recently in Willie v. Local Realty "nownertte^cies JolggJLhis property and a
Co., supra, and in Ekberg v. Bates, 121 survey is made by him or his buyer revealUtah 123, 239 P.2d 205 (1951), this Court ing that the marked boundary encroaches a
again rejected the suggestion that bound- ~few~tricfies or"somifimes a"few feet "Rathary by acquiescence should not apply un- er than disturbing the long acquiesced in
less it could be demonstrated that the true boundary, the law has been and is that the
line could not be ascertained by a survey. boundary shall not be disturbed but the
The majority advocates that we "return" buyer may protect himself by requiring a
and now 'follow an obscure statement made reduction in the purchase price by the venin Glenn v.JVhitney, 116 Utah 267,209 dor to compensate for the shortage of propP2g~257 '(1949), that "lack ofjoiowledge as erty. If fortuitously the survey shows that
ETtfie location of the txue boundary is not the seller has an excess of property, the
synonymous with uncertainty." The sub- buyer reaps the bargain of it. Either way
ject of surveying was not discussed in that the old boundary is preserved and strife
case and it is this writer's opinion that that and litigation is prevented. No innocent
statement does not refer to surveying. person is harmed. Only that owner who
However, if that statement means that has slept_QH.his jrighte is made to live with
there can be no uncertainty in the absence that which he has long accepted.
of a survey, it is out of harmony with every
I dissent from many statements made in
other case of this Court on the subject and part I of the majority opinioo First, proof
years have approached boundary disputes
with the view that it is not unjust in certain
cases to require disputing owners to live
with what they and their predecessors have
acquiesced in for a j^ng^jemd,_of time.
TodayThe majority turns its back on that
philosophy and now wants to explore and
decide boundary cases on what might have
been. This approach is not practical and I
believe will prove to be unworkable.
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aty or dispute is not, and has
£been an "ingredient" or element of a
ot action for jMindary by acqjuies^ce> Tripp v. Bagley, supra, cited by the
" onty does not so hold. Uncertainty and
pute were discussed in that case in conon with an express parol boundary
ement where it must be proved to
jrercome the bar of the statute of frauds.
jje party relying on the oral agreement
just show that the location of true boundiry was unknown, uncertain or disputed
men the agreement was made; otherwise
gie oral agreement is invalid as an attempt
by the contracting parties to transfer ownership of real estate without a writing.
Pie plaintiff in that case also relied upon
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
but this Court held it to be not applicable
for the reasons already stated in the first
paragraph of this opinion, viz., when the
boundary fence was erected the parties
mew that it was not on the true line because of its angle turns. The Court did not
lold that a party relying upon boundary by
icquiescence had to affirmatively show
hat the boundary was erected following
incertainty or dispute. Such a requirement would be entirely foreign to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence because
the basis of the doctrine is that the law
implies that there once existed uncertainty
and dispute and that the adjoining owners
mutually agreed upon the marked boundary in settlement. Holmes v. Judge, supra.
If there was ever any question about this
proposition, our opinion in Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202 (1951),
decided many years after Tripp v. Bagley,
supra, clarified that matter and put it to
rest
In some of the opinions of the court on
the subject of disputed boundaries, there
are statements to the effect that the
location of the true boundary must be
uncertain, unknown or in dispute before
an agreement between the adjoining land
owners fixing the boundary will be upheld, citing Tripp v. Bagley, supra, in
support thereof.
Such statements
should be understood to mean that if the
location of the true boundary line is

known to the adjoining owners, they cannot by parol agreement establish the
boundary elsewhere. As was pointed
out in the Tripp case, such an agreement
would be in contravention of the statute
of frauds. But the Tripp case does not
require a party relying upon a boundary
which has been acquiesced in for a long
period of time to produce evidence that
the location of the true boundary was
ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute.
That the true boundary was uncertain or
in dispute and that the parties agreed
upon the recognized boundary as the dividing line will be implied from the parties' long acquiescence. Roberts v. Brae,
5 Cal.2d 356, 54 P.2d 698. In Holmes v.
Judge, supra, this court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Frick, set forth the
following requirements necessary to establish a boundary by acquiescence: The
line must be open, visible, marked by
monuments, fences or buildings and recognized as the boundary for a long term
of years. It was expressly stated by the
court in that case that there was no
evidence how the fence and building
which were recognized as the boundary
came to be erected, or that there was
ever any dispute between the adjoining
owners concerning the location of the
true boundary, or that any question was
ever raised as to its location until shortly
before the plaintiff commenced his action.
^ZZZ
This explanation was again set out in haec
verba in Motzkus v. Carroll, 7 Utah 2d
237, 322 P.2d 391 (1958), where we expressly rejected the contention that the party
relying on the long recognized boundary
must prove that it was once unknown, uncertain or in dispute. Justice Wade, writing for the Court, stated:
[I]t is clear that where a party by evidence establishes a long period of acquiescence in a fence as marking the boundary line between two tracts, he is not
required to also produce evidence that
the location of the true boundary line
was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. The establishment of a long period
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of acquiescence in a fence as marking upon 'the old established boundary. ByS
the boundary line between two tracts by doing, one of the foundations of the da
tf
the respective owners gives rise to a trine is destroyed, viz., that the |*w ja
presumption that the true boundary line plies that the landowners were once unce
was in dispute or uncertain, which Tajn or in^ dispute and the boundary .WMl
places, at least, the burden of producing marked on the ^oundi;ij/s^emfi'na
evidence that there was no dispute or Rolmes v. Judge, supra. This unplicai-Lk
uncertainty but that the true boundary is drawn because due to the p a s s a g e ^
line was known to the respective owners time, there is often little or no eviden3
on the party claiming that such was the available as to the erection of the boundary
fact Where, as here, there is evidence marker. Without being able to rely on thy
on that question other than the proof of implication, the doctrine of boundary bg
acquiescence cannot continue to exist as | ]
acquiescence in the fence as marking the
workable and viable doctrine. Our cased
boundary line for the required long perih^ve recognized that lack of uncertainty on
od of time the trial court must find that
dispute can be raised as a defense againstj]
the boundary line by acquiescence has
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence]
been established.
by the person assailing the old boundary*
(Emphasis added.) Justice Wade cited as
Wright v. Clissold, Utah, 521 P.2d 1224;
his authority Brown v. Milliner, supra,
(1974). Motzkus v. Carroll, supra, and
which in turn relied on the original acquiesUniversal Investment Corp. v. Kingsbury?
c&TKfe s»&fc, Holmes u Judge, %wpr&.
26 Utah 2d 36, 484 P.2d 173 (1971), properly
^^m
view of the foregoing unequivocal pro- held that like other defenses the burden of
/ nouncements of this Court, I cannot agree proof is upon the person asserting the de/
with the majority that "we have concluded fense. We explained in our opinion in
/
from the more recent cases and from the Weight v. Clissold, supra, that once the
'
clear weight of authority that the relevance four elements of boundary by acquiescence
of this ingredient [uncertainty and dispute] (named above) are established, the Court ia
is settled in our law." None of the cases required to presume, the existence of a
cited by the majority in s^gort'^p^ that binding agreement unless the party who
statement' do'in fact ''Sjffilft£*~
~
assails it proves by competent evidence
™ e majority opinion in the face of 80 that there was actually no agreement beyears of cases to the contrary also places tween the adjoining land owners or there
the burden of proof that an uncertainty or could not have been a proper agreement
dispute once existed upon the party relying Said the Court
1. The cases cited by the majority make only the
briefest mention of uncertainty and dispute;
none of them hold that the party advocating
boundary by acquiescence must prove as an
element of his cause of action that the fence,
etc. was erected because of uncertainty or dispute by the adjoining land owners. For example, in Madsen v. Clegg, Utah, 639 P.2d 726
(1981), Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209
P.2d 257 (1949), Homeowners Loan Corp. v.
Dudley, 105'Utah 208, 141 R2d 160 (1943), and
Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 34 P.2d 697
(1934) it appears to this writer that uncertainty
and dispute was mentioned as an element of an
express parol agreement; most of those cases
cite Tripp v. Bagley, supra, which gives credence
to my interpretation. In two other cases cited
by the majority, Wright v. Clissold Utah, 521
?2d 1224 (1974), and Universal Investment Corp.
v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35, 484 P.2d 173
(1971), it was stated that lack of any uncertainty

or dispute at the time the fence was erected
could be shown as a defense by the party resisting boundary by acquiescence. In Leon v. Dansie, Utah, 639 ?2d 730 (1981), "dispute" was
mentioned not as a requirement but "that there
had been no dispute as to record title [not as to
the location of the boundary] at any time over
the years.'* In most of the above cases the
mentiQtt QC uncertainty m d dispute v<a& dicta,
since the case was decided on other grounds.
For example, in Leon v. Dansie, Wright v. Clissold and Glen v. Whitney, the fence was shown
to have been erected not as a boundary but
simply to contain livestock. Similarly, in Glenn
v. Whitney, the person erecting the fence did not
own land on either side of it; in Homeowners
Loan Corp. v. Dudley the same person owned
the land on both sides of the fence and in
Peterson v. Johnson the land on one side of the
fence was in the public domain
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Facts which prove the latter include the
following: (1) no parties available to
make an agreement, e.g., sole ownership
of the property with the existing line
tfhich was later transferred in tracts to
two or more other persons; (2) the line
tfas set for a purpose other than setting
i boundary; (3) the absence of a dispute
ir uncertainty in fixing the boundary;
md (4) ...
I disagree with the majority opinion that
some of our cases have placed the burden
of proof upon the party relying upon
boundary by acquiescence. My reading of
the cases cited by the majority indicates
that who has the burden of proof was not
an issue in any one of them, and I consider
the incomplete statements in those cases
upon which the majority relies to be dicta
as far as burden of proof is concerned. On
the other hand, in Motzkus v. Carroll, supra, burden of proof was a vital issue and
it was there held that the party relying
upon the old boundary fence is not required
to produce evidence that the location of the
true boundary line was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute.
I dissent from the adoption of the rule
proposed by the majority in Part II that:
(T|he property line shown on the record
title cannot be displaced by another
boundary unless it is shown that during
the period of acquiescence there was
some objectively measurable circumstance in the record title or in the reasonably available survey information (or other
technique by which record title information was located on the ground) that
would have prevented a landowner as a
practical matter from being reasonably
certain about the true location of the
boundary. By the same token a claimant
cannot assert boundary by acquiescence
if he or his predecessors in title had
reason to know the true location of the
boundary during the period of acquiescence.
I am in accord with the second sentence.
The instant case provides an illustration of
that rule, viz., during the period of acquiescence, Bigelow and Cluff had access to a
survey which indicated that they did not

own to the fence to which they claim.
However, the first sentence quoted above
seems to be out of harmony with the second sentence. It seems to require proof of
a negative, i.e., proof by the person relying
on boundary by acquiescence that he and
his predecessors were prevented for some
reason from having a survey made which
would have determined the location of the
true line. So far as this writer knows only
the lack-TJfTmoney could really "keejT'any
land owner from having, a,survey made._ Is
thaj^now^goinff-taJie a.,vital and yalid
inquiry bvthft-Court in_future boundary
cases?
I believe that a rule which would serve
us better and which would be workable
might be simply stated as follows:
A claimant cannot assert boundary by
acquiescence if he or his predecessors in
title during the period of acquiescence
had reason to know that the boundary
acquiesced in was not on the true line.
This "reason to know" could come about
because of information contained in the
record title or in existing survey information or information from other sources
which would put a reasonable man on
notice that the boundary acquiesced in
was not on the true line.
—
Since the reasonable man standard is used
in other areas of the law I would hope that
it would work well here. It would provide
courts with the basis for refusing to apply
boundary by acquiescence where the discrepancy was apparent and the acquiescence was blindly indulged in. On the other hand, we must not expect too much from
the rule since being familiar with the legal
description of one's property and locating
that description on the land are two entirely different things. That is why surveys
are made. However, the rule would serve
well in instances like Tripp v. Bagley, supra, where an old fence line had several
angle turns in it whereas the true line was
straight north and south along the section
line; and in Madsen v. Clegg, supra, where
the boundary fence ran on a straight line,
whereas the deed lines of both parties had
right-angle turns in them. In both cases
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the landowners had reason to know that
the fence was not on the true line.
Part III of the majority opinion ends with
the observation that because the property
involved in this case is in the city of Provo
survey information is readily available and
it is reasonable for the law to require the
parties to locate their property lines on the
ground by means of a survey. It appears
to me that this statement is out of harmony
with earlier statements in the opinion
which indicated that the Court should look
at the situation as of when the acquiescence began to determine ..whether, j,t,w#s
feasible for a survey to haye^been^made^n^C^^ears later when this litigationJ8#s
commenced.
In conclusion, I am concerned that the
rules laid down by the majority are unclear
and unworkable as I understand them
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
has a proper p\ace m our yarisprudence atf^
in my opinion has served well the publimpolicy which brought it into existence in the
first place. It has provided a fair basis for
settling disputes over often insignificant
amounts of land and has discouraged
countless property owners from feuding
with their neighbors when a recent survey
conflicts with long recognized lines.
Everything the majority argues and now
espouses was considered and rejected by
this Court in Holmes v. Judge, supra, when
Justice Frick wrote:
While the interests of society require
that the title to real estate shall not be
transferred from the owner for slight
cause, or otherwise than by law, these
same interests demand that there sh#H
be stability in boundaries, and th#t,
where parties have for a long term of
years acquiesced in a certain line between their own and their neighbors
property, they will not thereafter be permitted to say that what they permitted to
appear as being established by and with
their consent and agreement was in fact
false.
For nearly 80 years we have followed that
philosophy. But today the majority opinion
opens the way for any property owner in

this state to have now his property
veyed (or resurveyed) and gain posse
of every inch contained in his legal dee
tion. Old surveys and boundaries biL
reliance thereon will be meaningless
believe that the majority opinion is a
backward in achieving stability of b^
aries in this state
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Charles H. STRATFORD and Robert L.
Harris, Plaintiffs and Appellants,

session as additional theory wa s not abuaS
of discretion.
Remanded for entry of judgment
accordance with opinion.
Howe, J., dissented with opinion.

Earl P. MORGAN, Earl D. Morgan, Gloria M. Broadbent, Evelyn M. Neveille
and Alice M. Timmerman, Defendants
and Respondents.
NIL IMOi;,
M]()njnnji Court of iifnh
Aug. 30, 1984.

1. Boundaries «=»37(5)
In absence of evidence showing
there was dispute or uncertainty as to j
boundary, landowners failed to proved
elements of boundary by acquiescence.

2. Boundaries «=35(4)
Landowners brought action against
neighbors to quiet title to two small parcels
of property on basis of boundary by acquiescence. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., entered
judgment for neighbors, and landowners
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, CJ.,
held that (1) in absence of evidence showing that there was dispute or uncertainty
as to true boundary, landowners failed to
prove all elements of boundary by acquiescence; (2) title opinion, correspondence between landowners' predecessor and county,
and predecessor's testimony as to what she
believed boundaries of property to be when
purchased were properly excluded, as irrelevant or as hearsay if offered on basis of
its truth; (3) judgment which declared that
landowners were not owners or had any
record title of two described parcels was
required to be modified to decree that landowners had no right, title or interest in
described parcels as against defendant
neighbors based on boundary by acquiescence; and (4) denial of landowners' motion
to amend complaint to plead adverse pos-

In action to quiet title on basis or
boundary by acquiescence, title opinion?
correspondence
between
landowner^
predecessor and county, and predecessors
testimony as to what she believed bouncG
aries of property to be when purchasS
were properly excluded, as predecessor
state of mind was not relevant and e j g
dence was hearsay if offered on basis of i g
truth. Rules of Evid., Rule 63.

3. Boundaries <s=>43
In action to quiet title to two small
parcels of property on basis of boundary by
acquiescence, judgment which declared
that landowners were not owners or
any record title of two described parcels
improperly included property in landowners' possession in which neighbors had no
record title, and thus, was required to be
modified to decree that landowners had no
right, title or interest in described parcete
as against defendant neighbors based on
boundary by acquiescence.
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4. Pleading ^236(1)
Although rules of civil procedure tend
to favor granting of leave to amend, matter
remains in sound discretion of trial court.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 15, 15(b).
5. Quieting Title <s=>42
In action to quiet title to two small
parcels of property on basis of boundary by
acquiescence, in which landowners earlier
indicated to court that they did not intend
to rely on adverse possession and failed to
show requisite payment of taxes on disputed parcels, denial of landowners' motion to
amend complaint to plead adverse possession as additional theory was not abuse of
discretion. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 15,
15(b).

David E. West, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Thomas A. Duffin, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and respondents.

Shortly after the Stratfords constructed
the fence alongside the creek, they put
their livestock and other farm animals on
the property. They later built a fish pond
and a track for exercising their horses.
Both the pond and the track partially extend into the disputed parcel denominated
Parcel 12 in the diagram. The plaintiffs
and their predecessors in jnterestJreatecT
the property up tOLthe northern fence line
as their own and used it in the manner so
descnT)ej_wjthout interruption or dispute
from the defendants jorjhe^jnredecessors
until 197JL_jai ..period of ^nearly 30 ^years.^
In 1979, plaintiff Charles Stratford had
the property surveyed. (See diagram.)
The survey indicated that the location of
the fence constructed by the Stratfords
between the parties' properties was not
compatible with the metes and bounds description of the boundary line between the
properties. The portion of the fence at
issue here had been builtjfarlhe most part
Inside the legajjpjjujidaries of defendants'
property?
—-—=*-••< —^

HALL, Chief Justice:
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment dismissing their action to quiet title to two
small parcels of property on the basis of
boundary by acquiescence. We affirm.
On March 10. 1951, plaintiffs' predecessors in interest, L.H. and Ella Stratford
(hereinafter "the Stratfords"), purchased a
4.77-acre tract of land in Salt Lake County.
This property was conveyed to plaintiffs as
trustees for the Stratford grandchildren by
Ella Stratford after her husband's death.

The property was purchased by the
Stratfords for the purpose of operating a
hobby farm, where they could raise livestock (horses, cows, sheep, etc.) and other
farm animals. In order to make the property suitable for such use, the Stratfords
mended already-existing fences and constructed a new one along the south bank of
Big Cottonwood Creek.

After the plaintiffs received the survey,
they prepared and presented to defendants
for their signatures a quitclaim deed conveying the area put in issue as a result of
the discrepancy between the deed survey
and the fence line. Defendants refused to
sign the quitclaim deed.

As a result, plaintiffs initiated this quiet
title action, claiming that under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence they
own fee simple title to the parcels designated on the accompanying diagram as Parcels * 1 and * 2. At trial, after plaintiffs
had presented their evidence and rested
their case, defendants moved for a dismissal, which the court granted.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court
erred in four aspects: (1) in ruling that
plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to es-
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Parcel
# 1

DEFENDANTS '
(Morgan)
TRACT1

fence erected by
L. H. Stratford
ID 1951.

<&:

v
Parcel

\

Boundary line according
to 1979 survey (based
on metes and bounds
descriptions in
plaintiffs* deed).

PLAINTIFFS'
(Stratford)
TRACT

"°#Xh

tablish "prima facie" a boundary by acquiescence; (2) in excluding certain evidence
proffered by plaintiffs; (3) in the form of

judgment entered against plaintiffs; and
(4) in denying plaintiffs' motion to amend
the pleadings to conform with the evidence-

1. The record docs not include the metes and
bounds description of defendants' (Morgan)
tract. It does, however, indicate that the metes
and bounds description of the pertinent southern boundary of defendants' property is the
same as the metes and bounds description de-

scribing the northern boundary of plaintiffs
property. The record also fails to show the
eastern boundary of defendants' property, but it
is undisputed that defendants do not own all of
the property contiguous to plaintiffs' northern
boundary line.

STRATFORD v. MORGAN
Cite as 689 PJd 360 (Utah 1984)
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I. BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
On appeal, this Court reversed the trial
The jriaLcourtfound, relying on Madsen court, saying that "when the location of the
v. Clegg,2 jhatplaintiffs had failed to pro- true boundary between adjoining tracts of
duce evidence showing that therewas^ dis- land is unknown, uncertain or jn jiispute,
pute or uncertainty as to the true boundary the owners thereof may [establish a boundand thus had failed to prove all of the ary by acquiescence]." x This Court found,
necessary elements of boundary by acqui- Tiowever, that:
escence. Plaintiffs contend that a showing
[Plaintiff showed that no uncertainty or
^>f dispute or uncertainty is not ajiecessary
dispute existed concerning the location of
element ~of_boundary by __ acquiescence.
the boundary line at the time the 1904
CaseTaw~does not support that contention.
fence was constructed. The 1904 deeds
In Madsen, the parties' predecessors in
to plaintiffs and defendant's predecesinterest had acquired adjoining tracts of
sors unmistakenly define a boundary
land from a common grantor on the same
which takes a substantial jog northward
day in 1904. The metes and bounds deat its eastern end. Defendant has raised
scriptions of their respective deeds were
no question concerning the validity of
compatible insofar as they described the
these deeds; nor has he shown any subboundary between the two tracts. Alsequent conveyance by plaintiff or his
though a fence existed along the boundary,
father which might cast doubt on plainplaintiffs predecessor, owner of the southtiffs present title. The trial court did
ern parcel, constructed a new fence upon
not include in its findings any indication
his own property approximately 25 feet
that the boundary was disputed when
south of the boundary line. He used the
plaintiff s father built the fence or that
small lane between the fences to drive his
the fence was intended originally as a
cattle from a corral that had been conboundary line. In the absence of any
structed in the northeast corner of his parinitial uncertainty concerning the ownercel. Some years later (between 1936 and
ship of the property in question, the doc1942), the original fence on the boundary
trine of boundary by aquiescence has no
line and the corral were torn down, and
application.^4!
defendant's predecessor in interest began
to farm the land up to the fence constructRingwood v. Bradford* which involved a
ed by plaintiffs predecessor. In 1979, fence not erected to settle any uncertainty
plaintiff put a new fence along the bound- or dispute, also supports the findings of the
ary line, which defendant removed. Plain- trial court In Ringwood, the Court cited
tiff then filed an action to quiet title to the Glenn v. Whitney* with approval and
small parcel between the two fences.
quoted therefrom as follows:
The trial court in Madsen found that
inasmuch as defendant and his predecessors had farmed the land in question since
the 1930s without obtaining plaintiffs permission and inasmuch as plaintiff had
failed to notify defendant of his claim upon
the land until 1979, the fence constructed
by plaintiffs predecessor in 1904 (25 feet
south of the metes and bounds boundary
line) had been established by mutual acquiescence as the boundary between the two
properties.
2. Utah, 639 P.2d 726 (1981).
3. Id. at 728.
4. Id. at 729.

The theory under which a boundary
line is established by long acquiescence
along an existing fence line is founded on
the doctrine that the parties erect the
fence to settle some doubt or uncertainty
which they may have as to the location of
the true boundary, and the [sic] compromise their differences by agreeing to accept the fence line as the limiting line of
their respective lands. The mere fact
that a fence happens to be put up and
neither party does anything about it for
5. 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P. 2d 1053 (1954).
6. 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257 (1949).
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a long penod of time will not establish it dispute or uncertainty as measured by Halas the true boundary. [Citations omit- laday.
jM
ted.] 7
Therefore, plaintiffs failed to meet their
In Halladay v. Cluff? the Court declared burden of providing evidence of all of the!
that the showing of dispute or uncertainty 'elementsjof^boundary by acquiescence.
necessary in order to establish boundary by
acquiescence should be^measured^jtgainst
IT EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
an objective test of.reasonableness:.
[2] The next claim asserted by plah?
Under the rule as we have defined it
tiffs is that the trial court erred in exclud?
here, the property line shown on the
record title cannot be displaced by anoth- ing certain evidence offered by them. Thr
er boundary unless it is shown that dur- excluded evidence consisted of a title opu?
ing the period of acquiescence there was ion, correspondence between LH. StratforT
some objectively measurable circum- and Salt Lake County, and Ella Stratford's
stance in the record title or in the reason- testimony as to what she believed th?
ably available survey information (or oth- northern boundaries of the property to]S?
er technique by which record title infor- when purchased. The title opinion and c o g
mation was located on the ground) that respondence with Salt Lake County were
would have prevented a landowner, as a excluded on the basis of hearsay, while th?
practical matter, from being reasonably objection to Mrs. Stratford's testimony war
certain about the true location of the sustained by the trial judge before counsef
boundary. By the same token, a claim- could finish his objection.
ant cannot assert boundary by acquiesPlaintiffs contend that the contested evjF
cence if he or his predecessors in title dence was offered by them to establish the
had reason to know the true location of
state of mind of the Stratfords at the time.
the boundary during the period of acquithey erected the objected fence.
11
escenceJ
Mental state of the Stratfords was not a y
[1] PJamtiffsjpjlus^
issue in this case. No element of bound
vide any objective, pr_subjectiYe evidence of
by acquiescence could be proved by evQ
dispute or uncertainty. The trial judge
dence as to state of mind. Therefore, sincej
found, supported by the evidence, that the
state of mind was not an issue, the only,
parties received valid deeds containing
effect the challenged evidence could hawmetes and bounds descriptions of their rehad was its supposed truth value. As tar
spective parcels, that said deed descriptions
that the evidence was unquestionably bear^
were compatible insofar as they described
say and thus inadmissible.10
the boundary line between the properties,
that no dispute ever arose with respect to
plaintiffs' fence or the true boundary line
III. FORM OF JUDGMENT
until shortly before this litigation began,
Plaintiffs' third assertion of error is that
and that a survey prepared at plaintiffs' the form of the judgment of dismissal was
request based upon the parties' respective improper
deed descriptions established the true loca[31 The judgment declares: 1. It is
tion of their common boundary to be a
significant distance south of plaintiffs' hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that
fence line. These facts do not show any the plaintiffs are not the owners in fee
7

Supra note » «« 1054

8. Utah, 685 P 2d 300(1984)
9. Id., at 505
10. Rule 63, Utah It U*
follows:

>M nil mr, piovides as

Evidence oi a statement which is made other
than by a witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter
stated is hearsay evidence and inadmissible
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simple title or in fact have any record title
of the following described property in Salt
Lake County described as follows: [Parcels
1 and 2 are thereafter described by metes
and bounds]."
Plaintiffs contend that these descriptions
include property that is in possession of
plaintiffs in which defendants have no
record title. While plaintiffs' and defendants' land is contiguous along the mutual
boundaries of Parcel $ 2, it is not contiguous in the remainder. Therefore, plaintiffs
argue that the judgment clouds title to
property possessed by plaintiffs and not
owned by defendants. Further, the judgment in this case was rendered at the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence on a motion
to dismiss.
Plaintiffs' argument has merit The
judgment in this case should affect the
rights of the parties to the case only.
Rights and remedies as to other parties
should not be adjudicated and resolved in
this case.
Therefore, on remand the judgment of
dismissal should be modified to decree that
plaintiffs' action against defendants is dismissed with prejudice and, as against these
defendants, plaintiffs have no right, title or
interest in Parcels # 1 or # 2 based on
boundary by acquiescence.
IV. MOTION TO AMEND
THE PLEADINGS
[4,5] Plaintiffs' final argument is that
the trial court erred by refusing to amend
the complaint to allow them to plead "adverse possession" as an additional theory
upon which to establish their ownership in
the disputed parcels. Although Rule 15,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,11 tends to
favor the granting of leave to amend, the
matter remains in the sound discretion of
the trial court.12 In denying this motion,
the trial court cited the following reasons:
11. The pertinent subsection, 15(b), provides:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as
if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the

(1) plaintiffs had earlier indicated to the
court that they did not intend to rely upon
adverse possession and (2) they had failed
to show the requisite payment of taxes on
the disputed parcels. The court's reasoning does not indicate an abuse of discretion.
The case is remanded to the district court
for entry of judgment in accordance with
the opinions expressed herein.
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
HOWE, Justice (dissenting):
I dissent The trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint at the end
of the presentation of their evidence. The
dismissal was bottomed on the failure of
the plaintiffs to produce any evidence that
the location of tine boundary between the
properties was ever uncertain or in dispute.
The trial judge apparently thought that
Madsen v. Clegg, Utah, 639 P.2d 726 (1981)
required such evidence.
In defense of the trial judge's action,
admittedly there is dictum in Madspt v.
Cleggjhat could he interpreted as imposing
such a requirement It was for that reason
that this writer only concurred in the result
in that case. I thought that there was no
boundary by acquiescence because the
fence which allegedly was acquiesced in as
the boundary ran in a straight line, whereas the true line as described in the deeds of
both of the adjoining owners had a rightangle turn in it In view of that fact, I
thought that the adjoining owners could
not have reasonably believed that the fence
was on the true boundary line. I regarded
the reference in that case to uncertainty
and dispute as surplusage, and directed to
cases where a boundary is fixed by an
express parol agreement as distinguished
from a case of boundary by acquiescence.
evidence and to raise these issues may be
made upon motion of any party at any time
12. Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., Utah. 663 P.2d
93 (1983); Christiansen v. Utah Transit AutK
Utah. 649 P.2d 42 (1982).
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However, in the next boundary by acquiescence case decided by this Court, Halladay v. Cluff, Utah, 685 P.2d 500 (1984)
proof of uncertainty and dispute was elevated (albeit by dicta again) to a requirement. This writer in his dissenting opinion
vigorously protested that suggestion and
referred to Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah
16, 232 P.2d 202 (1951) where this Court in
a unanimous opinion stated that uncertainty and dispute are^significant only in cases
involving a boundary fixed on the ground
by_exgress par^^gre^r^nt^ofjhe adjoining owners. In such cases, if the location
of the true boundary line is known to them,
they cannot fix it elsewhere by their agreement because such an agreement would
contravene the statute of frauds. But we
pointed out that uncertainty and dispute
were not required to be shown by a party
relying on a boundary which had been acquiesced in for a long period of time but
which had not been fixed by express parol
agreement, citing Holmes v. Judge, 31
Utah 269, 87 P. 1009 (1906), the first boundary by acquiescence case decided by this
Court Proof of uncertainty and dispute
was again later rejected as a requirement
in Motzkus v. Carroll 7 Utah 2d 237, 322
P.2d 391 (1958). The majority misreads
Ringwood v. Bradford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 269
P.2d 1053 (1954). It was decided on the
basis that the fence was never intended or
recognized as a boundary, but was erected
only to protect young trees from sheep.
That case in no wise supports the necessity
of a showing of uncertainty and dispute.
\Madsen v. Clegg and Halladay x?. Cluff
must bear the responsibility for imposing
'this new requirement.

day v. Cluff, supra. It is useless to longer'
pretend that application of the doctrine will"
ever again be upheld by this Court. As i"
pointed out in my dissenting opinion in*
Halladay v. Cluff, it is entirely foreign to*
the doctrine of boundary by Acquiescence^
toimpose^^
certaintjT and^ dispute. ^This is because'the^
very*foundation of the doctrine is that the1
law imvlies that the adjoining landowners*
were once uncertain or in dispute and thai*1
the boundary was marked on the ground u l
settlement thereof. After the parties have4
for a long period of tame acquiesced in that1
marked boundary, the law protects ftl
Holmes v. Judge, supra. This implicate
is drawn because due to the passage of
time there is often little or no evidence
available as to the circumstances surround^
ing the erection of the boundary marker^
Without being able to rely on the implie
tion, the doctrine of boundary by acquie^
cence cannot continue to exist as a worka
ble and viable doctrine. In many of our
caseSjjtjs expressly stated tfiat thejaoima
ary whichjwas acquiesced in was builtjrioi
to.the jdme_,that the present landownei
acquired title. Those^ predecessors in titi
who supposedly huiltrthejnarke*d\qundar
had moved from- the .area..or.were .dead
There was no evidence as to how the mart
ed Bdufiaaiycamelnto bdn^. The marked
boundary, however, is viewed as mute evi
dence of an agreement struck many year
ago and acquiesced in since that time. Ab
sent settlement of disputes under the doc
trine of boundary by acquiescence, recourse must now be had to surveyors who
today with their finer and more precise
instruments, and due to destruction of old
monuments, often disagree with their pro
fessional brothers who set and established
boundaries on the properties of this state
many years ago. All boundaries are now
"fair game."

The holding of the majority opinion today
that uncertainty and dispute must be
proved as an element of boundary by acquiescence, coupled with our recent decision in
Halladay v. Cluff, supra, effectively
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not pdrtiapati
sounds the death knell of J^^darx^X-afiquiescence in this state. These two cases herein.
have overruled sub silentio most, if not all,
of the cases decided by this Court over the
last eighty years in which the doctrine was
applied. For a list of these cases, see the
appendix to my dissenting opinion in Halla-
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Susanne C. PARSONS and John M.
Parsons, Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Glenn C. ANDERSON, Jr., Defendant
and Respondent
No. 17827.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 31, 1984.
Action was brought to quiet title to
disputed strip of land along common boundary. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Kenneth RigtruiL J., quieted title
in defendant landowner on basis of boundary by acquiescence and awarded damages
to defendant for trespass. Appeals were
taken. The Supreme Court, Hall, C J., held
that (1) defendant landowner did not establish adverse possession; (2) there was
no mutual acquiescence in old fence as
boundary from 1972 onward; (3) period of
at most 15 years of mutual acquiescence
did not meet requirement of a "long period
of time" necessary to establish boundary
by acquiescence; and (4) element of dispute
or uncertainty as to boundary which resulted in establishing the fence as the boundary line was not established.
Reversed and remanded.
Howe, J., filed dissenting opinion.
1. Adverse Possession <s»93
In order to establish adverse possession, claimant must show not only that he
has paid taxes on the property adversely
claimed, but that he paid them prior in time
to payments of record titleholder for seven
consecutive years. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-12.
2. Adverse Possession <s=>93
Adjoining property owner did not establish adverse possession of disputed strip
of land along common boundary where,
although the property owner made his tax
payments on the disputed strip prior to
payments made by adjoining landowners in
1967 and from 1971 to 1976, there was no

evidence as to which parties' tax payment
was actually received first in years 1968 to
1970, when both parties paid taxes on same
day. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-12.
3. Boundaries <s=»48(l)
In order to establish a boundary line
by acquiescence, there must be evidence of
occupation up to a visible line marked by
monuments, fences or buildings, a mutual
acquiescence in the line as a boundary for a
long period of time by adjoining landowners, and evidence of dispute or uncertainty
as to true boundary line measured against
an objective test
4. Boundaries 3=48(2)
For purpose of establishing boundary
line by acquiescence, there was no mutual
acquiescence between adjoining landowners
from 1972 onward where landowners on
east side understood that their western
boundary was five feet to west of fence
line, testified that they treated the five-foot
strip as theirs, tore down significant portion of the fence in 1973 and 1975 without
objection by adjoining landowners, and
planted trees and plants on the strip and
used it for compost pile and for storing
firewood. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-12.
5. Boundaries e»48(3)
Period of at most 15 years in adjoining
landowners' mutual acquiescence in fence
as boundary line did not meet requirement
of a "long period of time" necessary to
establish boundary line by acquiescence,
absent unusual circumstances that might
have justified a shorter period. U.C.A.
1953, 78-12-12.
6. Boundaries <^>37(5)
For purpose of establishing boundary
line by acquiescence, there was no evidence
of dispute or uncertainty as to true boundary line measured against an objective test
where there was no evidence showing dispute or uncertainty as to boundary which
resulted in establishing old fence as boundary line and where there was no evidence
showing who built the fence, why it was
built or when it was built. U.C.A.1953,
78-12-12.
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Thomas N. Crowther, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs and appellants.
Walter P. Faber, Jr., W. Chris Wicker,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent
HALL, Chief Justice:
Plaintiffs appeal a judgment of the district court that quieted title to a disputed
strip of land in defendant on the basis of
boundary by acquiescence and awarded
damages to defendant for trespass on that
strip by plaintiffs. Defendant cross-appeals the conclusion of the district court
that defendant did not carry his burden to
establish title to the disputed strip by adverse possession. We reverse the judgment of the district court and quiet title in
plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs and defendant own adjoining
residential properties with plaintiffs' property situated on the east The land in
dispute is a strip approximately 5.05 feet
wide and 340 feet in length that lies between the respective" parcels and along the
1. See sketch.

boundary between them.1 In 1939, title to
this strip as well as the adjoining property
to the east now owned by plaintiffs was
quieted in plaintiffs' immediate predecessors in interest, Lee Neff Taylor and June
Bitner Taylor. In 1972, following Mr. Taylor's death, Mrs. Taylor sold this property
to the plaintiffs conveying by two separate
deeds, a warranty deed and a quitclain
deed Plaintiffs' property not in dispute
was conveyed by warranty deed; the disputed strip was conveyed by quitclaim
deed. The description in the quitclaim deed
was later found not to close and another
quitclaim deed correcting the error in describing the strip in dispute was issued to
the plaintiffs in 1979.
Defendant acquired his property in 1972
by warranty deed. His claim to title of the
disputed strip arises from a quitclaim deed
dated 1957 from Maude 0. Airis to some of
defendant's predecessors in interest that
included the disputed strip. There was no
evidence in the chain of title that indicated
that Airis had the right to convey any oi
the disputed strip.
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Disputed S t r i p

Mill
Creek

NORTH

t
Old Fence
Line

In the Airis quitclaim deed, an "old
fence" is used as the monument to mark
the east boundary. A redwood fence existed in 1957 that extended for approximately
three-quarters of the length between the
defendant's and plaintiffs' properties. A
wire fence extended the remainder. Plaintiffs tore down a significant portion of the

fence in 1973 and 1975, leaving only about
95 feet standing.
In 1979, defendant began to clear the
disputed strip with a bulldozer to build a
bath house and assorted accessories to a
new swimming pool on his property. Plaintiffs immediately objected, claiming that
the disputed strip was their property and
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filed this suit to quiet title to the strip.
Defendant counterclaimed asking for title
to be quieted in him based on his deed,
boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession. The trial court quieted title in
defendant on the basis of boundary by acquiescence but refused to find adverse possession. The court also awarded damages
to defendant for trespass by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs appeal that judgment, contending the evidence fails to support a finding
of boundary by acquiescence and arguing
that the court erred in awarding damages
for trespass. Defendant cross-appeals the
denial of his claim to title of the disputed
strip based on adverse possession.
I. ADVERSE POSSESSION
The trial judge concluded that the evidence presented by the parties as to payment of the taxes on the disputed strip did
not meet the burden of proof required to
prove adverse possession.
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-12-12, states:
In no case shall adverse possession be
considered established under the provisions of any section of this code, unless it
shall be shown that the land has been
occupied and claimed for the period of
seven yearsLAontinuously,, and that the
party, his predecessors and. grantors
have paid all taxes which have been ieviedjincTassessed upon^such land accord-^
jngj^jaw.^-,
The evidence presented at trial indicated
that the county assessor had levied and
assessed property taxes on the disputed
strip to both plaintiffs and defendant.
Both parties paid these taxes from 1966 to
1976 with a three-year lapse by plaintiffs.
[1] In a case where both parties paid
taxes on disputed la.nd, this Court, in Rio
Grande Western Railway v. Salt Lake
2. 35 Utah 528, 101 P. 586 (1909).
3. Id. at 540, 101 P. at 591.
4.

1 Utah 2d 335, 266 P.2d 756 (1954); See also
Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P.2d 983
(1954).

Investment Co.,1 said that "the one who
pays first is to be deemed as having paid
the taxes for the purpose of acquiring title
by adverse possession."3 In Christensen
v. Munster,* the Court held that payment
by the record title holder of taxes prior to
payment by the adverse possessor interrupts the running of the seven-year prescribed period necessary to acquire title by
adverse possession.5 Thus, in order to establish adverse possession, the claimant,
here defendant, must show not only that he
has paid the taxes on the property adversely claimed, but that he paid them prior in
time to the payments of the record title
holder for seven consecutive years.1 This
approach serves the primary purpose of the
tax requirement in these cases, which is to
increase the likelihood that the record title
holder will be put on notice of adverse
possession.7
[2] In this case, the tax summaries indicated that in 1967 and from 1971 to 1976,
defendant made his tax payments prior to
payments made by plaintiffs. In 1968 to
1970, both parties paid the taxes on the
same day. There is no evidence as to
which party's tax payment was actually
received first in those years. Therefore,
defendant has failed to carry his burden of
proof of showing that he paid taxes on the
disputed property prior in time to plaintiffs
for seven consecutive years. The trial
court was thus correct in finding that defendant did not establish adverse possession.
II. BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
[3] In order to establish a boundary line
by acquiescence, there must be evidence of
(1) occupation up to a visible line marked
byl^numents, fences or buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary,
5. Christensen, supra note 4f at 336-37, 266 P.2d
at 757.
6. See Neeley v. Kelsch, Utah, 600 P.2d 979
(1979); Home Owners' loan Corp. v. Dudley,
105 Utah 208. 141 P.2d 160 (1943).
7. See Bowen v. Olson, supra note 4.
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(3) f o r j ^ n £ _ £ e r i o a ^ Jim^^
ing landowners.8 In addition, therejnust
bel5) evidence_qf dispute or uncertainty as
to~^jK£bpundary line jneasured against
an objective test 9
Plaintiffs argue that none of the elements necessary to establish boundary by
acquiescence have been met We agree
that proof of at least some of the elements
is lacking, most particularly those of mutual acquiescence, a long period of time and
dispute or uncertainty.
[4] Defendant claims that a redwood
fence located between the two properties
marks the east boundary of his property.
Plaintiffs, however, contend that their
western boundary lies five feet to the west
of the location of the fence. Testimony at
trial indicated that there was a redwood
fence on the property in 1957 and at least
partially thereafter. There was no evidence presented as to who built the fence,
when it was built or why it was built
Defendant and his predecessors in interest
testified that they believed that the fence
marked the boundary line between the two
properties and treated it as such, although
they also testified that the strip was so
overgrown that activities by either owner
would be difficult to see from the other
side. Plaintiffs testified that they understood that their western boundary was five
feet to the west of the fence line and that it
was so represented to them by the Taylors'
son when they walked the property prior to
buying it. Plaintiffs also testified that
they treated the five-foot strip as theirs. It
is undisputed that plaintiffs tore down a
significant portion of the fence in 1973 and
1975 without objection by defendant,10
planted trees, shrubs and other plants on
the disputed strip, used it for a compost
pile and storing firewood, built a chainlink
fence thereon and immediately objected, resulting in this lawsuit, when it appeared

that defendant was attempting to clear and
build on the strip.
Defendant contends that plaintiffs'
predecessors in interest treated the fence
as the boundary line and presented testimony to that effect from his predecessors in
interest. June Bitner Taylor, plaintiffs'
grantor, did not testify. Plaintiffs, however, argue that delivery of the quitclaim
deed specifically describing the disputed
strip negates the presumption that the Taylors acquiesced in the fence as the boundary line.
In any event, while it is arguable that
mutual acquiescence by both parties7 predecessors in interest has been shown, given
plaintiffs' actions from 1972 onward, there
is little doubt that plaintiffs did not acquiesce in the fence as the boundary line.
Therefore, the most that could be said was
that there was mutual acquiescence in the
fence as boundary from 1957 to 1972, a
period of fifteen years.
^1 Fifteen years does not meet the requirement "of a longjxjriodpjf time. This
Court, in Hobson v. Panguitch Lake
Corp.,11 said that only under unusual circumstances would any less than twenty
years be sufficient to establish boundary
by acquiescence. In this case, no unusual
circumstances have been shown that might
justify a shorter period. Therefore, in light
of the evidence which shows a period of
acquiescence of at most fifteen years, the
element of a sufficiently long period of
acquiescence has not been met
[6] Finally, there is no evidence whatsoever in the record showing dispute or uncertainty as to the boundary which resulted
in establishing the fence as a boundary
line.12 No evidence was presented at trial
showing who built the fence, why it was
built or when it was built. In addition, it

8. Goodman v. Wilkinson, Utah. 629 P.2d 447
(1981); Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389
P.2d 143 (1964).

10. Only 95 feet of the fence remains,
sketch.

9. Halladav v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (1984); Madsen v. Clegg, Utah. 639 P.2d 726 (1981).

12. See Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (1984).

See

11. Utah. 530 P.2d 792 (1975).
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was undisputed at trial that title to plaintiffs' land including the disputed strip was
quieted in the Taylors in 1939 and that
Maude Airis had no interest in the disputed
strip to convey in her 1957 quitclaim deed
to defendant's predecessors in interest.
No other evidence was presented that
would indicate the fence line was acquiesced in as a boundary because of some
uncertainty or dispute as to where the
boundary line really was. In the absence
of this evidence, this element of boundary
by acquiescence has not been proven, and
boundary by acquiescence could not be established.
III. TRESPASS DAMAGES
In light of our conclusion that defendant
had no claim to ownership of the disputed
strip, the damage award for trespass was
inappropriate, and we need not reach the
merits of the damages claim.
The judgment of the trial court quieting
title to the disputed strip in defendant and
awarding damages to him for trespass is
therefore reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court to enter judgment in
accordance with the opinion expressed
herein.
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
HOWE, Justice (dissenting):
I dissent. The majority opinion fails to
give proper deference to the finding q£fact
by~the trial court that -the^arties. acqSescecT uTthVfence as a boundary line for
more thanHhv^lr^years stemming jTpm
before' 1957 ^to'l979.~ The~fial court did
not regard the removal of a portion of the
fence in 1973 as breaking the acquiescence
since it found that about that time, Mrs.
Parsons had a conversation with Mr. Anderson about replacing the old fence with
the new one, that the defendants Anderson
reasonably expected that a replacement
fence would be built and that plaintiffs did
not take any other action which would have
exhibited their repudiation of the fence line
as the boundary. The majority has overlooked this finding of fact in its pronounce-

ment that the acquiescence was interrupted
in 1973.
The majority also errs in requiring proof
that the fence was acquiesced in as a
boundary because there was uncertainty or
dispute among the adjoining owners as to
the location of the true line. I pointed out
in my dissenting opinions in Halladay v.
Guff, 685 P.2d 500 (1984), and Stratford v.
Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (1984), that evidence
of uncertainty or dispute is not required in
a"boundary by acquiescence case.. ToTmpose such a requirement in an acquiescence
case is toWrn it ini'X).a_case_of boujndary by"*
express^parol J ^ r e e m e n ^ The two means
of establishing boundaries should notTbe
confused: In the^elwIie^TJouh'Hary by a ?
quiescence case decided by this Court,
Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009
(1906), we observed that there was no evidence that there had ever been any dispute
or question over the location of the boundary. We held that lack of evidence to be of
no consequence. Although some of our
subsequent cases have mentioned dispute
or uncertainty, it was either dicta or the
author was referring to boundary by express parol agreement where it is a requirement The law could be no other way
since acquiescence in a marked boundary
rarely results from dispute or uncertainty
as to the location of the true boundary. In
the typical case, the parties have never
discussed the boundary until shortly before
the lawsuit arises. But they have both
been content to silently abide by the marked boundary for 20 years or more, and the
law will not thereafter allow them to depart from it In requiring prpofj?Luncer^illt^Qr_dispute x j$ej^Qn
demise of boundary by acquiescence^, as a
means of settling boundary jiisputes, oyer
what are often insignificant narrow strips
o?Tand whlcF rarely add any value to the
land of the party who seeks to upset the
recognized boundary.
^ " ~*
The majority opinion decries thatJ_'no_
evidence was presented_at Jbrial^ showing
who built the fence, why it jvasJbuilt^or
whenit jyasfiuilt. '* The lack of answers to
those questions is the very stuff of which
boundary by acquiescence cases are made.
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Evidence as tx) tho?e matters is wholly immaterials. The important fact is that the
fence was on the ground and both adjoining owners acquiesced in it as the boundary
between their properties. In Holmes v.
Judge, supra, the same void in the evidence
existed. Said this Court: "The record does
not show who constructed the fence nor
who requested it to be built, except by
mere inference." That lack of evidence
was held to be of no consequence in the
application of the rule of boundary by acquiescence.
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate
herein.
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PROVO CITY CORPORATION, a Utah
municipal corporation, and Monticello
Investors, a Utah limited partnership,
Defendants and Appellant.
No. 18475.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 12, 1984.
Roofer brought action against city and
building owner for injuries he sustained
when he touched an electrical wire while
working as part of a roofing crew. The
Fourth District Court, Utah County,
George E. Ballif, J., entered judgment in
favor of roofer, and city appealed. The
Supreme Court, J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge, held that: (1) trial court acted
properly when it refused to rule as a matter of law that employee's negligence was
the sole proximate cause of roofer's injuries; (2) trial court adequately covered the
issues of foreseeability and proximate causation; (3) instruction given by trial court

regarding compliance with the national
electric safety code was a correct statement of the law and was clearer than the
language proposed by city; and (4) city
suffered no prejudice by trial court's instruction regarding its duty of care to protect persons from injury caused by its electrical system.
Affirmed.
Howe, J., concurred in separate opinion
joined by Stewart, J.
1. Employers' Liability ^ l
An employer has a duty not to expose
his employees to unreasonable dangers.
2. Negligence <3=>62(1)
A more recent negligent act may break
the chain of causation and relieve the liability of a prior negligent actor under the
proper circumstances.
3. Negligence «=*136(25)
Proximate causation is generally a
matter of fact to be determined by the
jury.
4. Electricity <s=>19(6)
In action brought by employee against
city and building owner for injuries he sustained when he touched an electrical wire
while working as part of a roofing crew,
whether employer's negligence was the
sole proximate cause of employee's injury
was question for jury.
5. Negligence <3=>62(1)
An intervening negligent act does not
automatically become a superseding cause
which relieves the original actor of liability;
the earlier actor is charged with foreseeable negligent acts of others; therefore, if
the intervening negligence is foreseeable,
the earlier negligent act is a concurring
cause.
6. Electricity <3=>19(13)
Instructions given by trial court adequately covered issues of foreseeability and
proximate causation in action brought by
roofer against city and building owner for
injuries he sustained when he touched an
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Objective Uncertainty in Boundary by
Acquiescence: Halladay v. Cluff
Locating boundaries between adjoining tracts of land has
been a continual source of dispute and litigation in Utah and
other jurisdictions.^To facilitate dispute resolution, courts have
"employed the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The doctrine presumes that when a recognizable physical boundary has
existed between adjoining tracts of land for a long period of time
any dispute over the boundary has been resolved.1 This avoids
controversy and prevents litigation.*
Attempting to settle prior inconsistent case law, f;he Utah
Supreme Court held in Halladay v. Cluff4 that "objective uncertainty" must exist in the record title or in "reasonably available
survey information" before the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence can be applied.1 This new requirement gives record title
priority over previously recognized on-the-ground boundaries,
which tends to encourage rather than discourage litigation.
I.

THE

Halladay CASE

In 1947 defendants Perry and Norma Bigelow purchased a
231-by-59-foot parcel of real property in Provo, Utah. In 1948
defendant Norma Cluff purchased a neighboring parcel of approximately the same dimensions.1 When the Bigelows and Cluff
purchased the lots, a fence surrounding the two lots included an
additional 52 Vi-feet behind the rear property line of the two
lots. This extension apparently resulted from the assumption
that the 231-foot depth of the lots extended from the edge of the
street fronting the lots rather than from points across the street
as indicated in the legal description.7 In 1958 plaintiffs Mack and
1. Note, Boundarie* by Agreement and Acquieicence in Utah, 1975 UTAH U R*V.
221.
2. Bftum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, 726 (Utah 1974); Note, tupra not* 1, at 224.
3. Hobaon v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 630 P.2d 792, 794 (Utah 1975); OUan v. Park
Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 425, 511 P.2d 145, 147 (1973).
4. Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984).
5. Id. at 507.
6. Id. at 501.
7. Id.
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Merle Halladay, who already owned property on the opposite
side of the fence, purchased the fifty-two-foot strip of disputed
property.8
The Bigelows and Cluff assumed they owned the fifty-twofoot strip in their backyards. Accordingly, they cultivated gardens and built and maintained chicken coops on the property.*
On one occasion in the 1950's, Mr. Halladay informed Mr. Bigelow that the Halladays claimed the disputed property. On several occasions in the 1970's, Mr, Halladay asked Mr. Bigelow not
to use the disputed parcel. The Halladays and ClufF did not discuss the property line until shortly before the litigation
commenced.10
In 1956 the Bigelows paid for a survey that indicated they
did not own the disputed parcel. However, the Bigelows and
Cluff believed the survey to be erroneous. In 1975 Cluff obtained
a plat that also indicated that the Bigelows and Cluff did not
own the disputed fifty-two-foot strip.11 In 1979 the Halladays
commenced this action to quiet title to the property. The
Bigelows and Cluff counterclaimed to quiet title in themselves
on the ground of boundary by acquiescence. The district court
held for the Bigelows and ClufF, and the Halladays appealed to
the Utah Supreme Court. The Halladays claimed boundary by
acquiescence does not apply when the location of the boundary
is not disputed or uncertain."
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding
that a party who claims boundary by acquiescence must show
"objective uncertainty" regarding the true location of the
boundary.1* The court reasoned that boundary by acquiescence
did not apply in this case since neither the Bigelows nor Cluff
had record title to the disputed property.14
In concluding that objective uncertainty is a requisite element of boundary by acquiescence, the court examined its earlier cases and noted that while it had required dispute or uncertainty in many recent cases, it had ignored the element in
others." Cases that required dispute or uncertainty were split on
S Id
9 Id
10 Id
11 Id
12 Id
13 Id
14 Id
15 Id

at 502
at 601 02
at 602
at 607
at 603 04 Much of the confusion regarding tht element of dispute or uncer-
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the question of whether dispute or uncertainty should be measured objectively or subjectively. In some cases the court required dispute or uncertainty to be traceable to an objectively
determinable ambiguity in a deed or survey.1* However, in other
cases the court found mere lack of knowledge sufficient.17
The court reasoned that the interest in encouraging reliance
on property dimensions as recorded in the county records outweighed the interest in confirming boundaries that have been
recognized on the ground for a long period of time. Thus, the
court opte& for an objective test that made objective uncertainty
an element of boundary by acquiescence. Although the requirement of dispute or uncertainty is not new to boundary by acquiescence in Utah, the court's requirement and definition of objective uncertainty will significantly effect future boundary by
acquiescence cases.
Justice Howe authored a spirited dissent criticizing the majority's objective uncertainty requirement. He argued that
"[s]uch a requirement [is] entirely foreign to the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence because the basis of the doctrine is
that the law implies that there once existed uncertainty and dispute and that the adjoining landowners mutually agreed upon
the marked boundary in settlement."1* Justice Howe reasoned
that the implication of uncertainty and settlement is essential to
the doctrine "because due to the passage of time, there is often
little or no evidence available [regarding] the erection of the
boundary marker."1* Justice Howe further argued that "proof of
uncertainty or dispute is not and never has been an ingredient'
or element of a cause of action for boundary by acquiescence."10
Rather, such proof has only been required in boundary by agreement cases.
tamty is attributable to the intermingling of the requirements of boundary by acquies
cence and the requirements of boundary by agreement Originally the element was mentioned only in connection with boundary by agreement. Beginning with Tripp v Bagley,
74 Utah 57, 276 P 912 (1928), the Utah Supreme Court referred to uncertainty or die
puts as an element of boundary by acquiescence Since that time, Utah caw* have been
inconsistent in their treatment of the element of dispute or uncertainty
16 Glenn v Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 273, 209 P 2d 257, 260 (1949), Note, tupra note
1, at 231 32
17 Ekberg v Bates, 121 Utah 123, 127, 239 P 2d 205, 207 (1951) (quoting Willie v
Local Realty Co, 110 Utah 523, 631, 175 P 2d 718, 723 (1946))
18 Halladay, 685 P 2d at 511 (Howe, J , concurring & dissenting)
19 Id at 612 (Howe, J , concurring & dissenting)
£0 la at 51U 11 (Howe, J , concurring & dissenting)
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ANALYSIS

The requirement of objective uncertainty invites increased
litigation and thereby defeats the basic rationale for adopting
boundary by acquiescence. Making objective uncertainty an element of boundary by acquiescence causes previously recognized
on-the-ground boundaries to be uncertain. Consequently, landowners may initiate litigation to increase the acreage of their
property.*1 Boundary disputes presumed to have been settled
prior to the Halladay case may now be reopened and litigated.
A.

The Doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence

The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has four consistent elements in Utah case law: (1) occupation up to a visible
line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings; (2) with mutual
acquiescence in the line as a boundary; (3) for a long period of
time; (4) by adjoining landowners." To prove the first element,
the party claiming boundary by acquiescence must show that
the respective parties either actually or constructively occupied
the land on each side of the claimed boundary." The plaintiff
must also show that the boundary line itself is visibly and permanently marked on the land by fences, buildings, or other
monuments.*4 The second element, mutual acquiescence, requires a showing that the owners accepted the line as a boundary.15 Showing that the parties actually intended or agreed that
the line be a boundary is not necessary. The party claiming
boundary by acquiescence need only show that the parties allowed the boundary to stand for a long period of time."
At least one state has held that the statutory period for adverse possession (generally seven years) is sufficiently long to
Batisfy the third element, which requires a long period of time.17
However, the Utah Supreme Court has held "[ojnly under unusual circumstances would a period less [than 20 years) be
21. Of course a judicial change would not alter the legal description found in the
record title, but it would increase the on-the-ground acreage available for use.
22. Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447, 44S (Utah 1981); Fuoco v. Williams, 18
Utah 2d 282, 284, 421 P.2d 944, 946 (1966).
23. Harding v. Allen, 10 Utah 2d 370, 37374, 363 P.2d 911. 913-14 (i960).
24. Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282, 286, 421 P.2d 944, 946 (1966).
26. Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 120, 605 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1973).
26. Id.
27. Lamm v. McTighe, 72 Wash. 2d 587, 434 P.2d 565 (1967).
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deemed sufficient."" The fourth element requires a showing that
the acquiescence is by adjoining landowners." Thus, the doctrine does not apply if the alleged boundary belongs to a single
owner or if the lands of different owners are separated by a strip
of land belonging to a third person.
Some Utah cases additionally have required that the adjoining landowners dispute, or be uncertain over, the true location of
the boundary." As previously noted, the issue in Halladay was
whether this uncertainty is a required element of boundary by
acquiescence and, if so, whether the uncertainty must be traceable to an objectively determinable ambiguity in a deed or survey
or whether mere lack of knowledge is sufficient.11
1.

The rationale

The basic reason for applying the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence is that it avoids litigation. The good order of society requires stability in the ownership and occupation of land.
Therefore, courts have sought to avoid litigation and controversy
by declining to disturb long-established boundary lines that
have been accepted by the concerned parties." In Baum v.
Defa" the Utah Supreme Court said:
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence derives from realiza28. Wood v. Mymp, 681 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1984) (quoting Hobton v. Panguitch
Lake Corp., 630 P.2d 792, 795 (Utah 1976)); King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 136, 141-42. 378
P.2d 893, 897 (1963).
29. Note, $upra note 1, at 228-29.
30. Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981). But tee Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629
P.2d 447 (Utah 1981) (making no mention of a showing of uncertainty or dispute). Other
jurisdictions that recognize boundary by acquieacence are split on whether dispute or
uncertainty is a required element of the doctrine. Dispute or uncertainty is not required
in New Mexico, Sprolee v. McDonald, 70 N.M. 168, 173, 372 P.2d 122, 126 (1962), or
Washington. Lamm v. McTighe, 72 Wash. 2d 587, 693, 434 P.2d 566, 569 (1967). But it is
required in Idaho. Lisher v. Kraaselt, 94 Idaho 513, 616, 492 P.2d 52, 66 (1962).
31. Halladay, 686 P.2d at 603-06. Early cases were also inconsistent regarding this
rule. See Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257 (1949), which required the element of dispute or uncertainty and held that "lack of knowledge as to the location of the
boundary is not synonymous with uncertainty." Id. at 272-73, 209 P.2d at 260. The court
in Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 (1951) (quoting Willie v. Local Realty
Co., 110 Utah 623, 631,175 P.2d 718, 723 (1946)), rejected this objective measurement in
favor of a subjective test in which "a boundary line may be 'uncertain' or 'in dispute'
even though it is capable of being readily ascertained." Ekberg, 121 Utah at 127, 239
P.2d at 207.
32. Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792, 794 (Utah 1975); Baum v. Defa,
526 P.2d 726. 726 (Utah 1974).
33. 625 P.2d 726 (Utah 1974).
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tion, ancient in our law, that peace and good order of society is
best served by leaving at rest possible disputes over long established boundaries. Its essence is that where there has been any
type of a recognizable physical boundary, which has been accepted as such for a long period of time, it should be presumed
that any dispute or disagreement over the boundary has been
reconciled in some manner.14
A second, less frequently invoked, rationale for the doctrine is
that it minimizes conflict with the statute of frauds, which forbids the transfer of an interest in real property without a written
conveyance.8*
The court in Halladay indicated that requiring objective
uncertainty would minimize reliance on boundary by acquiescence and thereby advance both rationales.86 Arguably, requiring
objective uncertainty does advance the statute of frauds rationale. However, close analysis of the doctrine indicates the requirement will result in increased litigation. Therefore, the basic rationale of preventing litigation is defeated by the objective
uncertainty requirement.
2.

Definition of objective uncertainty

Although some Utah cases have required dispute or uncertainty, objective uncertainty was not a settled element of boundary by acquiescence prior to Halladay. In making objective uncertainty an element of the doctrine, the court said, " '[DJispute*
is not proved by a mere difference of opinion, and 'uncertainty*
is not proved by a mere lack of actual knowledge of the true
location of the boundary.' "8T The court then formulated the following test:
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matter, from being reasonably certain about the true location
of the boundary.**
The court's definition of objective uncertainty requires a determination of whether there was "reasonably available survey
jiiformation." This phrase appears to originate, and is defined,"
in the Halladay case:
In general, when survey information is reasonably available
(such as when reliable survey control points are accessible to
the land and survey costs are not disproportionate to the value
of the land) so that it is reasonable to expect the parties to
locate their boundary on the ground by surveys, the courts
should be less willing to apply the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. This reasonable availability of survey information
obviously varies from place to place and from time to time.
However, it can be said in general that survey information is
more available and its cost is less likely to be disproportionate'
in relation to the value of the land in the city and platted areai
than in rural or wilderness areas.*9
The court's requirement of objective uncertainty and its
definition of "reasonably available survey information" complicate the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Utah courts will
now have to determine whetherjthe land is rur^l or urban and
whether the cost of a survejTis disproportionate to the value of
theJan^-THese inquiries tend to encourage and prolong litiga-~
tibn rather than prevent it, thereby contravening the primary
rationale for boundary by acquiescence.
B.

Applying the Element of Objective Uncertainty

Under the rule as we have defined it here, the property line on
the record title cannot be displaced by another boundary unless it is shown that during the period of acquiescence there
was some objectively measurable circumstance in the record title or in the reasonably available survey information (or other
technique by which record title information was located on the
ground) that would have prevented a landowner, as a practical

The pre-Halloday rule of boundary by acquiescence was
based on the policy of confirming boundaries that had been recognized on the ground for a long period of time. In contrast, the
Halladay court's requirement of objective uncertainty is based
on the policy of encouraging reliance on the dimensions shown
in the county records.40 By shifting the emphasis from established boundary lines to county records, the Halladay court has

34. Id. at 720.
35. Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1981); Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57,
71-72, 276 P. 912, 917-18 (1928).
36. Halladay, 686 P.2d at 605.
37. Id. (citing Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 273, 209 P.2d 257, 260 (1949)).

38. Halladay. 685 P.2d at 505. The Utah Supreme Court recently quoted this language in reaffirming that objective uncertainty ia a neceaaary element in boundary by
acquiescence. Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah 1984).
39. Id. at 504.
40. See id.
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undermined the previous rationale and presumption of boundary by acquiescence.
1.

Movement of on-the-ground boundaries

Boundary by acquiescence cases generally arise in two situations. In the first situation the true location of the boundary is
not ascertainable because of some uncertainty in the record title
or survey and a boundary was erected which may or may not be
the true boundary,41 In the second situation the true boundary is
ascertainable but the physical boundary was erected somewhere
other than on the true boundary.41
In the first situation, the additional requirement of objective uncertainty makes no difference. If the other four elements
of the doctrine are satisfied, the on-the-ground boundary will be
allowed to stand regardless of the requirement of objective uncertainty. In the second situation, the requirement of objective
uncertainty makes a difference. If objective uncertainty is not
required and the other four elements are met, the on-the-ground
boundary is allowed to stand. However, if objective uncertainty
is made an element of the doctrine, the on-the-ground boundary
will be moved because objective uncertainty was not present,
even though the other four elements of the doctrine may be met.
When objective uncertainty is made an element of the doctrine, the property owner in the second situation who could increase his acreage by moving the on-the-ground boundary is encouraged to bring action to quiet title to the additional property.
Prior to Halladay, the landowner had no incentive to file a quiet
title action because if the other four elements of the doctrine
were satisfied, the on-the-ground boundary could not be moved.
However, the objective uncertainty requirement allows one landowner to take possession of property previously occupied by another landowner, thus creating an adversarial situation. Since
the landowner whose acreage will be decreased by the move has
occupied the land for over twenty years, he will not likely give
up the property without litigation.
41. See Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d 105. 110-11, 369 P.2d 117, 120-21 (1962);
Jensen v. Bartlett, 4 Utah 2d 68, 60, 286 P.2d 804, 806 (1956).
42. See Halladay, 686 P.2d at 501-02; Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447, 448
(Utah 1981); Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 666, 667 (Utah 1979).
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Reasonably available survey information

The court's definition of "reasonably available survey information" also encourages litigation. The definition requires
courts to inquire into the value of the property in dispute, the
costs of the survey in proportion to the value of the property,
and the nature of the property—whether rural or urban.4* If the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is restricted to the traditional four elements, adjoining landowners can predict with reasonable certainty how a court will rule on a boundary dispute.
Therefore, in many cases litigating the dispute is unnecessary.
However, since the Halladay courts definition of reasonably
available survey information requires a factual determination involving several variables, parties will not be able accurately to
predict how a court will rule on a dispute. As a result, parties
will initiate litigation and hope the court will determine the
facts in their favor.
The factual variables the court must consider are subject to
change over time. This may cause inconsistent results that tend
to increase litigation. Situations could arise in which a court will
not require a survey because the cost of the survey is disproportionate to the land, even though a survey would resolve the ambiguities in the record title. Since the ambiguity is not resolved,
objective uncertainty will be found and the on-the-ground
boundary will not be moved. Further, because property values
frequently vary, a court facing a similar boundary dispute a year
later may require a survey if the increased value of the land now
makes a survey feasible. In that situation the ambiguity would
be resolved and there would be no objective uncertainty. The
cases would be resolved differently simply because the land increased in value. Such inconsistent results will make it difficult
for landowners to predict how the court would rule on their disputes. Therefore, the parties will seek litigation rather than settling on the basis of prior cases.
Additionally, the definition of reasonably available survey
information requires the court to make so many factual determinations that it increases not only the amount of litigation but
also the length of time spent litigating. In contrast, requiring
only the traditional four elements of boundary by acquiescence
43. Halladay, 686 P.2d at 604.
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would discourage litigation and thus further the traditional purpose of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
III.

CONCLUSION

The decision in Halladay is a significant development in the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The Utah Supreme Court
added the requirement of objective uncertainty to the four previously recognized teste. This marks a shift away from the traditional deference afforded long-recognized on-the-ground boundaries and toward protection of property dimensions as recorded.
Although reliance on county records is a legitimate policy consideration, in the boundary by acquiescence context the new requirement tends to increase litigation, thus defeating the traditional rationale for boundary by acquiescence.
Marvin D, Bagley
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counsel until after the child was surrendered. He filed a notice of
paternity within hours of the child's birth and commenced court
proceedings within one week, prior to the filing of an adoption
petition.4*4
Sanchez is significant because it marks a departure from the
policies underlying the Utah statute that were relied on in Ellis
and Wells. The Utah statute is designed to resolve the competing
interests of the illegitimate child and the man who claims to be its
father.446 The court noted in Wells that the statute provides a
means "(1) of promptly determining whether there is a man who
will acknowledge paternity and assume the responsibility of
parenthood, and if not, (2) of speedily making the child available
for adoption."411 Because Sanchez desired to claim paternity and
acknowledged responsibility for his child on many occasions, legislative intent would have been preserved by allowing Sanchez to
claim parental rights despite his imperfect compliance with the
statute. Sanchez therefore represents an abandonment of the legislative purpose in favor of a policy of "discouraging litigation"4*7 in
adoption cases.
Further, Sanchez marks an abandonment of the principled
analysis developed in Ellis and Wells to determine if failure to
comply with the statute was justified. Rather than analyze whether
it was "impossible" and "through no fault" of Sanchez that the
454. Id. The dissent considered the purpose of the filing deadline to feciliUte and
secure homes for children whose fathers are uncaring, not to "encourage a 'race' for placement to cut off the rights of fathers who are identified and present" Further, the dissent
noted that the majority's concern of prolonged litigation was unfounded because in the vast
majority of cases, the unwed father ie unlikely to claim parental right*. Id. at 767.
The dissent further pointed out that under Utah's statutory scheme, parental rights are
terminated well before a third party may obtain parental rights to an illegitimate child. See
UTAH COOT ANN. | 78-30-4(3)(d) (1983 Supp.). Parental rights are terminated on the child's
surrender to an adoption agency and an adoption petition cannot be filed until this time.
Moreover, the first tune anyone is obligated to check for a notice of parental righto is during
adoption proceedings, which cannot take place for a minimum of six months after the filing
of an adoption petition. Added flexibility in the statutory filing deadline, therefore, would
not prejudice third parties. Set 680 P.2d at 767.
466. Walla v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 681 P.2d 190, 204 (Utah 1084).
466. Id.
467. Sanchez, 680 P.2d at 766. This change in philosophy is contrary to United States
Supreme Court cases indicating that the underlying policy in terminating parental righto is
to make children available for adoption immediately when the natural father is unwilling to
assume responsibility for the child. See Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct 2066, 2996 (1083). In
Csban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1070), the Supreme Court held that where a father
demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by "coming forward to
participate in the rearing of hie child," his interest in personal contact with hie child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause. Id. at 302.
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filing deadline was not met, the court merely stated that u Wells
controls the issue here."411 The court may or may not have found
the Ellis exception applicable; however, the fact that those criteria
were not mentioned emphasizes the court's strict adherence to the
statutory filing deadline.411
In summary, Sanchez suggests that the Ellis exception to
compliance with the requirement of filing a notice of paternity is
extremely limited, if an exception still exists at all. This decision
reflects a shift in the underlying policy of the statute from one of
eliminating parental rights of uncaring fathers to one of reducing
litigation in adoption proceedings.411 That policy operates at the
expense of an unwed parent who indicates a commitment to his
child despite failure to comply with the statute. The Sanchez opinion leaves no question that strict compliance with the statutory filing deadline is the only way to assure a paternal claim to an illegitimate child in Utah.
VII.

A.

REAL PROPERTY

Boundary by Acquiescence

In Halladay v. Cluff,"1 the Utah Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence does not apply if the party
relying on the doctrine cannot show "objective uncertainty" as to
the location of the true boundary line.411 In reaching that conclusion, the court purported to clarify the elements of the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence and to reconcile contradictory Utah
authority.411 Following Halladay, the court in Stratford v.
468. Sanchez, 680 P.2d at 766.
469. The strict interpretation of the filing deadline in Sanchez may subject the Utah
statute to further constitutional attacks. Other states with statutory schemes similar to
Utah's allow for notice of paternity to be filed within sixty days of birth, ninety days of
birth, or before adoption proceedings terminate. See MINN. STAT. ANN. | 269.261(1) (West
1982) (requiring notice within ninety days of the child's birth or within sixty days of the
child's placement with the adoptive parents); SD CODIFIED LAWS ANN. | 26-61.1 (1984)
(requiring notice within sixty days of the child's birth and before the entry of a final order
in any adoption proceeding). The rapid termination of claims to parental righte in Utah
signals what may be further constitutional challengee to the Utah statute in the future, both
facially and aa applied.
480. See aupro note 412 and accompanying text
461. 686 P.2d 600 (Utah 1984).
462. Id at 606.
463. Id. at 603; see generally Note, Boundary by Agreement and Acquiescence in
Utah, 1976 UTAH L. RSV. 221 (hereinafter cited as Boundary by Agreement); Note, Boundary by Acquiescence, 3 UTAH L. Rav. 604 (1953) (discussing the historical development of
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Morgan"4 again rejected a claim of acquiescence, affirming the
"objective uncertainty" test as developed in Halladay4** These decisions^ffectively eliminate boundary by acquiescence as a viable
doctrine for settling property disputes in Utah. As a result7 longstanding boundaries may now_ be subject to challenge.40
Boundary by acquiescence as a means of settling boundary
line disputes has long been recognized in Utah law. m The doctrine, as a rule of repose, is based on the policy that a boundary
that has been acquiesced in for a number of years should not be
disturbed.4** The effect is to quiet title in the claimant.4** To establish a boundary by acquiescence, the claimant must prove all of
the following elements:470 (1) occupation up to a visible line
marked definitely by monuments, fences or buildings;471 (2) mutual
acquiescence in the line as a boundary;47* (3) for a long period of
years;471 (4) by adjoining landowners.474
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence in Utah).
464 No. 18306 (Utah Aug. 30, 1984). The Utah court decided a second case in accord
with Stratford the following day. See Persons v. Anderson, No. 17827, slip op. at 4 (Utah
Aug 31, 1984).
465. Stratford, No. 18306, slip op. at 6.
|
466. See id. slip op. st 9 (Howe, J., dissenting) ("all boundaries sre now 'fsir game* ").
ijThat result if particularly significant because claimants in boundary disputes in Utah uaujaJly are unable to rely on adverse possession as an alternate theory for quieting title in
' occupied property. See mfra note 620; Stratford, No. 18306, slip op. at 7.
467. See supra note 463.
468. See Moyer v. Langton, 37 Utah 9, 106 P. 608 (1910); supra note 463.
469. See supra note 463.
470. See Hale v. Frakee, 600 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah 1979); Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 2d
282, 284, 421 P.2d 944, 946 (1966) (Fuoco II); Boundary by Agreement, supra note 463, at
224.
471. Occupation may be constructive or actual. See Brown v. Peterson Dev. Co., 622
P.2d 1176, 1177 (Utah 1980) (cultivating the ground); King v. Pronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 138,
378 P.2d 893, 896 (1963) (placing a mortgage or other encumbrance on the property): Dragoa
v. Russell, 120 Utah 626, 628-29, 237 P.2d 831, 832-33 (1961) (building or other improvements). The boundary line mutt alto be marked clearly and visible. See Brown v. Peterson
Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1176, 1176 (1980) (fence and irrigation ditch); Davia v. Lynham, 67 Utah
283, 287, 247 P. 294, 296 (1926) (buildings and trees); Bartholomew v. Pickett, 61 Utah 312,
314, 170 P. 66, 66 (1917) (fence lines and ditchee). But see Fuoco II, 18 Utah 2d 282, 286,
421 P.2d 944, 947 (1966) (rejecting an irrigation ditch aa a boundary line where the ditch
was subject to "shifting or obliteration by erosion").
472. See infra notes 476-78 and accompanying text
473. In most states, this period is the same as the limitations period for adverse possession. Boundary by Agreement, supra note 463, at 228 & n.67. Early Utah cases accepted
that view, requiring only a seven-year period of acquiescence. See Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah
123, 239 P.2d 206, 208 (1951) (although the parties had acquiesced in the boundary for
fourteen years, the court indicated in dicta that it would accept the seven-year limitations
period for adverse possession), overruled on other grounds, Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255,
1268 (Utah 1984) (eleven years was insufficient). More recently, the court has estended the
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The element of mutual acquiescence has generated the greatest amount of controversy in Utah.47* Acquiescence has been defined as "indolence," or "consent by silence/'4'* and generally requires that both property owners recognize and accept the line as
the boundary.477 Boundary by acquiescence will not exist where
one party consistently maintains that the marked line is not the
boundary, even though the line remains visible and the other party
occupies up to it.47* Thus, although mutual acquiescence does not
require express agreement, there cannot be express disagreement.
In some earlier cases, the Utah court has accepted lack of uncertainty or dispute over the location of the boundary line as a
defense to boundary by acquiescence.47* In Glen u. Whitney,4** the
court suggested that where the parties did not know where the true
location of the boundary was but where it could have been determined, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence was inapplicable.4*1 However, the court rejected that position in Brown u. Millin r 4
? t *L, stating that a party relying on boundary by acquiescence
was not required "to produce evidence that the location of the true
boundary line was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute."4** Most
cases adopt this latter rule and imply dispute and subsequent acquiescence from the parties' conduct during the requisite period of
time.4*4 Thus disputing landowners could be bound by the conduct
acquiescence period to require at least twenty years. Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530
P.2d 792, 796 (Utah 1975) (accepting twenty years); King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 140 42,
37S P.2d 893, 896-97 (1963) (twenty years eicept in unusual circumstances).
474. See Baum v. Defa, 625 P.2d 726, 727 (Utah 1974) (fence erected when land on
both aides was owned by the same person did not imply an intention of creating a boundary); Fuoco II, 18 Utah 2d 282, 286. 421 P.2d 944, 947 (1966) (acquiescence by tenants to
boundary marked by irrigation ditch was not sufficient; acquiescence of landowner was
required).'
475. The court has been unable to agree whether the test for acquiescence is subjective
or objective. Compare Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 120, 506 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1973)
(objective indolence sufficient) with Wright v. Cliaaold, 521 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah 1974)
(subjective test applied to find no acquiescence).
476. Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 119-20, 506 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1973).
477. See Fuoco II, 18 Utah 2d 283, 286, 421 P.2d 944, 947 (1966).
478. See. ej., Leon v. Danaie, 639 P.2d 730, 731 (Utah 1981); Ringwood v. Bradford, 2
Utah 2d 119, 269 P.2d 1053 (1954).
479. Glenn v. Whitney. 116 Utah 267, 272-73, 209 P.2d 267, 260 (1949).
480. 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257 (1949).
481. Id at 272, 209 P 2d at 260.
482. 120 Utah 16, 232 P 2d 202 (1951).
483. Id at 26, 232 P. 2d at 208.
484. Id, 232 P.2d at 208; see also MoUkus v. Carroll. 7 Utah 2d 237, 243, 322 P 2d
391, 396 (1968) (a long period of acquiescence gives rise to the presumption that the true
boundary line was in dispute or uncertain); Binford v. Eccles, 41 Utah 463, 458. 126 P. 333.
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of their predecessors who had acquiesced in a boundary for a long
period of time.4fi
Despite the fact that uncertainty or dispute could be implied
from a long period of acquiescence, the opposing party still could
defeat the claim of boundary by acquiescence by rebutting any
other prima facie element.4** Thus if the opposing party could
show that the claimant or his or her predecessors in interest knew
the accurate location of the boundary, that the marked line was
intended for other purposes or that the line had not existed for the
requisite number of years, the claim of boundary by acquiescence
would fail.4*7
In Halladay v. Cluff,4" the Utah Supreme Court accepted the
established elements of boundary by acquiescence but added a
fifth element of objective uncertainty.4** In Halladay, the parties
disputed the ownership of a 52.5-by-118-foot parcel of property in
the City of Provo. Three property owners were involved. Defendants Bigelow and Cluff bought their property in 1947 and 1948,
respectively. Both assumed that their north property line extended
to a fence that had been built in the 1930*8. In 1956, nine years
after he purchased the property, Bigelow had a survey made that
placed the north property line several feet south of the existing
fence. Both Bigelow and Cluff apparently believed the survey to be
in error and continued to occupy the property up to the fence.4*0
During this period of adjoining ownership, the Halladays maintained that the fence did not mark the correct boundary line and
so informed the claimants on one occasion in the 1950*8 and several times during the 1970'B.491 The Halladays commenced their action to quiet title in 1979.
335 (1912) (adopting the rule of implied agreement where one party claimed certain surplus
ground and her neighbor acquiesced in the line regardless of the deed description); Holmes
v. Judgt, 31 Utah 269, 281, 87 P. 1009, 1014 (1906) ("the law will imply an agreement fixing
the boundary as located and will not permit the parties or their grantors to depart from
such lines").
485. See Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 (1951), overruled on other
grounds, Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1984); Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110
Utah 623, 531, 175 P.2d 718, 723 (1946); supra note 484.
486. See Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979).
487. Boundary by Agreement, supra note 463, at 229-30.
488. 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984).
489. Id. at 505; see also Parsons v. Anderson, No. 17817, slip op. at 4 (Utah Aug. 31,
1984) (referring to a fifth element as "evidence of dispute or uncertainty aa to the true
boundary line measured against an objective teat," citing Halladay).
490. Halladay, 685 P.2d at 501-02.
491. Id. at 502.
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The district court quieted title in the defendants, finding
boundary by acquiescence. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the claimants Cluff and Bigelow could not assert
boundary by acquiescence where they had previously surveyed the
property and had "reason to know the true location of the boundary during the period of acquiescence."491
Under the facts of the case, the same result could have been
reached by applying the established test for boundary by acquiescence. The claimants examined surveys prior to the running of the
period of acquiescence and had actual knowledge that the fence
did not represent the true boundary. In addition, the plaintiffs
consistently claimed ownership of the parcel.491 Thus, under prior
case law, boundary by acquiescence could have been rebutted; mutual acquiescence would not exist where there was an express disagreement between the parties on the location of the line and uncertainty would not be implied where the opposing party could show
that there was no dispute or that the true boundary was known to
the respective owners.494
The court, however, chose not to reject the claimant's position
based on the established criteria for a prima facie case but instead
argued for a "return to a more rigorous definition" of "dispute."4"
Rejecting the rule that a dispute may be implied from acquiescence, the court held that the claimant must demonstrate the existence of uncertainty or dispute about the true location of the
boundary line during the period of acquiescence.4** Additionally,
the court held that a dispute or uncertainty could not be premised
on "a mere difference of opinion" or "lack of actual knowledge of
the true location of the boundary."4*7 Rather, a claimant must present "some objectively measurable circumstance in the record title
or in the reasonably available survey information . . . that would
have prevented a landowner, as a practical matter, from being rea492. Id. at 506.
493. Id. at 502.
494. Id. at 508 (Howe, J., concurring and ditaenting). Justice Howe cites the following
cases where the claim of boundary by acquiescence failed because the true boundary was
known to the owners: Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981); Florence v. Hiline Equipment Co., 581 P.2d 998 (Utah 1978); Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110 Utah 523, 175 P.2d 718
(1946); Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912 (1928); see also supra note 478 and accompanying text.
495. Halladay, 685 P.2d at 505.
496. Id.
497. Id.
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sonably certain about the true location of the boundary."01 Thus
the court transformed the questionable defense of lack of uncertainty into a key requirement for maintaining a claim of boundary
by acquiescence.490
The court's holding departs from prior law that emphasized
actual knowledge of the true boundary. Under that approach, acquiescence coupled with lack of actual knowledge could imply uncertainty, even though a survey might have placed the line accurately. Under the Halladay rule, however, if there is any
information that could locate the true boundary line, there is no
uncertainty and the claim of boundary by acquiescence will fail.
That is true even if a survey was not made during the period of
acquiescence, or the opposing party made no claim to the property.500 That change in the law severely limits application of the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
While the "objective uncertainty" requirement of Halladay
may have been dicta under the facts of the case,601 Stratford v.
Morgan™ elevated that dicta to a rule of law. In Stratford, the
court held that where a deed description establishes the true location of a common boundary, there is no objective uncertainty as
required by Halladay and boundary by acquiescence will not
apply."*
JStratfordjaiBkes it clear that the element of objective uncertainty will limit the future application of the doctrine. The claimants in Stratford met the requirements for a prima facie case of
boundary by acquiescence under prior Utah law. The claimants
and their predecessors in interest had occupied the property up to
a visible fence line for nearly thirty years. However, according to a
survey made after the running of the period of acquiescence, the
fence line did not agree with the metes and bounds description in
the deeds of both parties,*04 Because the true boundary was ascertainable from the deed descriptions, the court held that the test of
objective uncertainty was not met.
Justice Howe, dissenting in both Halladay*0* and Stratus. Id.
499. See supra notes 479-85 and accompanying text
500. See infra note 503 and accompanying text.
501. Halladay, 885 P.2d at 508 (Howe, J., concurring and dissenting).
502. No. 18306 (Utah Aug. 30, 1984).
503. Id. slip op. at 5.
504. Id slip op. at 1-3. The occupation of the property by the claimant* included
building a fishpond and an exercise track for their horses. Id.
505. 685 P.2d 500, 508 (Howe, J., concurring and dissenting).
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ford*0* argued that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has
been applied restrictively in Utah and need not be limited further
by the requirement of objective uncertainty.W7 Justice Howe also
emphasized the policy reasons for accepting the doctrine, stating
that it has provided a basis for settling disputes over insignificant
amounts of land.900 In addition, the doctrine has discouraged disputes in cases where a recent survey conflicts with long recognized
boundaries.*0* Justice^Howe^concluded that JStratford coupled with
Halladay "effectively sounds the death knell of boundary by acquiescence in this state,"*10
v
Justice Howe's prognosis for the application of boundary by
acquiescence is probably correct.111 The doctrine, as restricted by
506. Stratford, No. 18306, slip op. at 8 (Howe, J., dissenting).
507. Halladay, 685 P.2d at 508 (Howe, J., concurring and dissenting).
608. Id.
509. Id. at 514.
510. Stratford, No. 18806, slip op. at 9.
511. The majority opinion in Halladay, 685 P.2d at 505-06, cites the following cases
where the test of objective uncertainty would be met: Joaquin v. Shiloh Orchards, 84 Cal.
App. 3d 192, 194,138 Cal. Rptr. 495, 496 (1978) (landmarks referenced in deeds have disappeared); Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d 106, 110-11, 369 P.2d 117, 120-21 (1962) (metes and
bounds descriptions that do not close); Moxkus v. Carroll, 7 Utah 2d 237, 322 P.2d 391, 393
(1958) (uncertainties or disputes created by conflicting terms in deeds, such as overlapping
descriptions); Jensen v. Bartlett, 4 Utah 2d 58, 60, 286 P.2d 804, 806 (1955) (no official or
original plat or survey by which the boundary lines can be located); id. at 60, 286 P.2d at
806 (disagreement among different surveyors on the location of the boundary line); Young v.
Hyland, 37 Utah 229, 233, 108 P. 1124, 1126 (1910) (internal inconsistencies in the plat);
Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 271, 87 P. 1009-10 (1906) (inability to locate monuments
established in the original survey).
However, in reviewing twenty-six cases where the doctrine has been successfully invoked in Utah, the author of this development found only twelve that would likely survive
the standard of objective uncertainty. An example of a case that decreed title by acquiescence prior to Halladay and Stratford that would probably not meet the test of objective
uncertainty includes the situation where there U a valid survey, plat or deed description
available but where the court determined the boundary line to be a fence or other marker
that the parties had acquiesced in for the requisite period of years. See Brown v. Peterson
Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1980) (no survey had been made but the boundary could
have been located from the record title); Baum v. Defa, 625 P.2d 725 (Utah 1974) (survey
available); Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 506 P 2d 1199 (1973) (boundary ascertainable
from the metes and bounds description); Universal Inv. Corp. v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 36,
484 P.2d 173 (1971) (boundary could have been determined from the deed information,
placing the boundary line through the claimant's home); Johnson v. Sessions, 25 Utah 2d
133, 477 P.2d 788 (1970) (survey available); King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 378 P.2d 893
(1963) (boundary determinable by reference to the plat); Harding v. Allen, 10 Utah 2d 370,
363 P.2d 911 (1960) (accurate survey available); Provonsha v. Pitman, 6 Utah 2d 26, 305
P.2d 486 (1967) (line ascertainable by survey); Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205
(1951) (survey located true boundary), overruled on other grounds, Wood v. Myrup, 681
P.2d 1255 (Utah 1984); Dragos v. Russell, 120 Utah 626, 237 P.2d 831 (1951) (deed line
ascertainable by survey); Willie- v. Local Realty Co., 110 Utah 523, 175 P.2d 718 (1946)
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the court, applies only where it can be affirmatively shown that it
was not possible for the two parties to determine their actual deed
lines by survey at the time the fence or other boundary markers
were placed.11* Even where a boundary marker has been acquiesced in for over twenty years, the doctrine would not apply if
twenty years ago the fence or marker could have been placed on
the true boundary line. It is difficult to imagine many circumstances where the parties could not have correctly surveyed their
properties.1" Where a survey has not been made or where it cannot be shown that the survey made was erroneous or inconsistent,
the law no longer will imply uncertainty or dispute and subsequent
agreement or mutual acquiescence in the location of a boundary.
Rather, the claimant must be able to prove that the boundary dispute could not be resolved by a survey made at any time during
the period of acquiescence.114
The court in Halladay opted for a "bright line" test. That
test, however, may defeat the purpose of the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence for it disregards the conduct of the property owners and their successors in interest during the period of acquiescence and ignores the element of occupation.'11 Those are the precise factors that the doctrine was designed to take into account in

settling boundary disputes.*1* While such a bright line test may
promote reliance on the record title information,117 it is likely to
lead to absurd practical results. In many cases the affected property will be a narrow strip of ground. The survey costs may exceed
the value of the property. Homes or other improvements may have
been built on the strip of property in question. Under Halladay,
uncertainty will not be implied in those situations and boundaries
™}ll_be reestablished only after costly surveys and litigation.*1*
Damages may be assessed for encroachments, and improvements
more valuable than the property itself may be ordered removed.*1*
Since claimants in Utah cannot rely on the doctrine of adverse
possession to settle boundary disputes,*10 there is no effective way
ftjrqujet titleTto small portions of land representing the difference
between a fence line and a deed description.
The result of Halladay and Stratford may be to convert a doctrine that was originally predicated on the policy of settling boundaries by reference to long acquiesced in lines into a doctrine that
will serve as a basis for challenging boundaries not founded on recent survey information. Thus, in contrast to the purpose of the
court, litigation over boundaries may increase. In that event, the
solution to future boundary disputes may lie in legislative action.

(accurate survey available); Davis v. Lynham, 67 Utah 283, 247 P. 294 (1926) (metes and
bounds description in deed); Warren v. Mazxuchl, 46 Utah 612, 148 P. 360 (1915) (current
survey available); Moyer v. Lanfton, 37 Utah 9, 106 P. 608 (1910) (court used a fence as
evidence of 'the monuments used in the prior survey where the original monuments had
disappeared).
j
612. See infra notes 616-18 and accompanying text
'j
613. See $upra note 611 for situations where objective uncertainty would apply.
j
614. Prior Utah law held that it is "incumbent on the party disputing title by acquies-J
cence to prove that a boundary was not established" once the four elements of boundary byj
acquiescence were demonstrated. Fuoco //, 18 Utah 2d 282, 284, 421 P.2d 944,946 (1966). Ial
Halladay, the court placed the burden of proving objective uncertainty on the party claim j
ing by acquiescence. That aspect of the court's holding wss limited to the facta of the easel
686 P.2d 607. However, by generally requiring evidence that the landowner was prevented!
from accurately locating the boundary and by removing the implication of uncertaintfj
where a boundary line has long been acquiesced in, the court places the burden squarely e n
the claimant in most instances.
] |
616. Halladay, 686 P.2d at 609 (Howe, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Hotffl
pointed to three criticisms of the court's requirement of objective uncertainty. First, a sujjjl
vey actually may have been made but because of the lapee of time, no one who was prsssjSH
then is alive or available to provide such evidence. Under the majority's rule the later survM
therefore would govern. Second, the rule disregards the conduct of the owners in acquiesdagl
to the markers on the ground. Third, the court takes on the impossible task of deUnnlningl
whether the owners several years ago could have afforded s survey or whether the property?
at the time would have been worth it Id. Justice Howe's concern with the Halladay teet*ofl
ignoring the element of occupation was warranted, as is demonstrated in Stratford. SHIJ
tupra note 604 and accompanying text

516. Halladay, 685 P.2d at 609 (Howe, J., concurring and dissenting).
617. Id at 604.
518. As an alternative theory to boundary by acquiescence, a claimant might argue a
prescriptive easement Set Anderson v. Osguthorpe, 29 Utah 2d 32, 504 P.2d 1000 (1972)
(easement in the nature of a profit a prendre to the entire tract where claimant had not paid
taxes and could not establish boundary by acquiescence but had used the property for over
fwenty years).
J. 619. See, e.g., Stratford, No. 18036 (Utah Aug. 30, 1984).
^ 620. In most states the impact of Halladay would be less severe because the claimant
often could quiet titis by adverse possession. However, Utah requires the payment of taxes
|for a claim of adverse possession and taxes are generally levied according to the description
in the deed, not by fence lines acquiesced in by adjoining landowners. See UTAH COOI ANN.
| | 78-12-12 (1977). Other states requiring the payment of taxes to quiet title by adverse
possession include: (1) California, CAL. Crv. PROC. CODI | 325(2) (West 1972); (2) Florida,
iPtA. STAT. ANN. | 95.18 (West 1982); (3) Idaho, IDAHO CODS f | 6-207, -210 (1979) (taxes
Required when adverse possession based on an oral claim as opposed to a written instrument); (4) Indiana, INO. Cona ANN. | 34-1-2-2 (Burns 1973); (6) Montana, MONT. CODE ANN.
(|f11.160 (1983); (6) New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. | 37-1-22 (1978); (7) Washington, WASH.
.tar. COM ANN. | 7.28.050,070 (1961). States that have a shorter statute of limitations for
[adverse possession when taxes are paid and a longer one when taxes are not paid include:
^ 8 o u t h Dakota, SJ). CODIFIED LAWS ANN. fS 15-3-10, -11, -15, -16 (1984) (twenty years
^required when no taxes paid, ten years required when taxes paid); (^LTSSHJ^* Crv. STAT.
AMM. arte. 5509, 6510 (Vernon 1958) (five years required when taxes paid, ten years required
^wfcen no taxee paid); (3) Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN | | 893.26-27 (West 1983) (ten years
required when no taxes paid, five years required when taxes paid). See generally POWKLL.
^ o w r r v 1 1013f21 (1982).
——«*.
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For example, the statute on , adverse «..posse8$ionMI^couldibi
amended to conform to the realities of boundary problems inUtaE
In addition to granting title by adverse possession where the claim?
ant has paid the taxes and occupied the land under a claim of right
for seven years,*" title by adverse possession could also be granted1
where a claimant has occupied property up to a visibly marked linf
for a period of twenty years without the payment of taxes.*** Su3t
legislative action or a reversal of Halladay v. Cluff may be the onjf
way to minimize litigation and stabilize boundary lines in Utatfft
B.

Easements in Gross

In Crane u. Crane,**4 the Utah Supreme Court held thatjonM
mercial easements in gross are transferable, contradicting fprijfij
dicta that had indicated easements in gross were inalienabl^jj
The decision signifies the Utah court's adoption of the Restate!
ment of Property position"* regarding this type of property jntai
est, a view that modifies the common law.
NK*J
The plaintiffs in Crane had used a dirt road that crossedJSI
defendants' land to drive their cattle to and from grazing laijdftj
the Fish Lake National Forest. The plaintiffs brought suit Wm
tablish their continued right to use that road, claiming tha^raM
had obtained a prescriptive easement across the defen
property."7
At the time the complaint was filed, ten of the twelve in
ual plaintiffs had not been using the trail for the twenty years
quired to establish an easement by prescription."* These plaintifl
however, were successors to former members of a grazing assotf
tion that had adversely919 used the same road to transport cattle
and from the grazing land since 1950."° At trial, the question";

_3H
~ ~ " 521. UTAH CODE ANN. | 73-12-12 (1977).

522.
523.
524.
526.

Id.
See $upra note 520.
683 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1984).
Emit v. Allen, 56 Utah 272, 277, 184 P. 827, 829 (1919) (quoting 3 Wjl

PHRASES 2311).

**'

626. RISTATBMBNT or PROPERTY | 489 (1944): "Easement* in gross, if of a
character, are alienable property interests." See infra note 544.
527. 683 P.2d at 1063.
I,(
628. Id. at 1066; nee Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 160, 162 (Utah 1981) (recce^
^
Utah common law rule requiring a twenty-year prescriptive period).
^'ttet]
529. The Utah Supreme Court sustained the district court's finding that the v » f l
adverse. Crane, 683 P.2d at 1065.
I'
630, Id. at 1066=
f
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wfiether these plaintiffs had established a prescriptive* easement
kinged on whether the claimants could "tack on"611 the years of
their^predecessors' use to determine if the period of adverse use
smeTthe twenty-year requirement. The answer to that question depended in turn on whether an established easement in gross1"
cpid&be transferred.1** The district court held that the plaintiffs
4*d|obtained a prescriptive easement/*4 and by inference, that
easements in gross are transferable.
r^J Easements in gross were not generally transferable at common
pjr.JJhBy definition, an easement in gross burdens a servient teneJiwuyithout benefiting any neighboring lapd owned by the posPfsmfdf the easement.*" Because such an easement tends to ret^ric^the utilization of the servient tenement by the owner without
•^ng the use of any neighboring land, an easement in gross argualeads to a less efficient utilization of land.**7 In order to proline economic utilization of land, common law courts thereVeld that easements in gross were personal, nonalienable
rests* That rule prevented those perceived "undesirable" inter•from lasting indefinitely, limiting their duration, at most, to
twjUffiof the original owner of the easement. Early Utah case law
loptemthat common law rule.***
wTlwiinalienability of certain types of easements in gross, howMa%|tiurden8 society in general more than it protects the individMJWyffint tenement from reduced utility. For example, a power
tfmwajng private property might lessen the value of that land
creating'an eyesore, a hazard, or by monopolizing space that
•rwisefepuld be utilized by the property owner. On the other
)|X^£fl&me power line may supply electricity to an entire com•ity^miles away. Transferability of that easement may decrease
^duejgfthe servient tenement by allowing a potentially permad
JBEEt
Jj^Fsckinf on" occurs when successive possessions are joined to constitute the full
r period.'There must be some sort of privity between the current user and the predj) fbr.tacfctaf on to be allowed. Cheatham v. Vanderwey, 18 Arix. App. 35, 499 P.2d
J (lf72)?blckinaon v. Pake, 284 N.C. 676, 201 S.E.2d 897, 903 (1974).
t s l l i e district court concluded that the easement in question was an easement in
*5w?«83 P.2d at 1064-65.
|MtK*l067.
|J«\fti*1064.
.JldSii 10M; Maw v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy Diet, 20 Utah 2d 195, 197,
I t t 0 * » 2 (1968); Ernst v. Alien, 55 Utah 272, 276-77, 184 P. 827, 829 (1919); An not,
J t 1263,(1941).
fcgDeeeret Livestock Co. v. Sharp, 123 Utah 353, 358, 269 P.2d 607, 610 (1953).
F.fftBvrATSMBNT of P*onwTY | 489 (1944).
l ^ S # e Ernst v. Allen, 55 Utah 272, 277, 184 P. 827, 829 (1919).
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HALLADAY V. CLUFF: "OBJECTIVE
UNCERTAINTY" IN DEED!
I.

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence1 has had a confused and
oftentimes troubled history in the Utah courts. In three 1984 Utah
Supreme Court decisions,1 the requirements for boundary by acquiescence have been significantly extended, creating doubt as to the doctrine's continued availability in Utah. Although the recent cases have
in some respects clarified the doctrine in Utah, the new requirement
of "objective uncertainty" as to the true location of the boundary line
makes the doctrine inapplicable to a great majority, if not all, of the
"cases involving disputed boundary locations. This Note will attempt
to clarify the status of the doctrine following these three most recent
cases, focusing primarily on Halladay v. Cluff.*
II.

BACKGROUND

A. A Brief History of Boundary by Acquiescence in Utah
Although the Utah Supreme Court's historical acceptance of the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has waivered, boundary by acquiescence has existed in Utah in a fairly developed form for almost
eighty years. During its history/ the doctrine has often been confused with the doctrine of boundary by agreement.9 The confusion
1
Boundary by acquiescence if a judiciaJ doctrine where neighboring landowners who have
recognized a boundary for a long period of time will be assumed to have agreed upon the
boundary at an earlier date. Under the doctrine, such presumed boundaries are judicially recognized and enforced.
• Halladay v. Cluff, 686 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984); Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P 2d 360 (Utah
1984); Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984).
• 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984).
4
Other articles have dealt in depth with the history and development of boundary by acquiescence and the related doctrine of boundary by agreement See Note, Boundary by Acquiescence, 3 UTAH L. Rav. 504 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Note, Acquiescence)', Note, Boundaries
by Agreement and Acquiescence in Utah, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 221 [hereinafter cited as Note,
Agreement and Acquiescence}. Both articles summarize the development of the two doctrines,
and provide a general overview of the confusions and inconsistencies which have plagued this
area of Utah law. For the first case clearly establishing boundary by acquiescence in Utah, see
Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269. 87 P. 1009 (1906); see also Halladay, 685 P.2d at 508 (Howe, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (stating that Halladay is "an unwarranted assault upon boundary
by acquiescence as it has been developed by the cases of this Court over the past 80 years").
• See, e.g., Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792 (Utah 1975). The doctrines of
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between the two doctrines became so pronounced that a Utah Law
Review article written in 1975 concluded that boundary by agreement
had merged into the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.6 The
Utah Supreme Court, however, has again shown confusion between
the two doctrines as recently as 1981.7
Despite the confusion between boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence, the court consistently required four elements for
a boundary by acquiescence claim. They included: (Inoccupation up
to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (3) for a long period of
time,8 (4) by adjoining landowners.* In addition, some Utah Supreme
Court cases,10 most notably the recent cases which are the subject of
this Note, have imposed a fifth requirement that there be uncertainty
or dispute as to the actual location of the property line.
The degree of uncertainty required, and whether that uncertainty
is measured objectively or subjectively, is the primary focus of the
1984 cases of Halladay v, Clufftu Stratford v. Morgan11 and Parsons
v. Anderson.1* The new requirement of uncertainty established in
Halladay, Stratford and Parsons significantly narrows the application of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence in Utah. Halladay,
however, carefully limited some of its holdings to the facts before the
boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence deal with two related but different situations. "Boundary by agreement it applied where adjoining landowners have actually orally
agreed upon a certain line as the boundary between their property. Where there is no proof of
an actual agreement, however, the court will rely upon the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and imply an agreement if certain conditions are shown." 3 UTAH L. REV at 504.
• See Note, Agreement and Acquiescence, supra note 4, at 232.
' In Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981), the court erroneously stated that boundary
by acquiescence would not apply because "the evidence simply fails to support any finding of
an agreement between the parties." Id. at 729 (emphasis added). The confusion in Madsen v.
Clegg is largely responsible for the opinions discussed in this Note. The correct approach would
have been to see if the other four requisites of the doctrine were present: if so. the court could
have implied an agreement filing the boundary. Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202,
207 (1951). See also infra text accompanying notes 34-50.
• The period of time required varies depending on the circumstances of the particular case.
Most recently, the court has stated that it must be a "long period of time . . . generally related
to the common law prescriptive period of 20 years; and only under unusual circumstances
would a lesser period be deemed sufficient." Halladay, 685 P.2d at 503 n.l (quoting Hobaon V.
Panguitch Lake Corp., 630 P.2d 792, 795 (1976) (10 years held insufficient)).
• Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981); Hales v Frake, 600 P 2d 656, 56$
(Utah 1979); Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282, 284, 421 P.2d 944 (1966). Accord, Nunley v.
Walker, 13 Utah 2d 105, 369 P.2d 117 (1962); Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205
(1951); Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202 (1951).
•• See, eg, Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 272-73, 209 P.2d 257, 260 (1949).
» 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984).
»• 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984).
!S
690 p.2d 635 (Utah 1984).
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court. With specific regard to the burden of proof in establishing "objective uncertainty," the Halladay court stated: "[A]s to this circumstance we hold that the party claiming boundary by acquiescence has
the burden of proving objective uncertainty as part of the prima facie
elements of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence."14 The subsequent cases of Stratford and Parsons have further established the
new requirement of proving objective uncertainty. They also have
placed the burden of at least producing evidence of objective uncertainty on the party seeking to prove boundary by acquiescence without considering whether the circumstances fit the Halladay
requirements.
As with past history, the future of boundary by acquiescence in
Utah is uncertain. In all three of the 1984 cases, Justice Howe has
entered strong dissents against the majority opinions. He describes
the Halladay opinion as "dicta and an unwarranted assault on the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence."15 Moreover, in his Stratford
dissent he states that Stratford, combined with Halladay, "effectively sounds the death knell of boundary by acquiescence in this
state."16
B. Halladay v. Cluff
In Halladay, the defendants purchased two parcels of adjacent
property in the city of Provo in 1947 and 1948. When they purchased
their lots they believed that both lots extended to a fence which in
fact rested behind their rear property lines. Believing the existing
fences marked the adjacent property's boundary, the defendants used
the land between their actual property line and the fence for cultivation and chicken coops. In 1956, one of the defendants hired a surveyor who placed the boundary near the actual deeded boundary.
Both of the property owners dismissed this survey as being erroneous, however, and continued to use it. During the same period of time
the plaintiff contended that the disputed property belonged to him,
and on one occasion told one of the defendants to stop using it.17
Finally, in 1979, the plaintiff commenced suit to quiet title to the
disputed land. Defendants counterclaimed, and the district court
granted title to the defendants under the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence.1* Plaintiff appealed on the grounds that there was no
"
"
»•
"
"

Halladay, 685 P.2d at 607. See also infra text accompanying notes 79-80.
Id. at 608 (Howe, J., concurring and diwenting).
Stratford, 689 P.2d at 366 (Howe, J., diwenting).
Halladay, 685 P.2d at 601-02.
id. ai 602.
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acquiescence. *

dispute or uncertainty concerning the location of the boundary. The
Utah Supreme Court reversed, ordering that the district court quiet
title in the plaintiff because the record of title to the property contained no uncertainty that prevented the claimants from ascertaining
the true boundary.19
In holding for the plaintiff, the court identified the issues as: (1)
whether a showing of uncertainty or dispute on the location of a
boundary line is necessary to the application of boundary by acquiescence, and, if so (2) what is meant by uncertainty and (3) who has
the burden of proof of uncertainty.10 The court held that proof of
uncertainty or dispute is required as an element of boundary by acquiescence in Utah, and that the uncertainty or dispute should be
measured against an objective test. Finally, the court held, limited to
the Halladay facts, that the party claiming boundary by acquiescence had the burden of proving objective uncertainty. Unfortunately, Halladay and subsequent rulings have added to the doctrine's
confused history by resurrecting questionable case dicta and holdings
which had been either distinguished or silently overruled prior to
Halladay.*1
III.

HALLADAY v. CLUFF
1

THE OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY RATIONALE: CASES AND CRITIQUE

Halladay, Stratford and Parsons create a significant new requirement to establish boundary by acquiescence. Objective uncertainty in
the location of the boundary must now be shown by the claimant.
Although most of the significant developments of this requirement.
are contained in Halladay, the Stratford and Parsons opinions do
give a preliminary indication of how Halladay will be interpreted in,
future opinions. This Note will focus primarily on Halladay and wi^
discuss the significant additions made by Stratford and Parsons, cj
Halladay'a new requirement of objective uncertainty is yet another,,
result of the confusion between the related doctrines of boundary fcyL
agreement and acquiescence. As a result of the confusion, the Hallaz*
day court digressed to a standard which had been disavowed ip ifl
case preceding Halladay*1 Furthermore, what were significant limy
tations on Halladay have been ignored by Stratford and Parsohss
leaving some doubt as to the exact requirements for a boundary byj
$
»• Id at 507-08.
•• Id at 601.
11
See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
M
The court had previously discarded the standard in Brown, 232 P.2d at 202. See also infra
text accompanying notes 34-40.

A. Uncertainty or Dispute in Boundary by Acquiescence
In addressing the issue of whether a showing of uncertainty or dispute is required for boundary by acquiescence, the Halladay court
notes that the confusion between boundary by acquiescence and
boundary by agreement has carried over to the requirement of uncertainty or "dispute over the boundary. Originally, uncertainty or dispute was required only for boundary by agreement.*4 In 1928, however, the court in Tripp v. Bagley** began to refer to uncertainty or
dispute as an essential ingredient for boundary by acquiescence. Halladay cites a number of other acquiescence cases decided since Tripp
v. Bagley which also required uncertainty or dispute as to the true
location of the boundary. Although acknowledging a series of boundary by acquiescence cases to the contrary, the Halladay court concluded that the requirement of uncertainty or dispute as to boundary
location is an ingredient "settled in our law."1*
The case law cited by the Halladay court in support of its proposition that uncertainty or dispute is required has been misapplied.
Most of the cases cited in Halladay have been either limited or narrowly construed in later cases. Furthermore, several of the cases cited
for requiring a showing of uncertainty or dispute refer to such a
showing only97 as a possible defense to an action of boundary by
acquiescence,
M
See infra text accompanying notes 81-90.
" Halladay, 685 P.2d at 503.
•» 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912 (1928).
M
685 P.2d at 504. But cf. id. at 510-11 (Howe, J., concurring and dissenting),
whereHalladay,
it is stated:

proof of uncertainty or dispute is not and has never been an "ingredient" or element
of a cause of action for boundary by acquiescence . . . fsjuch a requirement would be
entirely foreign to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence because the basis of the
doctrine is that the law implies that there once existed uncertainty and dispute.
* Madsen v. Clegg. 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981), one of the most recent predecessors to Halladay, does contain language which implies that evidence of uncertainty may be a requirement of
[the doctrine. That case, however, tm noted supra note 7, confused the doctrines of boundary by
[agreement and by acquiescence. Furthermore, it was clear that the plaintiff never acquiesced in
[the new boundary, thus eliminating the possibility of boundary by acquiescence.
L Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202 (1951). one of the court's clearest pron ouncelosenU on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, clarified that the absence of uncertainty
[could serve as a defense to boundary by acquiescence, because if an absence of uncertainty
could be proven, there would be no room for the court to imply an earlier agreement. See infra
text accompanying notes 49-50.
f Of the other cases cited in Halladay, Leon v. Dansie, 639 P.2d 730, 731 (Utah 1981). involved
testimony on both sides thst there had been no dispute as to record title at any time over the
pars. Nowhere in Leon, however, is there any indication that the court considered dispute or
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Bagley, * the first Utah boundary by acquiescence case
which required a showing of uncertainty or dispute, should have been
decided as a boundary by agreement case." In Tripp, the property
purchasers were actually informed of the correct boundary location
when they purchased the land.*0 Thus in Tripp, there was actual
knowledge of the true boundary. The Tripp court held that because
of the parties' knowledge, there was no room for the court to enforce
any agreement to establish a boundary, implied or otherwise, between the parties.31 Consequently, Tripp v. Bagley was not in fact a
boundary by acquiescence case, but actually a case of boundary by
agreement.82 Therefore, the Halladay court should not have relied on
JLTIPP
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it.
For several years Tripp v. Bagley was incorrectly cited as requiring
uncertainty or dispute in boundary by acquiescence cases." The
Utah Supreme Court should have interpreted Tripp as holding that
proof of an absence of uncertainty left no room for the court to imply
an agreement in boundary by acquiescence cases. Consequently, several of the cases decided after Tripp v. Bagley, and subsequently
cited in Halladay, mistakenly required evidence of uncertainty as an
element of boundary by acquiescence.
In 1951, the well-reasoned decision of the Utah Supreme Court in
Brown v. Milliner** clarified the confusion caused by Tripp over the
uncertainty or dispute requirement. The Brown court limited Tripp
uncertainty to be a prerequisite for a claim rather than at a defense.
In Wright v. Chssold, 621 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1974), the court clearly recognized that the
absence of a dispute or uncertainty in filing the boundary was a defense to rebut the presumption that an agreement had been reached.
Universal Investment Corp. v. Kingsbury. 26 Utah 2d 36, 37-38, 484 P.2d 173, 174-76 (1971),
placed the burden on the defendant to show that there was no dispute or uncertainty and thai
the true boundary line was known.
In Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Uiah 267, 272-73, 20S P.2d 257, 260 (1949), the court did requin
that there be uncertainty or dispute as to the location of the boundary before a boundary bj
acquiescence could be established.
Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 219, 141 P.2d 160, 166 (1943) (citing
Tripp v. Bagley also requires that the boundary must be uncertain or in dispute).
The final case cited in Halladay, Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 93, 34 P.2d 697, 698-9!
(1934), found a claim for boundary by acquiescence on the grounds that the location of th
boundary was not known or that there was no dispute.
»• 276 P. 912.
" See Note, Acquiescence, supra note 4, at 509.
•• 276 P. at 917.
" Id. at 918.
•• See Note, Acquiescence, supra note 4, at 609.
•• For cases citing Tripp, see Home Owners* Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 219, 14
M
P.2d
120
160,Utah
166 (1943);
16. 232Peterson
P.2d 202v.(1951).
Johnson. 84 Utah 89, 93, 34 P.2d 697, 698 (1934).
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and noted that several cases had misapplied Tripp. The Brown court
stated that Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley,** Peterson v. Johnson*9 and Glenn v. Whitney,*1 cases which Halladay relied on, were
cases where "[t]he doctrine of boundary of [sic] acquiescence was not
applicable because in view of the evidence there was no room for any
implication that the fence line had been erected by adjoining owners
pursuant to an agreement between thera."M Furthermore, Brown
continued, previous holdings of the Utah Supreme Court that uncertainty or dispute need be proven as an element should be understood
to mean that if the true boundary line is known to the adjoining owners, they cannot by parol agreement establish the boundary
elsewhere."
Following the clarification that proof of uncertainty or dispute is
not an affirmative requirement of boundary by acquiescence, the
Brown decision returned the doctrine to the previous policy of allowing proof of the absence of uncertainty or dispute as a defense to
boundary by acquiescence.40 The Utah Supreme Court did not again
require a showing of uncertainty or dispute by the party claiming
boundary by acquiescence until 1981, in Madsen v. Clegg.41 Although
boundary by agreement was thought to have merged completely into
boundary by acquiescence by 1975,4* the doctrine of boundary by
agreement was seemingly resurrected in Madsen in 1981. The Madsen court stated that the trial court "could not have resolved such
uncertainty on the basis of defendant's acquiescence theory, because
the evidence simply fails to support any finding of an agreement between the parties. M ° Thus the confusion between the two doctrines
emerged once again, this time in the idea that boundary by acquiesM

*
,"
••
"

106 Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943).
84 Utah 89, 34 P.2d 697 (1934).
116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 267 (1949).
Brown, 232 P.2d at 207-08.
Id. at 208. The court stated:

fT]he Tripp case does not require a party relying upon a boundary which has been
acquiesced in for a long period of time to produce evidence that the location of the
true boundary was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. That the true boundary
was uncertain or in dispute and that the parties agreed upon the recognized boundary
as the dividing line will be implied from the parties' long acquiescence.
fid at 208. For an illuminating and more detailed discussion of the dispute over uncertainty
luring this period, see Note. Acquiescence, supra note 4, at 608-11.
.*•«• Brown, 232 P.2d at 209. Although Brown did not specifically hold that uncertainty i§ a
lefanse, subsequent decisions interpreted the opinion this way. See, e g, Wright v. Clissold, 621
\2d
1224, 1226 (1974).
u
639 P.2d 726 (1981).
,—
Note, Agreement and Acquiescence, supra note 4, at 232.
." 639 P.2d at 72Q
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cence required finding an agreement.
Although there is room for both doctrines in Utah law, it is unfortunate that the two doctrines cannot coexist without causing sucTf
confusion.^Madsen should have resolved the boundary by acquiescence question by determining if the four traditional requirements44
were met; if those requirements were met, the Madsen court should
have implied an agreement.4* The actual holding in Madsen v. Clegg,
however, extended no further than the original holding in Tripp v.
Bagley4* which caused years of confusion. The Madsen court's statement that "[i]n the absence of any initial uncertainty concerning the
ownership of the property in question, the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence has no application,"47 is consistent with the traditional
rule of uncertainty or dispute as clarified by Brown v. Milliner.4*
Under the traditional rule, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence must be clearly distinguished from the doctrine of boundary by
agreement. In boundary by agreement cases, uncertainty has traditionally been required to minimize conflicts with the statute of
frauds.40 In cases of boundary by acquiescence, however, the court
assumes the presence of uncertainty, and implies that at some time
the parties made an agreement to settle the uncertainty. If one party
could prove an absence of uncertainty in a boundary by acquiescence
case, the court could not assume that uncertainty had existed, leaving
no room for the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.*0 Thus, uncertainty of boundary should be viewed as a defense toHbounHary'bjf
acquiescence rather than as a'requirement.
B.

The Degree of Uncertainty Required

After deciding that uncertainty or dispute would be a requirement
in boundary by acquiescence cases, the Halladay court held that
"uncertainty" would be measured under an objective standard. In
reaching its decision, the court noted that a subjective test for uncertainty has often been the rule in Utah. Under the court's definition,
subjective uncertainty allows that "a boundary line may be 'uncertain' or 'in dispute' even though it is capable of being readily ascer44

See supra text accompanying not* 9
«• Brown, 232 P at 207
44
See supra text accompanying not* 39
« 639 P 2d at 729
*• See supra text accompanying notes 34 45
49
Note, Agreement and Acquiescence, supra note 4, at 223.
•• Brown, 232 P 2d at 207
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tained."" Under this subjective standard, therefore, two adjoini
landowners who knew the approximate boundary between their pro
erty but who did not desire to hire a surveyor could create an e
forceable boundary through long acquiescence in a line which th
agreed upon.
Although acknowledging that both objective and subjective tes
had been used in Utah, the court adopted the objective test becau
of two policy considerations." Under the court's new objective unce
tainty standard, there must be a showing that "during the period
acquiescence there was some objectively measurable circumstance J
the record title or in the reasonably available survey information . .
that would have prevented a landowner, as a practical matter, froi
being reasonably certain about the true location of the boundary."
In defense of the new uncertainty requirement, the Halladay opir
ion argues that boundary by acquiescence has not been obliteratec
Boundary by acquiescence is still applicable when there is objectiv
uncertainty in the location of the true boundary that cannot reasona
bly be resolved by reference to the record title and by use of reasona
bly available survey information.94 A number of situations are cite<
in Halladay where the doctrine would remain viable under the "ob
jective uncertainty" standard. M
In adopting objective uncertainty, the court returns to an idea sim
ilar to the earlier Utah requirement of "objective uncertainty" firsi
mentioned in Glenn v. Whitney** in 1949. Under the Whitney stan
41
Halladay, 685 P 2d at 604, (quoting Ekberg v. Bate*. 121 Utah 123, 239 P 2d 206, 207
(1951), which in turn quoted Willie v. Local Realty Co, 110 Utah 523, 175 P 2d 718, 723
(1946)).
M
See infra text accompanying notes 66-70
•« Halladay, 685 P 2d at 605
M

/«/

" In Halladay, the court atatea "f b)oundary by acquiescence remains a viable means of establishing a boundary where there is objective uncertainty in the location of the true boundary
that cannot reasonably be resolved by reference to the record title and by use of reasonably
available survey information " 685 P 2d at 605 As examples of cases which would meet this
objective uncertainty requirement, the court refers to inability to locate monuments estab
lished in the original survey, internal inconsistencies in plat, no official or original plat or sur
vey by which the boundary can be located, disagreement among different surveyors on location
of boundary line, landmarks referenced in deeds have disappeared, and uncertainties or dis
putes created by conflicting terms in the deed, such as overlapping descriptions or metes and
bounds that do not close Id at 505-06
Such disputes are rare, however, and comprise only a very small proportion of the vast array
of instances in which boundary by acquiescence should be available Boundary by acquiescence
did not orginate as only a means to resolve errors in recording property descriptions, but rather
"with a view of preventing strife and litigation " Holmes, 31 Utah at 281, 87 P at 1014
* 116 Utah 267, 209 P 2d 257 (1949)
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dard, dispute is not proved by a mere difference of opinion, and uncertainty is not proved by a mere lack of knowledge as to the true
location of the boundary.57 This standard appears essentially identical to objective uncertainty. In support of returning to this standard,
the Halladay court cites to Madsen v. Clegg, and several cases from
Wisconsin and Idaho.M
The Wisconsin and Idaho cases, however, are not applicable to the
Halladay facts. The Wisconsin case, Hartung v. Witte** dealt with a
combined doctrine of boundary by agreement and acquiescence. Citing conflicts with the statute of frauds, the Wisconsin court stated
"an agreement to treat an existing fence as the line has no force when
the true line can be ascertained from the deed itself and by a lawful
survey."*0 The Wisconsin court clearly seemed to be dealing with the
policy considerations behind boundary by agreement.
Another cited Wisconsin case, Buza u. Wojtalewicz,*1 can also be
distinguished in that boundary by acquiescence in Wisconsin has now
been codified as part of the state's adverse possession law, thus making the case irrelevant to Utah's common law doctrine.*1 Furthermore, dicta in the case seems to indicate that had the parties acquiesced for twenty years, the court would have enforced the agreement
notwithstanding the lack of uncertainty or dispute,**
The Idaho case, Fry v. Smith,*4 comes closest to supporting the
Halladay court's position. But as in Hartung, Fry discusses boundary
by acquiescence and agreement, indicating that the two doctrines and
their requirements have become merged in Idaho.** Thus, none of the
cases cited in Halladay provide any clear precedent for the objective
uncertainty requirement in Utah.
In addition to case law, the Halladay opinion cites two policy considerations as supporting the "objective uncertainty" test. First, limiting boundary by acquiescence minimizes the conflict with the statute of frauds' proscription of transfering land without a writing.**
" 209 P.2d at 260. See also Halladay, 685 P.2d at 606.
M
Halladay, 686 P.2d at 505 (citing Buia v. Wojtalewicz, 48 Wia. 2d 557, 564-67,180 N.W.2d
556, 560-61 (1970); Hartung v. Witte, 59 Wis. 285, 298-300, 18 N.W. 175, 180-81 (1884); Pry v.
Smith, 91 Idaho 740, 741-42, 430 P.2d 486, 487-88 (1967)).
»• 59 Wis. 285, 18 N.W. 175 (1884).
M
18 N.W. at 180.
•' 48 Wis. 2d 557, 180 N.W.2d 566 (1970).
•• 180 N.W.2d at 559-60.
•» Id at 560.
" 91 Idaho 740, 430 P.2d 486 (1967).
•• 430 P 2d at 487
w
Halladav. 685 P.2d at 605.
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Second, an objective test corresponds more closely to the purpose
the doctrine because it prevents litigation and promotes repose ol
tie and stability of boundaries. This prevention of litigation is i
thered if those who purchase, use or sell real property must rely
descriptions in deeds and reasonably available survey information
settle disputes. The opinion stated that boundary by acquiesce]
should only be applied where it is not reasonable to expect landov
era to verify the true location of their boundaries through referei
to record titles and surveys.*7
These policy considerations are, however, of questionable mei
First, the court's concerns regarding conflicts with the statute
frauds are without basis. In the first place, it is questionable wheth
a boundary established by acquiescence would in fact conflict wi
the statute since the person acquiring property would do so by opei
tion of law rather than by virtue of agreement." The statute
frauds is designed primarily to prevent fraudulent agreement
Where an agreement is created by law, as in boundary by acquie
cence cases, this concern is obviated because the agreement can 1
assumed to be non-fraudulent. Furthermore, the Restatement (Se
ond) of Contracts recognizes several exceptions to the statute <
frauds, at least two of which would be applicable in a boundary b
acquiescence case." Accordingly, concerns about the statute c
frauds, although somewhat justified in a boundary by agreement situ
ation, should not greatly concern a court dealing with boundary b:
acquiescence.
The court's second policy consideration is equally insufficient. Th<
avoidance of controversy, the prevention of litigation and the promotion of repose of title and stability of boundaries are not furthered by
an objective uncertainty test. The inability to obtain a court settlement because of the need for objective uncertainty will not result in
" Not*. Acquiescence, supra not* 4, at 509
RMTATE«K*r (S.COND) or CONTRACTS § 128 provides:

£f i t r £ l i K z:z t r f s s tr r of , r^ in < • dividin< •—*»

bou,ldaf
puted the contract becomeTenfor^Jh. n It WT, t h " U nV*"
* waa honMt,y *sboundary ha. b e e n Z Z d o HZa S tU e n °
* * n * ** « • * * when the agreed
tract*.
"**""«« ^ the subsequent use of the

RESTATEMENT (S«COND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 2 9 p r o v i d e s .

A contract for the transfer of interest in )anA ^«. u
^ ..
.landing failure to comply with the S u t i t ^ ^ f bt.a*V!!*?a*
• » ' • « * "otwithtion that inju»tice can be avoided onlv Z.HOSLVZT1-

hM $

° chan«ed

hu

!»«-
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the avoidance of controversy. A property disagreement between two
adjoining landowners will not rest merely because a court will not
enforce a long-established boundary between the parties; the dispute'
will continue. Although the "objective uncertainty" test may in the*
end prevent litigation, this prevention of litigation comes at a signifi-'
cant price. With the objective uncertainty requirement, the doctrine"
of boundary by acquiescence may cease to be viable in Utah. 70
Whether litigation will actually be reduced is also very questional
ble. Because objective uncertainty will be so difficult to prove in 1
many instances, 71 a party who has long accepted an erroneously
placed boundary may now be willing to go to court to correct thtf^
boundary on the assumption that even though the fence was errone^
ou9ly located, the record title will support their claim.
* ^
The promotion of stability in boundaries, another cited goal, will*
also be adversely affected by the objective uncertainty requirement!
Long-standing boundaries which have at least had the potential j6f
being judicially protected will become fair game if the physical
boundaries disagree with the record title. As noted above, under th£
new requirement, a party which has long acquiesced in an improperly
placed boundary may see the objective uncertainty requirement ai1'!'
way to expand his or her property holdings by going to court, thus
promoting boundary instability. This reality was recognized long ago4
by the Utah Supreme Court in Binford v. Eccles1* where the cow;
stated that an objective uncertainty would increase litigation. 71 tyl*
In short, the policy arguments relied upon in Halladay are, at th$
very best, questionable. At worst, the requirement of "objective uncertainty" may prove in the end to stir up controversy, increase liti~
gation and destabilize existing boundaries that are technically incorf
rect but stable boundaries, contrary to the court's stated purposes for
;
adopting the new standard.
?jjj
The absence of supporting case law and the weakness of the court's
policy arguments are not, however, as disturbing as what is likely to
be the end result of the objective uncertainty requirement IfJtheioli!
•

•

" •

•

•'

"

'•

-1

;

*• See infra text accompanying notes 75-78.
71
See infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
" 41 Utah 453, 126 P. 333 (1912).
" 126 P. 333. The opinion stated:
Appellant would thus be permitted to unsettle boundaries which by the adjoining1
landowners had been recognized and acquiesced in for approximately a quarter of a
century. Any rule of law which would permit such a result would be pernicious, and'
in the long run would produce strife and litigation, and in the nature of things would
often result in injustice if not oppression.
126 P. at 335.
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jective uncertainty requirement becomes firmly entrenched in Utah
law, the doctrine^of^ boundary by acquiescence will cease to exist in
Utah. Several considerations, all of which are'at1*least briefly men*
tioned by Justice Howe in his three dissents/ 1 Support the contention
that the doctrinecannot co-exist with the objective uncertainty
requirement.
- «
. s» "^ajin':.*
First, boundary by acquiescence has always had very limited application. Now that further limitations have been imposed upon the
doctrine, application of the doctrine will be an extreme rarity, if it
continues at all.7*
-*>'>Second, the majority of boundary by acquiescence cases involve
fences or boundaries which have stood for many years, and involve a
chain of title which has passed through several property* owners. In
many situations it would be difficult, if not impossible, to .determine
if there had been objective uncertainty when the original boundary
was placed. This difficulty in retracing the history of a boundary is
central to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence; indeed i t is this
difficulty of proof that made earlier Utah courts imply an • agreement. 74 For example, although the Halladay court notes1 in a footnote77 that an erroneous survey may create an objective uncertainty
which would allow the doctrine to apply, the property may have been
surveyed so long before the dispute that it is impossible to prove that
the survey_was_taken or what the survey revealed. In short, although
circumstances constituting objective uncertainty may have existed at
K>me time in the past, such objective uncertainty may be impossible
ft prove when the dispute arises.7*

C. The Burden of Proving "Objective Uncertainty"
The third and fined issue addressed in the Halladay opinion dealt
[with the procedural aspects of the new doctrine; assuming that
^boundary by acquiescence requires that there be a showing of "objective uncertainty," who carries the burden of proof in boundary by
acquiescence cases? In holding that the defendant had the burden of
proof, the Halladay court carefully limited the ruling to the circumstances before it. The court held in that circumstance that the party
i

••

•"••••

••

•

—

—

—

Li tZSmSZ?""

•

*~*' " Haltaday- «

PM

« * *"** 689 P.2d 360;

| " Jurtie, How. note, in bit Halladay diwent that . i n « tk. A . • . .
•»• b~n .pplM ta only «ppro«im.t«ly 2 6 ^ , r . « h i T f K
'"' ' UlC">U°a ta I 9 0 6 ' '*
p £ • « • * * 686 P.2d * 612 ( H o w . ^ ^ n t " ' ; ) h , n g " " , U p ' " D ' £ o u r t - 686 P-2d , t 608..
I" W. at 612 (How., J.. dU»ntin f ).
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claiming boundary by acquiescence had the burden of proving objective uncertainty as part of the prima facie case.7* The circumstance
under which the holding is limited is that this case arose in the city
of Provo, where survey information is reasonably available. In a footnote, the court stated, "[w]e express no opinion on whether this allocation of the burden of proof would apply to property not located in
a city or platted area."80 Thus the court appears to have limited its
holding on this issue to city areas where survey information is readily
available.
The Halladay court carefully limited its holding for several reasons. First, the court noted a historical conflict in case law as to who
carries the burden of proof.01 Second, the question of burden of proof
is evenly balanced on the authorities and both positions can be supported by persuasive arguments." Because of these considerations,
the Halladay court limited its rule of law to the facts before it," implying the burden of proof issue should be determined on a case-bycase basis based on the availability of title and survey information
between the parties.
In the later cases of Stratford and Parsons, the court failed to even
consider the limitations imposed by Halladay. Both cases placed the
burden of presenting evidence of objective uncertainty on the parties
seeking to establish boundary by acquiescence without considering
whether the facts met the Halladay facts. The court's failure to discuss the Halladay limitations indicates that the limitations will not
be of great concern to the court. Stratford and Parsons can both be
cited as requiring that the burden of presenting evidence, if not the
burden of proof, be placed on the moving party regardless of which
party has better access to the information.
Because the Stratford and Parsons courts failed to address the
Halladay limitations, the similarity of the facts in the cases is unclear. Whether the plots in the cases were platted is unclear, but the
cases' discussions of the disputes seem to indicate that they were
not." Furthermore, it appears that neither of the properties were
79

Id. at 507.
•• Id. n.6.
•» Halladay, 685 P.2d at 506-07.
M
Id. at 507.
'• Id.
M
The disputed property involved in Stratford was a 4.77 acre tract of land in Salt Lake
County; the opinion makes no reference to any plats, and refers to a "metes and bounds**
description of the boundary line between the properties. 689 P.2d at 361. In Par$on$t the disputed property's boundaries were described in reference to an "old fence" as a monument to
mark one boundary; there is no reference in the case to any platted records. 690 P.2d at 637.
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within city limits. In Halladay, the platted nature of the property
and its location
within city limits were carefully noted as
significant/1
In Parsons, although the court did not explicitly place the burden
of proof on the moving party, the court did list "evidence of dispute
or uncertainty as to the true boundary line measured against an objective test" as one of the elements required to establish a boundary
by acquiescence.M As a required element, it is clear that the burden
lies on the moving party, for without showing evidence of such a dispute, the moving party's claim will fail. Although the Parsons court
could have dispensed with the case because the required period of
acquiescence was not met,87 the court stated in dicta that in the absence of evidence indicating a dispute, boundary by acquiescence
could not be established.84
In Stratford, the court found that the moving party had failed to
provide any objective or subjective evidence of uncertainty or dispute.88 Without such a showing, the court stated, there was no uncertainty or dispute as measured by Halladay.90
Placing the burden of presenting evidence on the moving party
does not, of itself, place the burden of proof on the moving party.
However, under the language of Halladay, Parsons and Stratford, it
strongly appears that future parties seeking boundary by acquiescence should not proceed without the potential ability of meeting a
burden of proof requirement. As an element of a prima facie case for
boundary by acquiescence, "objective uncertainty" must be shown by
the plaintiff. Anything less than a showing of "objective uncertainty,"
by a preponderance of the evidence, may be insufficient to get the
moving party beyond a directed verdict.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In adopting the "objective uncertainty" requirement as an element
of boundary by acquiescence, the Utah Supreme Court has further
confused one of the most troubled doctrines of Utah law. The new
objective uncertainty standard, as Justice Howe stated in the Stratford dissent, "effectively sounds the death knell of boundary by acn
Halladay, 685 P.2d at 607.
•• 690 P.2d at 538-39.
m
Id. at 539.
" Id.
" 689 P.2d at 364.
m
Id.
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quiescence in this state."91
The Utah Supreme Court should limit the future applications!
"objective uncertainty" to, at the very most, those cases to which
Halladay's originally limited holding clearly applies.** Because of thf
questionable policy grounds upon which the Halladay opinion is
based,98 and upon the probable consequence of the elimination of tht
doctrine in Utah,*4 the precedent set by Halladay and somewhat expanded in Stratford and Parsons should be limited to its narrowesi
possible reach.
&
In Halladay, the court turned conventional thinking regarding
boundary by acquiescence upside down when it argued that the goal?
of preventing litigation and strife could best be served by adoption o
the objective uncertainty requirement. Because the conventional ap
proach outlined in Brown v. Milliner** had served these goals so well
the court should return to that policy of clearly distinguishini
boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence.
LINCOLN W. HOBBJ

MALAN V. LEWIS: ANOTHER "U" TURN IN
GUEST STATUTE RATIONALE ON THE ROAD
TO NEW TORT PRINCIPLES OF LOSS
ALLOCATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

TJ Automobile guest laws were once effective in approximately thirtythree states.1 Within the last decade, however, the trend of holding
fautomobile guest statutes unconstitutional1 has nearly culminated in
[their demise.* The quick decline of the automobile guest statute
raises the question of what precipitated the recent rejection of a contemporary tort doctrine embraced by most states. The recent Utah
Supreme Court ruling in Malan v. Lewis* which reduced the number
of states maintaining guest statutes to four,8 may help in answering

1

Twenty-nine states have enacted automobile guest statutes at one time; four states have

had judicially created statutes. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK or THE LAW OF TORTS § 34 at 187

*« Id. at 366 (Howe, J.t dissenting).
M
See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
•• See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
M
See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
•* See supra text accompanying notes 34-41.

(4th ed. 1971); Comment, Treatment of Guest Passengers: Georgia Maintains Its Minority
Rule, 31 MERCER L. REV. 1061 (1980). New Jersey is typically not thought of as having a guest
statute, perhaps because its judicially created law only applied to guests who asked for rides.
Lutvin v. Dopkua, 94 NJ.L. 64, 108 A. 862 (1920). See generally Note, The Present Status of
Automobile Guest Statutes, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 659 (1974).
• The major impetus of the trend occurred in Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212,
106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) (holding California's automobile guest statute unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds).
* Cases holding guest statutes to be unconstitutional include: Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855,
506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365
(1974); Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 1980); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518
P.2d 362 (1974); Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932); Manistee Bank &
Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Midi. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975); Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial
Diat, Court, 91 Nev. 506, 538 P.2d 574 (1975); Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 36 N J . 276, 176 A.2d 483
(1961) (judicially created); McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975); Johnson v.
Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974); Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio S t 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723
(1975); Ramey v. Ramey, 273 S.C. 680, 258 S.E.2d 883. cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980);
McConville v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wi*. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962) (judicially
created); Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 (Wyo. 1978). States repealing guest statute laws include: Arkansas (1983); Colorado (1975); Connecticut (1937); Florida (1972); Georgia (1982)
(judically created); Illinois (1971) (restricted to hitchhikers); Massachusetts (1974) (judicially
created); Montana (1975); Oregon (1979); South Dakota (1978); Texas (1973) (limited to certain
relatives); Vermont (1969); Virginia (1977); and Washington (1974). See Malan v. Lewis, 693
P.2d 661 (Utah, 1984); Green, The Excitements of Change: A Dialogue on the Constitutionality of the Guest Statute, U CREIGHTON L. REV 37 (1980); Comment, Treatment of Guest Passengers: Georgia Maintains Its Minority Rule, 31 MERCER L. REV. 1061 (1980).
• 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984).
1
See supra note 3. The remaining four states include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 32-1-2 (1975);
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The Law of Practical Location of Boundaries
and the Need for an Adverse Possession Remedy
James H. Backman*
in recent decisions, the Utah Supreme Court has overturned
a long-established approach for settling boundary disputes.1 The
court has placed significant restrictions on traditional means of
settling disputes between neighbors regarding the practical location of boundaries. Understanding the full impact of the recent
Utah decisions requires familiarity with Utah law on adverse
possession2 and with boundary dispute doctrines used in other
jurisdictions.3 Several commentaries have already explored the
specific decisions,4 beginning with Halladay v. Clufi? in which
the Utah court has developed its new position. This article assesses these decisions in a larger context and proposes legislation6 to revamp Utah's statute of limitations, making adverse
possession the normal means of resolving most boundary
disputes.
L

LEGAL DOCTRINES

Courts have employed several major doctrines to award
property to a party in possession despite superior record title in
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. A.B.,
1969, Harvard College; J.D., 1972, University of Utah. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Richard van't Rood in the preparation of this article.
1. See Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984); Stratford v. Morgan, 689
P 2d 360 (Utah 1984); Halladay v. ClurT, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984).
2. UTAH CODE ANN § 78-12-12 (1953).

3. See Browder, 77ie Practical Location of Boundaries, 56 MICH L REV 487 (1958);
Comment, Built-up Boundaries Outweigh Paper Boundaries, 4 CALIF L REV 293 (1916)
[hereinafter Comment, Built-up Boundaries]; Comment, Agreed Boundaries and
Boundaries by Acquiescence: The Need for a Straight Line from the Courts, 9 LOY
LAL REV 637 (1976).
4. Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1985 UTAH L REV 131, 193; Note, Halladay
v. ClurT "Objective Uncertainty" In Deed!, 11 J. CONTEMP LAW 567 (1985) (hereinafter
Note, In Deed*), Note, Objective Uncertainty in Boundary by Acquiescence- Halladay v.
ClurT, 1984 B Y U L REV 711.
5. 685 P 2d 500 (Utah 1984).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 112-14.
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another person.7 These doctrines are: (1) long-term adverse possession; (2) short-term adverse possession; (3) prescriptive easement; and (4) boundary dispute doctrines, including boundary
by agreement, acquisition, and estoppel. All of these doctrines
are related, though their requirements differ.
A.

Adverse Possession

Adverse possession, sometimes known as title by prescription, transfers interests in land to a person in possession without
the consent of the legal owner.* The doctrine originated in thirteenth century England and by 1623 evolved into the prototype
for American statutes.0 The English statute was essentially a
statute of limitations which limited the time in which a person
with legal title could bring an action to regain possession from
one in wrongful possession.10 The English rule was adopted by
most early American jurisdictions and still prevails today.
American scholars characterize the doctrine of adverse possession as a method of taking title to another's property through
a "wrongful" occupation.11 There are varying explanations for
the rule, but most courts agree on its basic rationale. Justice
Holmes aptly stated: "The true explanation of title by [adverse
possession] seems to me to be that man, like a tree in the cleft of
a rock, gradually shapes his roots to his surroundings, and when
the roots have grown to a certain size, can't be displaced without
cutting at his life."11 Although his possession is said to be wrongful, the claimant seldom deliberately sets out to take land from
another by claiming adverse possession.1* Most people, in fact,
settle into a piece of land believing that the land belongs to
them. The doctrine has therefore been accepted as additional title assurance for one who possesses land under a belief of
ownership.14
7. See generally R CUNNINGHAM, W STOEBUCK & D WHITMAN, THE LAW or PROP-

ERTY f 11.8, at 764-65 (1984) (hereinafter R CUNNINGHAM).
8. See R POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1 1012, at 1087 (abr. ed.

1968) [hereinafter R POWELL].

9. See id. at 1087-88.
10. Id. at 1088.
11. See R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.6, at 757.
12. M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH or JUSTICE HOLMES 417-18 (1943) (quoting

letter from Justice Holmes to William James (Apr. 1, 1907)).
13. J. CRIBBET & C. JOHNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 1554 (5th ed.

1984).
14. See Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L REV. 135, 135-37
(1918).
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However, because adverse possession is a judicial doctrine
governed by state statutes, the requirements differ from state to
state. Two types of adverse possession exist in the United States
today, "long-term" and "short-term."
To satisfyJ;he_ elementsj)fJong-term adverse possession,1*
c^jnu^have (1) actual, (2) open and notorious, (3) hostile, (4)
exclusiyejuand_(5) continuous possession of the land for the statutory period, usually about twenty years.16 The first element, ac~tuaT~possession, requires some physical occupation of the land.
This may be satisfied by such possessory acts as building fences,
roads, or buildings,17 which define the boundaries of the land
taken. Some courts relax the actual possession element, requiring only constructive possession, when the claimant holds a document that gives "color of title"1*—the appearance of title to the
land claimed. Under this exception to the actual possession rule,
the description in the document, rather than the possessory acts,
set the boundaries.1*
Open and notorious possession requires that there be visible
15. Forty-one states have this type of adverse possession. Pendley v. Pendley, 338
So. 2d 405, 406-07 (Ala. 1976); ALASKA STAT § 09 10.030 (1983); ARIZ. REV STAT ANN §

12-526 (1982); ARK STAT ANN J 37-101 (1962); COLO REV STAT § 38-41-101 (1982);
Ruggiero v. Town of East Hartford, 2 Conn. App 89, 477 A.2d 668, 672-73 (1984); DEL.
CODE ANN tit. 10, § 7902 (1975); FLA. STAT ANN § 95.12 (West 1982); GA CODE ANN §
44-5-163 (1982); HAW REV STAT § 657-31 (1976); III. ANN STAT ch. 110, para. 13-101
(Sraith-Hurd 1984); IOWA CODE ANN § 614.1 (West 1950 & Supp. 1986); KAN STAT ANN.
! 60-503 (1983); KY REV STAT ANN § 413.010 (Baldwin 1972); ME. REV STAT ANN t i t
14, S 801 (1980), MD CTS & JUD PROC CODE ANN § 5-103 (1984); MASS GEN LAWS ANN

ch. 260, § 21 (West 1959); MICH STAT ANN § 27A.5801 (Callaghan 1986); Miss CODE
ANN § 15-1-13 (1972), Mo ANN STAT § 516.010 (Vernon 1952); NEB REV STAT § 25-202
(1985); N H REV STAT ANN § 508:2 (1983); NJ STAT ANN § 2A.14-30 (West Supp.
1986); N Y REAL PROP ACTS LAW § 501 (McKinney 1979); N C GEN STAT § 1-40 (1983);

N D CENT CODE § 28-01-04 (1974); OHIO REV CODE ANN § 2305 04 (Baldwin 1981);
OKLA STAT ANN tit. 12, § 93 (West 1960 & Supp. 1987); OR REV STAT § 12.050 (1983);
PA STAT ANN tit. 12, § 71 (Purdon 1970); RI GEN LAWS § 34-7-1 (1984); SC CODE ANN
{ 15-67-210 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S D CODIFIED LAWS ANN § 15-3-3 (1984), TENN CODE
ANN § 28-2-101 (1980); Tx Civ PRAC & REM CODE ANN § 16 026 (Vernon 1987), VT.
STAT ANN tit 12, § 501 (1973); VA CODE § 8.01-236 (1984); WASH REV CODE ANN § 7-28-

050 (1961); W VA CODE § 55-2-1 (1981); Wis STAT ANN § 893.25 (West 1983), WYO
STAT § 1-3-103 (1977).
16. R CUNNINGHAM supra note 7, § 11.7, at 758*
17. See id.
18 Through the color of title exception, a person can increase the amount of land
"possessed" by adverse possession because the description in the document giving color
of title may include more land than is actually possessed. Lott v. Muldoon Rd. Baptist
Church, 466 P 2d 815, 817-18 (Alaska 1970); Nyman v. City of Eugene, 286 Or. 47, 64,
593 P2d 515, 524 (1979).
19. Lott, 466 P.2d at 817-18.
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evidence of the use of the land. Actual possession usually satisfies this element perforce; it is a more difficult (and particularly
important) element in the caSe of constructive possession. This
element, sometimes called the "notice" requirement, is considered crucial because it provides the legal owner with notice of
the claimant's intention and thus with the opportunity to take
preventive measures against the possessor.30
The third element, hostility, means in most states that the
possession cannot be with the owner's permission.*1 Therefore,
any use with permission such as a license or lease will not qualify as adverse possession. Some courts add to the lack-of-permission requirement by requiring specially that the possession be
under a claim of right." Claim of right may be difficult to establish because many courts do not have a clear definition of the
concept
The exclusive-possession element demands that the owner
and the adverse possessor never had concurrent ownership.**
This requirement solidifies the adverse possessor's claim of continuous possession and evidences an intent to exercise dominion
over the land to the exclusion of all others.
Under the last element of adverse possession, continuity,
the possessor cannot allow any significant interruptions of his
possession before the statutory period runs. What constitutes a
significant interruption depends on the nature of the land.*4 If
an adverse possessor transfers his interest to another before the
period of limitations has run, "tacking" allows the new possessor
to add the time of his possession to that of his predecessor and
use the aggregate to satisfy the statutory period.** To successfully invoke tacking, there must be privity between transferor
and transferee, and the transfer must be made with a document
showing color of title.**
The second form of adverse possession, short-term adverse
possession, has much the same requirements as long-term ad20. Oiwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587 (Utah 1982); R POWELL, supra note 8,1 1013.
21. Perm v. Ivey, 615 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1980); R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.7,
at 760.
22. R POWELL, supra note 8, % 1015, at 1091.
23. Raftopouloa v. Monger, 656 P2d 1308, 1311 (Colo. 1983); Diuria v. Kucharik,
164 Colo. 278, 282, 434 P.2d 414, 416 (1967); see R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, { 11.7, at
762.
24. R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.7, at 763.
25. See R POWELL, supra note 8,1 1021.
26. See generally Warren, A Problem in "Tacking," 88 U PA. L REV 897 (1940).
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verse possession, with the differences ot a shortened limitation
period and the special requirement that the adverse possessor
either pay the property taxes before the legal owner,*7 or base
his claim on a document (which boosts the claim to one made
under color of title)." If the possessor pays the taxes or has
color of title and satisfies all the requirements of long-term adverse possession for a shorter statutory period—usually five to
seven years—he receives title to the land.
Short-term adverse possession was probably created as an
incentive to pay taxes." But it also creates an incentive to take
land by adverse possession. Because one must procure a tax
description from the assessor's office in order to pay land taxes,
one is likely to become aware that he is not the legal owner of
land he possesses. One who thus learns that he is on land to
which he has no legal title may deliberately try to take it
through short-term adverse possession.30
One who possesses land for a long period without having legal title, but believing he is the actual owner, is unlikely to think
of procuring a tax description in order to pay taxes on the
land.*1 The tract that he wrongfully possesses will probably lie
next to his own, and he will think that he is already paying taxes
on it. Consequently, such a person rarely takes land by shortterm adverse possession. Furthermore, boundaries between
propertiesjre probably seldom^ettled under the short-term adverse possesgionjtequkeraeat^f paying taxes. Therefore, the ra27. See Montgomery, The Adverse Possession of Land Titles in Utah, 3 UTAH L
REV 294, 310 (1953). Currently, nine states have shortened statutes of limitations for
cases where taxes are paid, in addition to their long-term statutes. ALA. CODE § 6-5-200
(1977); ARIZ. REV STAT. ANN § 12-525 (1982); Awe STAT. ANN. § 37-102 (1962) (possession not required); COLO. REV STAT. § 38-41-108 (1982); III. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, paras.
13-107, -109 (Smith-Hurd 1984); S D CODIFIED LAWS ANN § 15-3-15 (1984); TEX. Crv.
PRAC. & REM CODE ANN § 16.025 (Vernon 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.28.070

(1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.27 (West 1983).
28. States which have shortened statutes of limitations for cases involving color of
title include the following: ALA. CODE § 6-5-200 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.050 (1983);
ARIZ REV STAT ANN § 12-523 (1982); and NC. GEN. STAT § 1-38 (1983). Some states
require color of title for longer adverse possession also. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 2801-08 (1974).
29. See Montgomery, supra note 27, at 313.
30. A few states allow shortened statutes of limitations for color of title claims. See
supra note 28. These statutes also require affirmative action by the possessor, thus
preventing anyone from adversely possessing land not included in his deed description
but within his physical boundary.
31. See Herrmann v. Woodell, 107 Idaho 916, 919-20, 693 P.2d 1118, ! 121-22 (1985);
Piatt v. Martinez, 90 N.M. 323, 324, 563 P.2d 586, 587 (1977).
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tionale behind long-term adverse possession of providing additional titl^^surance does/not: J*PpljMto_jhort-term adverse
posseision.
Utah is one of the _few states that, does not have long-term
adverse possession,31 though it does have short-term adverse
possession. However, since short-term adverse possession does
not help resolve boundary disputes, Utah property owners must
look to other methods of resolving such disputes and providing
better title assurance.
B.

Prescriptive Easements

The doctrine of prescriptive easements is another method
whereby one can obtain rights to the land of another without the
owner's permission.8* The prescriptive easement is a judicial
doctrine based on the statute of limitations. It was created at
about the same time as adverse possession and operates in much
the same manner.84 The requirements for a prescriptive easement also resemble those of adverse possession. One can obtain
a prescriptive easement by showing that a particular use of land
has been "open and notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and under claim of right."8*
A crucial difference between the doctrines of adverse possession and prescriptive easement is that the former gives title
to land while the latter confers only a right to use it in a specific
way.8* Therefore, the doctrine will not serve to settle boundary
disputes as does long-term adverse possession.87 The prescriptive easement does, however, serve to settle disputes over the
use of land.
C. Boundary Dispute Doctrines
Boundary dispute doctrines8* were created to resolve recur32. See supra note 15.
33. See R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 8.7; R POWELL, supra note 8,1 413.
34. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
35. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 994 (1981); see also supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
36. R POWELL, supra note 8, 1 413, at 555.
37. Another reason why the doctrine of prescriptive easements is insufficient for settling boundary disputes is that a disputed tract will rarely be used for a specific purpose
for the prescribed length of time. In most cases, the use of a disputed tract is construed
as possession rather than a use and therefore does not qualify for a prescriptive easement See R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 8.7, at 452.
38. See R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.8.
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ring problems encountered in trying to fix boundaries between
adjoining property owners. Adjoining landowners often suffer
from incorrectly marked boundaries or unclear deed descriptions. Three separate doctrines have been developed to resolve
such questions. These include: (1) boundaryJby^greerneiit, (2)
boundary by .acquiescence, and (3) estoppel/* All of these principles share similar policy foundation^ wKich are to promote efficient use of property, to reduce litigation, to establish a status of
repose, to remove stale claims, and to avoid the necessity of producing evidence of events from the distant past.40
J. Boundary by agreement
The theoretical bases of boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence are similar but not identical. The differences are important in defining the elements of each of these
boundary resolution rules. Boundary by agreement is premised
on a contractual theory,41 whereas boundary by acquiescence,
though it has some of the same elements, is founded on public
policy considerations similar to the justifications for adverse
possession.41
The elements of an enforceable boundary by agreement are
(1) an agreement (2) between adjoining landowners, (3) settling
a boundary that was uncertain or in dispute, and (4) executed
by actual location of a boundary line.43 In addition to these requirements, many courts, including Utah,44 require mutual acceptance for a long period of time, typically the same length of
time required for long-term adverse possession.4* As commentators have pointed out,46 the stated requirement that the boundary set by agreement must have existed for a long period of time
effectively removes a major distinction between boundary by
agreement and boundary by acquiescence. In theory at least,
39. See generally Browder, supra note 3. This article remains the best exploration
of these boundary doctrines.
40. See, e.g., Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979).
41. See Comment, Built-up Boundaries, supra not* 3, at 293-96.
42. Oisen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 425, 511 P.2d 145,147 (1973).
43. Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 24, 232 P.2d 202, 206 (1951); R CUNNINGHAM,
supra not* 7, § 11.8, at 766-68; Browder, supra not* 3, at 490-95; Note, Boundaries by
Agreement and Acquiescence in Utah, 1975 UTAH L REV 221, 221.
44. Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792, 794 (Utah 1975).
45. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra not* 7, § 11.8, at 767.
46. Note, supra note 43, at 222-23.
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there should be no general time requirement in boundary by
agreement.
The boundary by agreement doctrine requires that the
boundary agreement be in writing to comply with the Statute of
Frauds because it involves the transfer of title to land.47 To the
degree the boundary is set on a line that differs from the recordtitle line, one of the parties gains title to an additional parcel of
land at the expense of the other. Yet most boundary-by-agreement situations involve only an oral understanding. To preserve
oral agreements, some courts have indulged in the fiction that,
because there is uncertainty, the agreement merely defines the
actual boundary rather than transferring land from one party to
another.4* Professor Browder justifies this fiction by arguing that
boundary agreements are essentially in a unique category in
which public policy should support a deviation from traditional
contractual rules such as the Statute of Frauds. Courts, he indicates, have appropriately argued that boundary agreements are
akin to arbitration agreements and are therefore not subject to
the Statute of Frauds.49
Another contractual requirement—that the agreement be
supported by consideration—is satisfied by the dispute-or-uncertainty requirement. Each party by agreeing on a boundary
surrenders its right to assert its position in a more formal context. The compromise position reached "does not create new
rights, but only establishes existing ones."50
The legal difficulties associated with boundary by agreement are troubling, but seldom defeat the doctrine's application.
Th^major q t e t e ^
boundary by agreement.51 As mentioned above, most agreements
made to settle boundaries are oral. Given the "long period of
time" requirement in Utah, there is little chance that the original owners who made the agreement are still in possession of the
land. Therefore, it is unlikely that they will be available to testify as to the agreement. Even assuming that the original parties
are available, it is unlikely that they could remember the alleged
47. See Comment, Built-up Boundaries, supra note 3, at 293-94.
48. See, e.g., Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 25, 232 P.2d 202, 206-07 (1951).
49. Browder, supra note 3, at 490-93. The requirement of dispute or uncertainty it
necessary to justify this analogy because there cannot be arbitration without a dispute.
50. Id. at ,491.
51. See Stith v. Williams, 227 Kan. 32, 35, 605 P.2d 86, 89 (1980); Huggans v. Weer,
189 Mont. 334, 337-38, 615 P.2d 922, 924-25 (1980).
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agreement. And if the original parties are still in possession, the
party adversely affected by the agreement may not want to admit that he made it. These problems have led the courts to create the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
2. Boundary by acquiescence
According to many courts, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is an extension of boundary by agreement. These
courts presume an agreement once the elements of boundary by
acquiescence are satisfied.63 Generally, those elements are: (1)
occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by monuments,
fences, or buildings, and (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a
boundary, (3) for a long period of time (4) by adjoining landowners.53 Because it does not require an agreement, this doctrine
does not have the same contractual underpinnings as boundary
by agreement. Boundary by acquiescence is actually akin to a
prescriptive theory in which rights are created by operation of
law. Thus, it is not necessary in boundary by acquiescence to
show satisfaction of contractual consideration requirements, and
the Statute of Frauds does not pose a problem.*4 Rather, the
doctrine is based on certain policy considerations which are illustrated by the Utah Supreme Court in Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co., where the court said that boundary by acquiescence is based on the policy
that the peace and good order of society require that there be
stability . . . in the ownership and occupation of lands . .
[B]oundary lines which have been long established and accepted by those who should be concerned should be left undisturbed in order to leave at rest matters which may have resulted in controversy and litigation . . . .M
Because of the differences between these two doctrines, it is not
necessary to prove the boundary was established by the parties
as the result of a dispute or uncertainty.
As shown above, boundary by agreement and by acquiescence have several important differences and are based on differ52.
53.
2d 282,
note 4,
54
55.
224.

See Brown, 120 Utah at 25, 232 P.2d at 20?.
See Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979); Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah
284, 421 P.2d 944, 946 (1966); see also Recent Developments in Utah Law, supra
at 193-94.
See Comment, Built-up Boundaries, supra note 3, at 300
29 Utah 2d 421, 425, 511 P.2d 145, 147 (1973); see also Noi# mpui iiotp I at
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ing rationales. However, because the requirements of these two
boundary resolution doctrines are so similar in some respects,
the courts have often confused their elements.54 Utah courts
provide a good example of such confusion in boundary disputes.
The best case to illustrate this confusion is Madsen v. Clegg.*7 It
is a particularly important case because it was the first of recent
cases to make reference to dispute and uncertainty in determining whether boundary by acquiescence applied.5* Until Madsen,
the strong opinion of Justice Wolfe in the 1951 case of Brown v.
Milliner had adequately illuminated that dispute and uncertainty were not necessary elements of the acquiescence doctrine:
In some of the opinions of this court on the subject of disputed
boundaries, there are statements to the effect that the location
of the true boundary must be uncertain, unknown or in dispute
before an agreement between the adjoining land owners fixing
the boundary will be upheld, citing Tripp v. Bagley in support
t h e r e o f . . . . But the Tripp case does not require a party relying upon a boundary which has been acquiesced in for a long
period of time to produce evidence that the location of the true
boundary was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. That the
true boundary was uncertain or in dispute and that the parties
agreed upon the recognized boundary as the dividing line will
be implied from the parties' long acquiescence.5*
In Madsen, the court failed to understand this language
when it said that "[t]he doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
has long been recognized, and when the location of the true
boundary between adjoining tracts of land is unknown, uncertain or in dispute, the owners thereof may, by parol agreement,
establish the boundary line . . . ."60 The court further reasoned
that an agreement is implied from acquiescence, therefore requiring uncertainty or dispute.61
The jcourt in Madsen describes acquiescence in terms of
boundary by agreement, failing to see the major difference between the two doctrines. Boundary by agreement requires an express agreement "between the parties. Since this doctrine is
56.
567-68.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.8, at 768; Note, In Deed!, supra note 4t at
639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981).
Id. at 729.
Brown, 120 Utah at 27» 232 P.2d at 208 (citation omitted).
639 P.2d at 728.
Id. at 729-30.
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based on contract law, the agreement can be defeated if there is
a failure of consideration. If actual knowledge of the boundary
situation exists, the consideration of the party gaining the land
fails because he exchanged nothing, not even a nagging uncertainty, to establish the boundary. Therefore, uncertainty or dispute is a necessary element of boundary by agreement. Boundary by acquiescence includes the requirement of acquiescence in
a marked boundary for a long period of time. This element is
defeated if the parties had knowledge of the true boundary, because in that case there is no acquiescence. Since this doctrine is
based on the operation of law—on the policy of setting boundaries on an equitable basis—uncertainty or dispute is not needed
to fulfill the requirements of contract law. The court in Madsen
apparently thought these requirements were interchangeable."
In Halladay v. Cluff, three years after Madsen v. Cluff, the
court drew on the language of Madsen in explicitly requiring uncertainty as an element of boundary by acquiescence.63 The
opinion in Halladay, with its new requirement, drastically
reduces the availability of boundary by acquiescence. The court
set an objective standard for uncertainty or dispute, requiring,
for example, that deeds be inconsistent or that surveyors disagree on the true boundary.*4 This, of course, places on property
owners the financial burden of getting their land surveyed. The
burden is likely to be particularly noticeable when the land is
transferred, since title insurance does not cover an incorrectly
placed boundary.
3

Estoppel

Under certain facts, a boundary may be established by the
acts or representations of the original titleholder. Even if the
record title describes a different boundary line, detrimental reliance on the title owner's misstatements of the boundary location
may give rise to a boundary by estoppel. If the true owner of the
62. Id at 730.
63. Halladay, 685 P.2d 500, 504-05 (Utah 1984). Though Justice Howe concurred in
Madsen, 639 P.2d at 730 (Howe, J., concurring), he'later explained in his dissenting
opinion in Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 (tJtah 1984) (Howe, J., dissenting),
that he "regarded the reference in [Madsen] to uncertainty and dispute as surplusage,
and directed to cases where a boundary is fixed by an express parol agreement as distinguished from a case of boundary by acquiescence/' For that reason, he explained, he
**only concurred in the result m that case M Id.
64. 685 P.2d at 505-06.

968

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1986

property knows that his neighbor is making improvements that
will abut an existing fence line which the parties have erroneously considered as the actual boundary line, then the true
owner may later be estopped from asserting a boundary claim
that shows the true line running through his neighbor's newly
constructed building. The elements of boundary by estoppel are:
(1) representations by the true owner that the mutually accepted line is the true boundary; (2) reasonable reliance by the
neighbor on those representations; and (3) substantial costs detrimentally incurred by the neighbor. In most cases, the true
owner must have known that his representations were erroneous
or must have been grossly negligent in making them. A court
with its equity powers can, because of the estoppel, quiet title in
the neighbor.
Other equitable grounds may exist for fixing a different
boundary than the one which the record description would establish. For instance, the Utah Supreme Court recently used the
equitable doctrine of reformation of a deed to change the record
boundary line to correspond with the boundary line intended by
the parties to the conveyance.6*
II.

APPLICATION OP THE LAW

The full impact of Utah's relatively drastic departure from
prior decisions regarding the dispute-or-uncertainty requirement
in the boundary by acquiescence context is best illustrated by
applying the above boundary resolution approaches used in
other jurisdictions to the facts of a recent Utah case. This exercise will show that the Utah Supreme Court has left a major gap
in its recognition of rights to property held for long periods of
time.
A. The Facts
The fact situation we shall apply comes from a Utah case
predating the recent flurry of cases in which the Utah Supreme
Court established its novel approach. Brown v. Peterson Development Co.," decided in 1980, involved a large strip of land,
seventy feet by 969 feet. Since before 1925, an old fence had
been the practical boundary between the adjoining properties.
65. Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P 2d 360 (Utah 1984).
66. 622 P2d 1175 (Utah 1980)
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Plaintiffs' land lay immediately to the west of the fence. However, their record title, according to a survey made in 1973, ended seventy feet west of the old fence. Plaintiffs and their predecessors had "occupied, possessed and used the land included in
the disputed strip for more than 40 years."*7 Defendants' land,
on the east side of the fence, was divided into three parcels. The
description of parcel one, on the north, overlapped the eastern
twenty-six feet of the disputed strip. The forty-four feet of land
between parcel one and the plaintiffs' land was not covered by
any deed. Parcel two, in the middle, had two descriptions, the
first overlapping the disputed strip by two feet, and the other
reaching all the way to the eastern border of the plaintiffs'
description. The third parcel, on the south, ended at the old
fence. Land between the plaintiffs' description and parcels two
and three was also not covered by any deed." No evidence is
given to show that taxes were paid by either party, but it can be
presumed that each party paid taxes for the land described in its
deed and that no one paid taxes on the land not covered by any
deed.
The court ruled in Brown that the plaintiffs had good title
to the disputed strip because their predecessors in interest had
established title "by operation of law under the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence."0 The opinion offers, however, no
analysis of the traditional elements of boundary by
acquiescence.
One unfamiliar with Utah law might immediately inquire
why this fact situation was litigated under boundary by acquiescence and did not justify application of the more common doctrine of adverse possession. The answer is that Utah_does not
have a long-term adverse possession jloctrine descended from
the original common law. Twenty years of possession is not sufficient to establish aHverse-possession,titleJn .JJtah.™ The claimants could "only "have qualified^undetJJtah's shortened sevenyear adverse possession rule, and this requires payment of taxes
foTseven consecutive years.71 The difficulty with this approach,
however, is that property tax assessments are always based on
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 1176-77.
Id. at 1177.
Id.
See Montgomery, supra note 27, at 301, 310.

71. UTAH CODE ANN § 78-12-12 (1953).
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the record metes-and-bounds description.71 Thus, only the party
who possesses under some document including the same description used by the county property tax assessment records can obtain property by short-term adverse possession.7*
Several commentators have pointed out that some states
which apply adverse possession restrictively appear to compensate by applying boundary by acquiescence more liberally.74
Utah law prior to Halladay v. Cluff fits into this pattern. The
payment-of-taxes requirement has transformed many claims
that would be treated under the doctrine of adverse possession
in other states to a claim relying on one of the boundary-resolution doctrines in Utah. For that reason, Utah has far more
boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence cases
than other jurisdictions in which this fact situation would be a
typical adverse possession case.
B.

The Application

The following is an analysis of each boundary dispute doctrine as applied to the facts of Brown.
1. Adverse possession
Under the long-term adverse possession a successful plaintiff must show the fulfillment of the five requirements listed
above. Since the disputed strip was "occupied, possessed, and
used . . . for more than forty years" by the plaintiffs, and the
defendants did not interfere,75 the actual, open and notorious,
exclusive, and continuous possession requirements are apparently satisfied by the facts of Brown.
The hostility requirement is not so easily satisfied. Hostility
usually means possession without the permission of one legally
72. The lack of a long-term adverse possession doctrine may also create problems
where valuable improvements have been made in the disputed area by the nonprevailing
party. In Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981), the court affirmed the lower
court's order requiring plaintiff to reimburse defendant for the fair value of the shed and
fruit trees placed on the property by defendant unless plaintiff decided to remove them
rather than use them. Utah, like many states, has a so-called betterments statute to
govern the situation where improvements are made by a possessor who later loses a title
dispute regarding the property on which the improvements were made. UTAH CODE ANN.
I 57-6-3 (1986).
73. See Montgomery, supra note 27, at 310-11.
74. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN. REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE AND DEVELOP-

MENT 138 (2d ed. 1981).

75. Brown v. Peterson Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Utah 1980).
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entitled to possession.7* The facts of Brown do not indicate
whether there was permission. Thus, some jurisdictions would
find claimants' position inadequate to establish title by adverse
possession. These jurisdictions place the burden of showing hostility on the plaintiff, thus they might find that the claimants'
state of mind was not hostile through the full twenty-year period.77 If the fence had been regarded all along as the actual
boundary line that fit the claimants' record title description or if
there was no explanation for the possession, then plaintiff could
not show that he had the requisite hostile intent required for
title by adverse possession.
However, other jurisdictions hold that adverse-possession
claimants should be allowed the benefit of a presumption that
an otherwise unexplained possession by one who does not have
record title is a hostile act under the requirements of adverse
possession.™ In a court that follows this rule, the defendant
would have to show permission. *
A question remains as to the land in Brown that was not
covered by any deed. Apparently neither party ever had legal
title to that portion of the property. Although the defendants
are not the proper party from whom to seek title to that land,
possession by plaintiffs should be sufficient to establish title by
adverse possession against the title owner, whoever that is (presumably a prior grantor who never succeeded in conveying away
the full strip). Because the plaintiffs paid no taxes on the unclaimed strip, they cannot get title to it through short-term adverse possession. In some states, however, (including California)
proving that no one else paid taxes on the land satisfies the tax
requirement in short-term adverse possession situations.7* If
that rule were applied to the facts in Brown, the plaintiffs would
get only the land not covered by any deed. Of course, the plaintiffs would not get all the land up to the old fence unless another
doctrine justifying such taking applies, but some land is better
than none.
In summary, there is a fundamental difference between adverse possession and boundary by agreement. Adverse possession is based on a philosophy of a hostile claimant taking the
76.
77.
78.
79.
(1981).

See supra text Accompanying notes 20-21.
See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 11.7, at 761.
Id. at 760.
Gilardi v. Hailam, 30 Cal. 3d 317, 326, 636 P.2d 588, 593, 178 Cal. Rptr. 624, 629
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land from the owner of record. Boundary by agreement is based
on an actual agreement. In adverse possession cases, there is no
agreement because the claimant establishes the boundary without the consent of the other landowner. In fact, proof of an
agreement would negate the hostility element necessary to show
adverse possession. Conversely, there is no hostility requirement
in either boundary-by-agreement or boundary-by-acquiescence
cases. Notwithstanding this fundamental difference, most
boundary dispute claimants in Utah are forced into the boundary resolution doctrines because adverse possession doctrines are
unavailable.
2.

Prescriptive easement

Attempting to apply the Brown facts to the prescriptive
easement doctrine will not produce the results desired by most
property owners. Applying the doctrine will not quiet title in the
person in possession;*0 it will merely give that person a right to
use the land in a specific manner. In Brown, the plaintiff's predecessors used the land only for farming. There were no particular lanes of ingress or egress. It is unlikely, however, that any
court will construe farming as a mere use as opposed to possession of the land.91 Even if a court did, that use is not a viable
option for plaintiffs since the disputed tract and the adjoining
tracts are too small for farming.81 Therefore the doctrine of prescriptive easements does not resolve the boundary dispute.
3. Boundary dispute doctrines
a. Boundary by agreement. This brings us to the application of these facts to the boundary dispute resolution doctrines.
To satisfy the requirements of boundary by agreement, the
plaintiff must show that there was uncertainty or dispute about
the actual boundary (which assumes that the property of the
parties is adjoining), and that the parties agreed to set the
boundary at a particular place.83 These requirements can rarely
be satisfied and are therefore seldom litigated. In Brown, there
is no evidence of any communication between the parties. Thus,
boundary by agreement fails.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
See R CUNNINGHAM, supra note 7, § 8.7, at 452.
Brown v. Peterson Dev. Co., 622 P 2d 1175, 1177 (Utah 1980).
See supra text accompanying note 43.

957]

LOCATION OF BOUNDARIES

973

b. Boundary by acquiescence. Boundary by acquiescence is
similar to boundary by agreement Nevertheless, it works
through the operation of law rather than through private agreement.14 The four traditional requirements for boundary by acquiescence are (1) occupation up to a_yisible line marked definitely by monuments, fences^jorJbuildJngs» (2) acquiescence in
thelinejisJheJboundary (3) for a long periodjand (4) by adjomingTandownersJlLSince there is no contractual basis!Jbhis doctnne has traditionally presumed agreement by the parties and
therefore has not required dispute or uncertainty. The courtlh
BrowJiHeteTmined without discussion that all the requirements
of boundary by acquiescence were easily met.*
But Brown may have been decided differently in Utah had
it arisen after Halladay v. Cluff. The traditional doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence does not apply after Halladay because the claimants may have had difficulty showing the newly
required element of uncertainty or dispute at the time the fence
was erected.17 There is no discussion of this element in Brown,
but because thelence was so old, it is highly unlikely that evidence jcould have been found to~ illuminate the circumstances
jurrounding the initial, construction^of the~fence. Under traditional boundary-by-acquiescence reasoning, an agreement was
implied from the fact that the fence had been erected and was
allowed to serve as the practical boundary between the properties for such a long time. Now, however, Utah courts require an
objective showing that the implied agreement grew out of a dispute or uncertainty as to"thcTproper location of theboundary.
The "claimants probablyjwould be unable to carry tfris burden of
proof. They would in essence have to establish the same factors
that are required in a boundary-by-agreement case^ which jnore
than likely would be_ impossible.*1 The end result would be to
award the seventy-foot disputed strip of property to the party
whose record title covered the disputed area—the reverse of
Brown's result
84. See supra text accompanying note 41.
85. See supra test accompanying note 53.
86. Brown v. Peterson Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Utah 1980).
87. See supra text accompanying note 51 (discussing evidence).
88. The court in Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah 1984), said that the
dispute arose when a survey was made. This implies that the dispute requirement will be
satisfied when parties acquiesce in a boundary for the required time after a survey shows
a boundary different from the boundary acquiesced in. That kind of reasoning, however,
contradicts the requirement that the true boundary must not be known by the parties.
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c. Estoppel. Since the defendant in Brown apparently made
no actual representations to the plaintiff, the doctrine of estoppel would be held inapplicable to the facts of that case.
III.

SURVEY OF CASES

The Utah Supreme Court has decided Joiir^njboundary..
cases in the past severuyears.8* In this section, four of these
cases are considered as representative of different categories: (1)
claims that might have satisfied the general adverse possession
requirements in other states, but were not recognized in Utah
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence; (2) claims that
met the earlier requirements for boundary by acquiescence in
Utah but would not meet the stricter doctrine announced in
Halladay u. Cluff; (3) claims following the Halladay decision
that satisfy boundary by acquiescence requirements; and (4)
claims following Halladay that were recognized on a theory of
equitable reformation of deeds because they would not qualify
under the new acquiescence requirements. By looking at the
cases chronologically, we gain a perspective of the immediate
context from which the new Halladay requirement evolved and
the problem it has created.
In looking at each case we will consider what the result
would have been if (1) Utah had an alternative adverse-possession doctrine eliminating the necessity of tax payments by the
claimant; (2) the pre-Halladay approach to the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence had not been changed; and (3) the additional requirement that boundary by acquiescence arise from a
dispute or objective uncertainty were applied.
A.

Claims That Failed Under the Pre-Halladay Approach

In Hales v. Frakes,90 the parties argued over a strip of land
two rods wide lying between the record title boundary on the
north and an old fence line on the south. Plaintiff owned prop89. These include Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984); Stratford, 689
P.2d at 360; Halladay v.~UIun7685 P 2d 500 (Utah 1984); Wood v. Myrup, 681 P7R 1255
(Utah 1984); Condas v. Willesen, 674 P.2d 115 (Utah 1983); Leor^v. Dansje, 639 P.2d 730
(Utah 1981);Ttfadsen_v. Clegg, 639 P 2d 726 (Utah 1981); Eddington v. CJegg, 639 P.2d
143 (Utah 198rTTGoo<fman v. Wilkinson, 629 P 2d 447 (Utah 1981); Brown v. Peterson
Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1980); Park v. Farnsworth, 622 P.2d 788 (Utah 1980);
Monroe v. Harper, 619 P.2d 323 (Utah 1980); Neeley v^Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah
1979);"and Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979).
90. 600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979).
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erty to the north of the strip in question. Record title to the
disputed strip was owned by defendant. The trial court refused
to accept plaintiff's claim that she was entitled to the disputed
property under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Essentially, the court found that the fence had been built to keep
cattle from entering plaintiff's property to the north. The fence
was placed two rods south of the true boundary line because a
road was to be built to join an already-existing four-rod wide
road to the west. The fence line was the continuation of a fence
that ran along the south side of the road on the property to the
west of the disputed strip. Based on these facts, the supreme
court agreed that plaintiff had not established boundary by acquiescence because the parties had never intended the fence to
be the boundary line.*1
This case would probably have turned out the same both
before and after Halladay v. Cluff. After Halladay. there would
probably have been a second element missing. Because the fence
had been built prior to 1933 by a common owner before the
larger tract had been subdivided, the boundary was not established to settle a dispute or an uncertainty.
The plaintiff in Hales may, however, have been able to satisfy the requirements of adverse possession if there were a statute of limitations retaining the common-law approach requiring
a twenty-year period of possession but making no mention of
property tax payments.** Certainly the time period here would
91. Id. at 560. For a case where a possessor failed to establish boundary by acquiescence because a line intended to be a boundary was not marked by monuments, see
Monroe v. Harper, 619 P.2d 323 (Utah 1980). The boundary between the parties' parcels
in Monroe was set in an old survey and marked with a row of stakes. After the line was
set, the disputed tract was in the possession of the plaintiff who developed it with a road
and an orchard. Approximately 25 years after the old survey, the defendant, who owned
the land on the north, had a new survey made and found the true boundary to be about
17 feet south of the old line. Sometime between the time these surveys were made, the
stakes placed during the old survey disappeared.
The supreme court ruled for the defendant based on one of the elements required
for boundary by acquiescence—"occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by
monuments, fences, or buildings."* Id. at 325. The court construed this prerequisite
strictly, noting that the trees and gravel roadway, though placed within the disputed
strip, were not located on the boundary line.
*
Obviously the parties knew where the old boundary was marked. Nevertheless,
through strict construction of the requirement, the court in effect created the same result
as in Halladay. The parties in Monroe were forced to rely on the deed description despite continuous possession for 25 years.
92. Another case where 20-year adverse possession may have been satisfied but for
the tax requirement is Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979). In Neeley, a dispute
over a seven-acre tract of land involved the doctrine of adverse possession but none of
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have been sufficient; the defendant did nothing to interfere with
plaintiff's or her predecessor's use of the property until 1974
when defendant tore downf the fence that had been constructed
in 1933. It is unclear, however, whether sufficient adverse hostility and other elements required for adverse possession could be
met Apparently the defendant did not use the property north of
the fence line during that time. If the plaintiff did and that possession was uninterrupted, it is possible that the case would
have come out in the plaintiffs favor—the reverse of the actual
result
B.

Claims That Succeeded Under the Pte-Halladay
Approach

Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment CoV was a quiet title
action involving a boundary dispute between parties owning
property on either side of the Provo River. The defendants received an eighty-acre tract of land on the west side of the river
in 1883. Their deed described the middle of the river as the easterly boundary of their tract The plaintiffs received their land
east of the river three years later. Theirs was also an eighty-acre
tract, but the deed described the tract by metes and bounds.
The westerly boundary was a straight line that crossed the river
at a bend and invaded the land described in the plaintiffs'
deed.*4
The basis for the plaintiffs' suit was the Marketable Record
Title Act** Under this Act, the plaintiffs' deed would have negated any prior deed. The court ruled, however, that the Marketable Record Title Act did not apply because it was superseded by the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.** The court
the boundary doctrines. The trial court's ruling in favor of the defendant landowners was
reversed under the doctrine of adverse possession. Because defendants had never paid
taxes on the disputed parcel, the requirements of adverse possession had not been satisfied although defendants apparently convinced the trial court that other requirements
for adverse possession had been fulfilled. Id. at 982. Here a party who had used and
possessed a tract of land for more than 20 years without interruption or objection from
the record owner was forced into court and ended up losing his claim to the property. If
Utah had a 20-year statute of limitations for adverse possession claims, this case would
probably have been decided differently. The policy behind both statutes of limitations
and adverse possession in reducing conflict and cutting down on litigation was frustrated
in this case.
93. 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973).
94. Id. at 423-24, 511 P.2d at 146-47.
95. Id. at 424-25, 511 P.2d at 147; see UTAH CODE ANN § 57-9-1 to -10 (1986).
96. Olsen, 29 Utah 2d at 426, 511 P.2d at 148.
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held that when a dispute about boundaries between properties
arises, and a physical boundary has been acquiesced in for a long
period of time, the conflict is presumed to be reconciled.*7 Although a dispute like the one required in Halladay existed, it
was probably not a determining factor. The case would have
come out the same with or without dispute, for uncertainty is
traditionally presumed to exist when there is long acquiescence
in the boundary.
In most cases of boundary by acquiescence, a fence is built
or a line otherwise marked for some unknown reason by an earlier occupant of the land. The actual boundary is subsequently
destroyed for one reason or another and the subsequent owners
acquiesce in the new boundary. In such a case, there will be uncertainty so long as there is no survey of the land. The Halladay
case takes away this type of uncertainty by presuming knowledge if a survey is possible. Therefore, the requirement effectively precludes boundary by acquiescence in Utah unless there
is a defect or mistake showing uncertainty on the deeds themselves rather than in the minds of the parties.
Olsen is perhaps the only case in Utah Jhat ^would have
clearly~come ourthe"samirbo^^
?"d-*ft*r Mnllndny -The
reason for this JSjfclfttiJhg rnmmrm grantor in Jly>_1 ftffinj^H^ a
mistake on the deeds which created uncertainty and dispute. No
conduct on the part of the parties could have created uncertainty in the location of the boundary.
C. Claims That Fail Under the Post-Halladay Approach
A prime example of a boundary-by-acquiescence case where
a party lost after Halladay but would have won before is Stratford v. Morgan** In 1951, plaintiffs bought a 4.77 acre tract next
to Big Cottonwood Creek to farm as a hobby. Shortly thereafter,
the plaintiffs built a fence along the river. They treated the land
as their own, using it without interruption until 1979.
In 1979, the plaintiffs had the land surveyed and found that
the actual boundary zig-zagged across their fence and created
two disputed parcels of land on the plaintiffs' side of the river.
The plaintiffs then presented defendant with quitclaim deeds
for the disputed parcels. The defendant refused to sign them.
97 Id at 425, 511 P 2d at 147.
98 689 P 2d 360 (Utah 1984).
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Plaintiffs then initiated a quiet title action to get title to the
land."
*
The court held that the plaintiffs did not establish boundary by acquiescence because there was no uncertainty or dispute
as to the true boundary, since a survey was available to the parties.100 All the other elements of boundary by acquiescence were
satisfied. There was insufficient dispute because the dispute did
not start until the 1979 survey was made.101 As in Olsen, nothing
the plaintiff could have done would get the disputed parcels
through any of the boundary resolution doctrines because the
deeds accurately set forth the boundaries. The plaintiffs were
therefore forced to give up the land that they had used for
twenty-eight years.
D. Claims That Succeed Under the Post-Halladay Approach
Another approach used by the court since the Halladay decision may provide a judicial alternative to claimants who previously would have relied on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. That approach is to permit reformation of a deed in order
to allow one occupying up to a visible fence to quiet title to the
disputed parcel even though a survey showed the actual description in the recorded deeds fell short of the fence. In Hottinser v.
Jensen,10* decided three months after Halladay, the court igTicretTThe parties' arguments regarding boundary by acquies99. Id. at 361-62.
100. For another case dealing with post-Halladay boundary by acquiescence, see
Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984). In Parsons, both parties claimed a strip
of land that was about five feet wide and 340 feet long. Title to this strip was quieted in
the plaintiffs' predecessors in 1939. Defendant, the wrongful possessor, also acquired his
Und to the west of the plaintiffs' by warranty deed in 1972, and received a quitclaim
deed for the disputed strip dated 1957. Since at least 1957, a fence existed, running in a
straight line from north to south starting at the dividing line on the south and serving as
the boundary. The fence, which placed the disputed strip on the defendant's side, existed in part until the dispute arose.
Both parties paid taxes on the property from 1967 to 1976. Plaintiffs paid first in six
of those years, and in the other three years, both parties paid on the same day with no
record of who paid first
The trial court quieted title in the defendant based on boundary by acquiescence.
The supreme court then reversed. Boundary by acquiescence failed because there was no
uncertainty or dispute and because it was unclear whether the long time requirement
was satisfied. Justice Howe dissented because the court did not look at all the facts
showing the length of possession. Furthermore, he disagreed with the court's use of uncertainty or dispute as a requirement of boundary by acquiescence.
101. 689 P.2d at 363-64; see also supra note 88.
102. 684 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1984).
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cence. Instead, defendant successfully obtained reformation of
the deecTto quiet title in her name.
Defendant and her husband acquired the land in 1945 as
part of a fifteen-acre parcel. They divided the property in 1958,
keeping only the parcel which contained their home, yard, and
garden. The larger parcel that they transferred to new grantees,
according to the stipulated facts, was intended to be separated
from the defendant's home property by an existing fence. After
two further transfers of the larger parcel under the same mutual
understanding as to the intended boundary line, plaintiffs obtained the property in 1973. Plaintiffs claimed there were no
representations made to them that tHe fence was tEe boundary
UneTFinally, in 1980, plaintiffs learned from a survey* thai defendant had been using a ninety-foot strip north of the fence
line that was described in the deed as plaintiffs9 property. The
actualjiescription brought the boundary line to within_aJew feet.
of defendant's house. At that time plaintiffs tore down the previously erected fence, built a new one at the line described in the
deed, and brought suit to quiet title to the disputed area. De^
fendant's counterclaim asked for reformation of the deed and ti^ayigteiJnjigiiiame^^
The court ruled in defendant's favor, ordering reformation
of the deed and quieting title in defendant. Plaintiffs were not
able to prevent reformation of the deed because they were
deemed to have inquiry notice of the mistake in the original
deed descriptions which negated their claim to be bona fide purchasers without notice. The notice arose from possession and obvious use of the property by defendant and the existence of the
fence both before and after plaintiffs' purchase.104
The facts of this case would satisfy general long-term adverse possession requirements, but lack of tax payments by the
defendant prevented her from gaining title by adverse possession under Utah's short-term adverse possession statute. It also
appears that the time period between 1958 and 1980 would have
been sufficient to satisfy the time requirements to establish
boundary by acquiescence. The other elements required prior to
Halladay would also have been met. However, the requirement
of objective uncertainty probably would not have been satisfied,
so boundary by acquiescence would not have been available af103. Id. at 1272-73.
104. Id, it 1273-74.

980

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1986

ter Halladay.10* Asurvey, the very means by which the discrepancy between the record boundary description and the existing
fence line was discovered} is a determinative factor inMalladay's
objective uncertainty requirement10*
The court could have determined that actions commenced
and tried before Halladay would be decided free of the newly
adopted prerequisite for application of boundary by acquiescence by refusing to give Halladay retroactive effect. It was unnecessary to reach that issue, however, because the case provided a sufficient alternative basis for decision.
The reformation-of-deed approach may be suitable in several other boundary dispute situations. However, in the typical
case the original grantor or grantee of the deed first incorporating the challenged description will not be a party in the law suit.
Evidence and proof sufficient to permit a court to order reformation of a deed would be difficult if not impossible to discover.
The understandings and intentions regarding boundary lines are
generally not easy to reconstruct107 These realities regarding the
difficulty of accurately deciphering events from the distant past
are part of the theoretical basis for prescriptive theories. Acts by
the parties, in the form of long-term, uninterrupted possession,
are better and more reliable forms of evidence as to the intent of
the parties regarding the practical location of boundaries.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The best solution to theJLJtah scheme of..protection.ioiLpar:
ties in long-jterm possession^oCproperty Js_ jiot to tinker_with
boundary-by:jicquie.SiQfence^pcinciples_but to amende the_statej5
adverse-possession rules.I0* The state should retain its current
105. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
106. See Halladay v. duff, 685 P.2d 500, 507 (Utah 1984).
107. See Neeley v. Kelach, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979). In Neeley, a similar issue of
mutual mistake was argued. In that case, although the original parties were present, the
Utah Supreme Court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of
mutual mistake which would justify the ruling that the original deed to defendants
should be reformed to include the disputed tract
A similar problem arises in boundary by agreement. See supra text accompanying
note 51.
108. A bill proposed in the 1987 General Session of the Utah Legislature attempt to
overturn the effect of Halladay v. Cluff. Senate Bill No. 120, Boundary By Acquiescence,
adding UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-40a-l to -5. The bill introduces a distinction between a
"marked boundary" and the "actual boundary'*. A marked boundary may become the
basis for a quiet title action if:
(1) the marked boundary has been in place for 20 years or more;

957]

LOCATION OF BOUNDARIES

981

seven-year statute of limitations based on payment of property
taxes. In addition, however, the legislature should adopt an alternative statute of limitations requiring a longer period—up to
a maximum of twenty years—for claims that cannot qualify for
the shorter seven-year period.
This approach is the appropriate means of protecting" per^
sons in possession as quickly as is reasonably possible"109 in the
limitation porio3irVro^
'Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the curative and limitation provisions of the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act.110 It is significant that this Act, which is designed to
strengthen and streamline record titles generally,111 nonetheless
liberally enforces the rights of persons in possession. Yet, the
Utah Supreme Court, when faced with the same competing policies—record title compared to rights springing from long-term
possession—leaned heavily in the other direction in order to
strengthen the position of record title and the recording system
generally. This attention to record title is too legalistic because
it ignores generations of deference to the practical realities represented by the unchallenged possessory conduct of another
The Utoh^§^j^ime,CQurt.has eliminatedjeur-impottaALdoctrine in its arsenaL for reaching equitable results incases based
on possession.111 It may not be fiHly^saSsBeSPwith ^he announced principles and the apparently inconsistent results flowing from the old doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. But that
liberality in applying this boundary doctrine was justified because it was the last route of escape for a party that had exercised significant possessory claims to property for substantial
periods of time.11*
^ ™
The state legislature should recognize the unfortunate situation that has "now been created. It should be willing to close the
(2) there is no evidence that during the 20-year period any of the owners of the
properties adjoining the marked boundary ever asserted that the marked
boundary was other than the actual boundary; and
(3) all owners have used their properties only up to the marked boundary during the 20-year period.
Id. at § 78-40a-2.
109. UNIFORM SIMPLIFICATION or LAND TRANSFSBS ACT $ 3-404 comment (1977).

110. Id. i 3-404.
111. See id prefatory note.
112. See Halladay v. Cluff, 6S5 P 2d 500, 514-15 (Utah 1984) (Howe, J., dissenting)
(An appendix lists cases supporting the old boundary-by-acquiescence doctrine.).
113. Id. at 509.
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hole thatjta own unreasonable limitation j)iustatutes of limitations has created. It should provide a statutory means of blocking a record title owner who has been less than diligent in protecting his rights in the face of another's possessory activities.
There appears to be no special reason why the age-old right to
perfect adverse possession title should be limited to claimants
who pay property taxes on the disputed property. Boundary-dispute cases in particular make the tax payment requirement unreasonable.114 There should be a residuary statute of limitations
for a longer period of time to cover all those claimants who do
not qualify for any shortened time period. Payment of taxes and
making claims under color of title are justifiable grounds for giving a claimant special treatment by allowing a shorter possessory
period,116 but Utah's approach to statutes of limitations is inadequate if it does not cover parties who fit into one of the shortened time periods.

